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Abstract
Today’s distributed systems are becoming increasingly complex, due to the ever-growing number of network
devices and their variety. The complexity makes it hard for system administrators to correctly configure
distributed systems. This motivates the need for effective analytic tools that can help ensure correctness of
distributed systems.
One challenge in ensuring correctness is that there does not exist one solution that works for all properties.
One type of properties, such as security properties, are so critical that they demand pre-deployment
verification (i.e., static analysis) which, though time-consuming, explores the whole execution space.
However, due to the potential problem of state explosion, static verification of all properties is not practical,
and not necessary. Violation of non-critical properties, such as correct routing with shortest paths, is tolerable
during execution and can be diagnosed after errors occur (i.e., runtime analysis), a more light-weight approach
compared to verification.
This dissertation presents STRANDS, a declarative framework that enables users to perform both pre-
deployment verification and post-deployment diagnostics on top of declarative specification of distributed
systems. STRANDS uses Network Datalog (NDlog), a distributed variant of Datalog query language, to
specify network protocols and services. STRANDS has two components: a system verifier and a system
debugger. The verifier allows the user to rigorously prove safety properties of network protocols and services,
using either the program logic or symbolic execution we develop for NDlog programs. The debugger, on the
other hand, facilitates diagnosis of system errors by allowing for querying of the structured history of network
execution (i.e., network provenance) that is maintained in a storage-efficient manner.
We show the effectiveness of STRANDS by evaluating both the verifier and the debugger. Using the verifier,
we prove path authenticity of secure routing protocols, and verify a number of safety properties in software-
defined networking (SDN). Also, we demonstrate that our provenance maintenance algorithm achieves
significant storage reduction, while incurring negligible network overhead.
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group
Computer and Information Science
First Advisor
Boon Loo
Second Advisor
Steve Zdancewic
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2220
Keywords
Declarative language, Distributed system, Logic, Provenance, Verification
Subject Categories
Computer Sciences
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2220
UNIFYING STATIC AND RUNTIME ANALYSIS
IN DECLARATIVE DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
Chen Chen
A DISSERTATION
in
Computer and Information Science
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2017
Supervisor of Dissertation Co-Supervisor of Dissertation
Boon Thau Loo Limin Jia
Professor Assistant Research Professor
Computer and Information Science Electrical & Computer Engineering
Carnegie Mellon University
Graduate Group Chairperson
Lyle Ungar
Professor
Computer and Information Science
Dissertation Committee
Steve Zdancewic (Chair), Professor of Computer Science
Andre Scedrov, Professor of Mathematics and Computer Science
Andreas Haeberlen, Associate Professor of Computer Science
Wenchao Zhou, Assistant Professor of Computer Science (Georgetown University)
UNIFYING STATIC AND RUNTIME ANALYSIS
IN DECLARATIVE DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
c© COPYRIGHT
2017
Chen Chen
To Ling Ding, my love.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This dissertation would not have been possible without the support and help of my advisors,
committee members, collaborators, friends and family, who I would like to thank for their
company and advice from the bottom of my heart.
First and foremost I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Boon Thau Loo, and my
co-advisor, Professor Limin Jia (Carnegie Mellon University), who I closely collaborate with
throughout my graduate life. Boon has been an extremely supportive advisor since my first
day at the University of Pennsylvania. It is a privilege for me to work with Boon, whose
passion for research is contagious. Boon is always actively involved my projects, whether
it be providing insights into problems or evaluating the proposed solution. Boon also offers
me comprehensive training in terms of programming, paper writing and oral presentation
by working side-by-side with me throughout the development of research projects.
Though Limin advises me remotely, such collaboration never makes her help and advice any
less. Limin patiently guided me through the first few years of my Ph.D life, when I gradually
figured out, under her supervision, the initial research direction of applying formal methods
to networking. This topic eventually turned into my dissertation. Limin also teaches me
how to find, evaluate and tackle a problem in a systematic way, not to mention that she
also gave tremendous help in improving my paper writing and experimental evaluation.
I am also very grateful for my dissertation committee members: Professor Steve Zdancewic,
Professor Andre Scedrov, Professor Andreas Haeberlen, and Professor Wenchao Zhou. Steve
is the committee chair for both my dissertation work and WPE-II examination, and provides
constructive advice regarding my research orientation, write-up and presentation. Andre is
always patient and cares much about the progress of my dissertation. Andreas has been
extremely helpful in evaluating my dissertation research and providing insightful and im-
portant feedback to my dissertation. Wenchao is actually more than a committee member.
In fact, Wenchao has been actively engaged in all my Ph.D projects and serves more like
iv
an unofficial advisor. I learned a lot from Wenchao, through his advice, comments and his
achievement as a professor.
I also want to express my sincere gratitude to all the collaborators. Sangeetha A.Jyothi
was the first graduate student I collaborated at Upenn. She helped me understand the
implementation of declarative programming languages quickly by answering almost all the
questions I asked. Hao Xu is another graduate student I was lucky to collaborate with.
Hao is an expert in C++ programming language, without whom I could not have been
able to implement the demo for declarative SBGP so quickly. I also would like to thank
Cheng Luo for implementing SCION with me and documenting all the experiments. Harshal
Tushar Lehri joined the provenance project and was of tremendous help when evaluating
our proposed solution. Our collaboration extended even after the paper was accepted. Lay
Kuan Loh is an very important collaborator as well. We worked together for three years
on two different projects. Her help with system implementation and proof of theorems
was indispensable and I much appreciate her efforts and contribution to the work in this
dissertation. Another person that I want to especially thank is Changbin Liu, who was
my mentor during my internship at AT&T Labs Research. Changbin opened the door to
Python for me, and worked side-by-side with me during that enjoyable three-month period
at AT&T. In addition, I woud like to thank Suyog Mapara, Chen Zhu, Anupam Alur, Sibi
Vijayakumar for contributing a lot to the work in this dissertation.
I am also lucky to make a lot of friends at Upenn. They are: Behnaz Arzani, Arthur Azevedo
de Amorim, Saeed Abedi, Ang Chen, Loris D’Antoni, Yi Ge, Harjot Gill, Justin Hsu, Kai
Hong, Radoslav Ivanov, Zhihao Jiang, Junyi Li, Xi Lin, Fei Miao, Gang Song, Xujie Si,
Yifei Yuan, Zhepeng Yan, Dong Lin, Antonis Papadimitriou, Mukund Raghothaman, Nicu
Stiurca, Nikos Vasilakis, Anduo Wang, Shaohui Wang, Yang Wu, Yinjun Wu, Zhiwei Wu,
Meng Xu, Hongbo Zhang, Jianzhou Zhao, Mabel Zhang, Menglong Zhu, Mingchen Zhao,
Nan Zheng, Qizhen Zhang, Yi Zhang, Zhuoyao Zhang, Xin Zhang.
Last but not the least, I want to thank my parents for their unrelenting support and
v
sacrifice during my pursuit of Ph.D. Without their understanding this journey could have
been much harder. I am also extremely happy to have the company of Yang Li and Qianru
Jia throughout my Ph.D life, who I always view as close family members.
Finally I dedicate this dissertation to my lovely girlfriend Ling Ding, who supports me and
my work with her whole heart from the first day we met. My achievement is unimaginable
without her continuing love and encouragement.
This dissertation is supported by the following funding: NSF CNS-1218066, NSF CNS-
1117052, NSF CNS-1018061, NSF CNS-0845552, NSF ITR-1138996, NSF CNS-1115706,
FA9550-12-1-0327, NSF CNS-1453392, NSF CNS-1513679, NSF CNS-1065130, NSF CNS-
1513961, NSF CNS-1513734, AFOSR MURI ’Science of Cyber Security: Modeling, Com-
position, and Measurement’ and AFOSR Young Investigator award.
vi
ABSTRACT
UNIFYING STATIC AND RUNTIME ANALYSIS
IN DECLARATIVE DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
Chen Chen
Boon Thau Loo
Limin Jia
Today’s distributed systems are becoming increasingly complex, due to the evergrowing
number of network devices and their variety. The complexity makes it hard for system
administrators to correctly configure distributed systems. This motivates the need for
effective analytic tools that can help ensure correctness of distributed systems.
One challenge in ensuring correctness is that there does not exist one solution that works for
all properties. One type of properties, such as security properties, are so critical that they
demand pre-deployment verification (i.e., static analysis) which, though time-consuming,
explores the whole execution space. However, due to the potential problem of state explo-
sion, static verification of all properties is not practical, and not necessary. Violation of
non-critical properties, such as correct routing with shortest paths, is tolerable during exe-
cution and can be diagnosed after errors occur (i.e., runtime analysis), a more light-weight
approach compared to verification.
This dissertation presents STRANDS, a declarative framework that enables users to per-
form both pre-deployment verification and post-deployment diagnostics on top of declar-
ative specification of distributed systems. STRANDS uses Network Datalog (NDlog), a
distributed variant of Datalog query language, to specify network protocols and services.
STRANDS has two components: a system verifier and a system debugger. The verifier
allows the user to rigorously prove safety properties of network protocols and services, us-
ing either the program logic or symbolic execution we develop for NDlog programs. The
vii
debugger, on the other hand, facilitates diagnosis of system errors by allowing for querying
of the structured history of network execution (i.e., network provenance) that is maintained
in a storage-efficient manner.
We show the effectiveness of STRANDS by evaluating both the verifier and the debugger.
Using the verifier, we prove path authenticity of secure routing protocols, and verify a
number of safety properties in software-defined networking (SDN). Also, we demonstrate
that our provenance maintenance algorithm achieves significant storage reduction, while
incurring negligible network overhead.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Distributed systems today are playing an ever more important role in supporting a variety
of services, such as distributed file systems [38]. As a result, failure in a distributed system
is costly, especially for those that provide mission-critical services. Despite the importance
of system correctness, it is difficult to manually ensure that a distributed system oper-
ates as expected, because a typical distributed system today has large scale (i.e., millions
of servers), contains heterogeneous devices (e.g., routers, switches and middleboxes) and
changes configuration frequently (e.g., due to virtual machine migration).
In light of this, researchers have proposed a variety of approaches to help network admin-
istrators and researchers analyze distributed systems. One branch of work applies static
analysis to distributed systems to verify properties that are expected to hold during system
execution ([56][9][47][50][13]). Static analysis requires the analyst to formally specify the
system in question, and use techniques such as model checking [8], theorem proving [14],
and symbolic execution [51] to rigorously analyze the desired properties of the specification.
Static analysis could unveil design flaws before they manifest themselves at runtime, which
could lead to undesirable and even disastrous consequences.
On the other hand, static analysis is not the panacea for system failure, for several reasons.
First, static analysis has no guarantee over unproven properties. Certain properties (e.g.,
security guarantee) may not even occur to the analyst when he/she is designing the system.
Second, a proven property could still be violated during runtime, due to bugs in low-level
software (e.g., compilers) and hardware (e.g., processors). Last but not the least, static
analysis is more suitable for an environment where system policies and configuration are
relatively static. A dynamic environment – e.g., a distributed system with frequent virtual
machine migration – changes so rapidly that the result of static analysis could become
1
outdated soon after verification is completed.
To overcome the deficiency of static analysis, network administrators also need tools to
help analyze distributed systems at runtime – i.e., monitoring the system, and, when the
system fails, identifying the root cause of the problem. For example, message logging [29] is
a typical runtime analysis technique that is widely used by network administrators. Also,
packet monitoring tools such as wireshark [1] are also popular in detecting abnormal traf-
fic in networks. There is work such as NetSight [43] that records the packet history as
well. Recently, the emergence of network provenance [95][92] has made it possible for net-
work administrators to query the complete derivation history of network events. Network
provenance captures the causal relationship among individual events in a network, even if
these events may occur on different network devices. Optimization also has been made to
maintain network provenance at low cost, such as only carrying the last-hop provenance
information during system execution (i.e., reference-based provenance maintenance [95]).
The problem with runtime analysis is its low coverage over the space of all possible system
execution traces. Subtle bugs, such as those caused by race conditions, may only happen
occasionally, making it hard for the user to identify the root cause simply by monitoring ex-
ecution traces. Furthermore, the overhead of enabling runtime analysis is high. To perform
system monitoring tasks, for example, a distributed system often needs to be instrumented
with monitoring software or hardware that inevitably interferes with normal execution. The
storage overhead required for maintaining system meta-data is also a concern. For instance,
in a distributed system where millions of packets are input every second, storing history (or
provenance) of all the packets takes up much storage space.
This dissertation intends to bridge the gap between static analysis and runtime analysis
through a unified declarative specification language – Network Datalog (NDlog) [54]. We
show that not only popular static analysis techniques such as theorem proving and sym-
bolic execution can be successfully applied to a distributed system modeled by NDlog, but
runtime analysis, such as storage-optimized network provenance, can be supported easily as
2
well. Furthermore, with the help of NDlog, we try to combine static analysis and runtime
analysis, so that they could complement each other in system verification and debugging.
An overview of the proposed framework – called STRANDS– can be found in Figure 1.
Oval nodes in Figure 1 represent input by the user, including the declarative specification
(i.e., NDLog programs) of distributed system and the properties to be verified. We choose
to use NDLog as our specification language for two reasons. First, it is shown that declar-
ative languages such as NDLog can specify a variety of network protocols concisely [55].
Second, NDLog is a specification language that allows for both verification and low-level
implementation. As a result, static and runtime analysis can be performed in a unified
framework.
The three shadow boxes represent the three components of this dissertation: (1) a program
logic for verifying security properties of secure routing protocols [18] (Chapter 3); (2) a static
analyzer of network protocols and services using symbolic execution of NDlog programs [23]
(Chapter 4); and (3) a storage-efficient provenance maintenance engine [22] (Chapter 5).
Specifically:
• A Hoare-style program logic is developed for verifying security properties of secure
routing protocols, such as Secure BGP (SBGP) [75]. To capture the security primitives
in those protocols, NDLog is enhanced with security-related user-defined functions
(e.g., symmetric/asymmetric encryption), to create a new programming language
SANDlog. The program logic is proved to be sound with regards to the semantics of
SANDlog. In the case study, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed logic
by formally proving the path authenticity property over two secure routing proposals:
SBGP and SCION [91].
• Though the program logic is effective in property verification, the manual proof process
with proof assistants (e.g., Coq [79]) could be tedious and time-consuming for network
administrators. Therefore, the second part of this dissertation aims at achieving
3
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Figure 1: The overall architecture of STRANDS that unifies static and runtime analysis of
distributed systems.
automation during static analysis of distributed systems. To do this, expressiveness
of the property specification language is limited – i.e., the properties to be proved
need to be specified in a restricted form of first-order logic. During verification,
the specified property is checked, with a few novel optimization, against all possible
execution traces of the distributed system. The execution traces are obtained through
symbolic execution of the NDLog program specifying the system. With the help of an
SAT solver, the verification process would further produce a counterexample when the
property fails to hold. In the case study, a number of properties about software-defined
networking applications are verified, with several subtle bugs identified.
• The third piece of this dissertation focuses on providing storage-efficient network
provenance for runtime analysis of distributed systems. Network provenance [95]
enables network administrators to query the execution history of network events. To
compress provenance, an equivalence relation for provenance trees is defined and each
equivalence class only maintains one concrete provenance copy that is shared by all
the members. The compression process is efficient, as it is proved that the equiva-
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lence of provenance trees could be identified by only examining the attributes of input
tuples. Such efficiency is attributed to the introduction of Distributed Event-driven
Linear Programs (DELP) – a constrained variant of NDLog programs – for modeling
network protocols and services. Our experiments of packet forwarding and DNS res-
olution showed that the compression scheme achieves low storage consumption, low
network overhead and low query latency.
Based on Figure 1, to perform analysis of a distributed system, a user first needs to specify
the system in NDLog or its variants (e.g., SANDlog or DELP). The specification is readily
subject to formal verification, either with the help of program logic or by symbolic execution.
If the property is verified as true, the user could further prove other desirable properties,
or execute the specification using a declarative networking engine (e.g., RapidNet [70]). If
verification fails, the framework would be able to generate counterexamples to help the
user identify and fix errors in the specification of either the program or the property. On
the other hand, The user could perform runtime analysis after execution – e.g., network
forensics or accountability – by querying the (compressed) provenance maintained by the
provenance engine.
The structure of the dissertation is as follows, we present the program logic in Chapter 3, and
show how to automatically verify safety properties of networking applications in Chapter 4.
We present compressed provenance for runtime analysis in Chapter 5. The related work
and the future work are summarized in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 respectively.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
We first provide the background of our unified specification language – Network Datalog
(NDlog) [54], and its operational semantics. In each individual piece of work, we extend
NDlog with a variety of features (e.g., security primitives) to cater to specific needs of
different applications.
2.1. Network Datalog
2.1.1. Syntax
NDlog’s syntax is summarized in Figure 2. A typical NDlog program is composed of a set
of rules, each of which consists of a rule head and a rule body. The rule head is a predicate,
or relation (we use predicate and relation interchangeably). A rule body consists of a
list of body elements which are either relations or atoms (i.e. assignments and inequality
constraints). The head relation supports aggregation functions as its arguments, whose
semantics will be introduced in Section 2.1.2.
Atom a ::“ x :“ t | t1 bop t2
Terms t ::“ x | c | ι | fp~t q | fcp~t q
Predicate pred ::“ ppagHq | ppagBq
Body Elem B ::“ ppagBq | a
Arg List ags ::“ ¨ | ags, x | ags, c
Rule Body body ::“ ¨ | body, B
Body Args agB ::“ @ι, ags
Rule r ::“ ppagHq :́ body
Head Args agH ::“ agB |@ι, ags, Fagrxxy, ags
Base tp rules b ::“ ppagHq.
Program progpιq ::“ b1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , bn, r1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , rk
Figure 2: Syntax of NDlog
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sp1 pathp@s, d, c, pq :́ linkp@s, d, cq, p :“ rs, ds.
sp2 pathp@z, d, c, pq :́ linkp@s, z, c1q, pathp@s, d, c2, p1q, c :“ c1` c2, p :“ z::p1.
sp3 bestPathp@s, d,minxcy, pq :́ pathp@s, d, c, pq.
Figure 3: A NDlog program for computing all-pair shortest paths
To support distributed execution, a NDlog program prog is parametrized over the node it
runs on. Each relation in the program is supposed to have a location specifier, written @ι,
which specifies where a relation resides and serves as the first argument of a relation. A rule
head can specify a location different from its body relations. When such a rule is executed,
the derived tuple is sent to the remote node represented by the location specifier of the head
tuple. We discuss the operational semantics of NDlog in detail in Section 2.1.2.
In Figure 3, we show an example program for computing the shortest path between each
pair of nodes in a network. s is the location parameter of the program, representing the
ID of the node where the program is executing. Each node stores three kinds of tuples:
linkp@s, d, cq means that there is a direct link from s to d with cost c; pathp@s, d, c, pq means
that p is a path from s to d with cost c; and bestPathp@s, d, c, pq states that p is the lowest-
cost path between s and d. Here, link is a base tuple, whose values are determined by the
concrete network topology. path and bestPath are derived tuples. Figure 3 only shows the
rules common to all network nodes. Rules for initializing the base tuple link depend on the
topology and are omitted from the figure.
In the program, rule sp1 computes all one-hop paths based on direct links. Rule sp2 ex-
presses that if there is a link from s to z of cost c1 and a path from s to d of cost c2, then
there is a path from z to d with cost c1+c2 (for simplicity, we assume links are symmetric,
i.e. if there is a link from s to d with cost c, then a link from d to s with the same cost
c also exists). The generated path tuple will be sent to z, as indicated by the head of sp2.
Finally, rule sp3 aggregates all paths with the same pair of source and destination (s and d)
to compute the shortest path. The arguments that appear before the aggregation denotes
the group-by keys.
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To execute the program, a user provides rules for initializing base tuples. For example, if
we would like to run the shortest-path program over the topology given in Figure 4, the
following rules will be included in the program. Rules rb1 lives at node A, rules rb2 and
rb3 live at node B, and rule rb4 lives at node C.
rb1 linkp@A,B, 1q. rb3 linkp@B,C, 1q.
rb2 linkp@B,A, 1q. rb4 linkp@C,B, 1q.
2.1.2. Operational Semantics
The operational semantics of NDlog adopts a distributed state transition model. Each node
runs a designated NDlog program, and maintains a database of derived tuples as its local
state. Nodes can communicate with each other by sending tuples over the network, which
is represented as a global network queue. The evaluation of the NDlog programs follows
the PSN algorithm [54], and updates the database incrementally. The semantics introduced
here is similar, except that we make explicit which tuples are derived, which are received,
and which are sent over the network. This addition is crucial to specifying and proving
protocol properties.
At a high-level, each node computes its local fixed-point by firing the rules on newly-derived
tuples. The fixed-point computation can also be triggered when a node receives tuples from
the network. When a tuple is derived, it is sent to the node specified by its location specifier.
Instead of blindly computing the fixed-point, we make sure that only rules whose body tuples
are updated are fired. The operational semantics also support deletion of tuples. A deletion
is propagated through the rules similar to an insertion.
More formally, the constructs needed for defining the operational semantics of NDlog are
presented below.
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A B C 
SA = {A,  
         ψA = { 
 (1,link(@A,B,1)), 
          (1,path(@A,B,1,[A,B])), 
          (1,bestPath(@A,B,1,[A,B]))} 
         UA = [], 
         progA = sp} 
 
SB = {B,  
         ψB = { 
 (1,link(@B,A,1)),   
 (1,link(@B,C,1)), 
             (1,path(@B,A,1,[B,A])),  
 (1,path(@B,C,1,[B,C])), 
           (1,bestPath(@B,A,1,[B,A])),  
              (1,bestPath(@B,C,1,[B,C]))} 
         UB = [],         progB = sp} 
 
SC = {C,  
         ψC = { 
 (1,link(@C,B,1)), 
          (1,path(@C,B,1)), 
           (1,bestPath(@C,B,1,[C,B]))} 
         UC = [], 
         progC = sp} 
 
Q = [+path(@A,C,2,[A,B,C]), +path(@C,A,2,[C,B,A])] 
cost = 1 cost = 1 
Figure 4: An Example Scenario.
Table Ψ ::“ ¨ |Ψ, pn, P q Network Queue Q ::“ U
Update u ::“ ´P | ` P Local State S ::“ pι,Ψ,U , progpιqq
Update List U ::“ ru1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , uns Configuration C ::“ QB S1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,Sn
Trace T ::“ τ0ÝÑ C1
τ1
ÝÑ C2 ¨ ¨ ¨
τn
ÝÑ Cn`1
We write P to denote tuples. The database for storing all derived tuples on a node is
denoted Ψ. Because there could be multiple derivations of the same tuple, we associate
each tuple with a reference count n, recording the number of valid derivations for that
tuple. An update is either an insertion of a tuple, denoted `P , or a deletion of a tuple,
denoted ´P . We write U to denote a list of updates. A node’s local state, denoted S,
consists of the node’s identifier ι, the database Ψ, a list of unprocessed updates U , and
the program prog that ι runs. A configuration of the network, written C, is composed of
a network update queue Q, and the set of the local states of all the nodes in the network.
The queue Q models the update messages sent across the network. Finally, a trace T is a
sequence of time-stamped (i.e. τi) configuration transitions.
Figure 4 presents an example scenario of executing the shortest-path program in Figure 3.
The network consists of three nodes, A, B and C, connected by two links with cost 1. Each
node’s local state is displayed right above the node. For example, the local state of the
node A is given by SA above it. The network queue Q is presented at the top of Figure 4.
In the current state, all three nodes are aware of their direct neighbors, i.e., link tuples are
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in their databases ΨA, ΨB and ΨC . They have constructed paths to their neighbors (i.e.,
the corresponding path and bestPath tuples are stored). The current network queue Q stores
two tuples: +path(@A,C,2,[A,B,C]) and +path(@C,A,2,[C,B,A]), waiting to be delivered to their
destinations (node A and C respectively). These two tuples are the result of running sp2
at node B. We will explain further how configurations are updated based on the updates
in the network queue when introducing the transition rules.
Top-level transitions. The small-step operational semantics of a node is denoted S ãÑ
S 1,U . From state S, a node takes a step to a new state S 1 and generates a set of updates U
for other nodes in the network. The small-step operational semantics of the entire system
is denoted C ÝÑ C1, where C and C1 respectively represent the states of all nodes along with
the network queue before and after the transition. Figure 5 defines the rules for system
state transition.
• Global state transition (C ÝÑ C1).
Rule NodeStep states that the system takes a step when one node takes a step. As
a result, the updates generated by node i are appended to the end of the network
queue. We use ˝ to denote the list append operation. Rule DeQueue applies when
a node receives updates from the network. We write Q1 ‘ Q2 to denote a merge of
two lists. Any node can dequeue updates sent to it and append those updates to the
update list in its local state. Here, we overload the ˝ operator, and write S ˝ Q to
denote a new state, which is the same as S, except that the update list is the result
of appending Q to the update list in S.
• Local state transition (S ãÑ S 1,U). Rule Init applies when the program starts
to run. Here, only base rules—rules that do not have a rule body—can fire. The
auxiliary function BaseOf (prog) returns all the base rules in prog. In the resulting
state, the internal update list (Uin) contains all the insertion updates located at ι,
and the external update list (Uext) contains only updates meant to be stored at a
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S ãÑ S 1,U
Uin “ r`p1p@ι,~t1q, ...,`pmp@ι,~tmqs rp1p@ι,~t1q, ¨ ¨ ¨ , pmp@ι,~tmqs “ BaseOfpprogq
pι,H, rs, progq ãÑ pι,H,Uin, progq, rs
Init
pUin,Uextq “ fireRulespι,Ψ, u,∆progq
pι,Ψ, u :: U , progq ãÑ pι,ΨZ u,U ˝ Uin, progq,Uext
RuleFire
C ÝÑ C1
Si ãÑ S 1i, U @j P r1, ns ^ j ‰ i, S 1j “ Sj
QB S1, ¨ ¨ ¨Sn ÝÑ Q ˝ U B S 11, ¨ ¨ ¨S 1n
NodeStep
Q “ Q1 ‘Q1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ‘Qn @j P r1, ns S 1j “ Sj ˝Qj
QB S1, ¨ ¨ ¨Sn ÝÑ Q1 B S 11, ¨ ¨ ¨S 1n
DeQueue
fireRulespι,Ψ, u,∆progq “ pUin,Uextq
fireRulespι,Ψ, u, rsq “ prs, rsq
Empty
fireSingleRpι,Ψ, u,∆rq “ pΨ1,Uin1,Uext1q fireRulespι,Ψ1, u,∆progq “ pUin2,Uext2q
fireRulespι,Ψ, u, p∆r,∆progqq “ pUin1 ˝ Uin2,Uext1 ˝ Uext2q
Seq
Figure 5: Operational Semantics
node different from ι. In this case, it is empty. Rule RuleFire (Figure 5) computes
new updates based on the program and the first update in the update list. It uses a
relation fireRules, which processes an update u, and returns a pair of update lists, one
for node ι itself, the other for other nodes. The last argument for fireRules, ∆prog,
transforms every rule r in the program prog into a delta rule, ∆r, for r, which we
explain when we discuss incremental maintenance. After u is processed, the database
of ι is updated with the update u (ΨZ u). The Z operation increases (decreases) the
reference count of P in Ψ by one, when u is an insertion (deletion) update `P (´P ).
The update list in the resulting state is augmented with the new updates generated
from processing u.
• Fire rules (fireRulespι,Ψ, u,∆progq “ pUin,Uextq). Given one update, we fire rules in
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the program prog that are affected by this update. Rule Empty is the base case where
all rules have been fired, so we directly return two empty sets. Given a program with
at least one rule (∆r,∆prog), rule Seq first fires the rule ∆r, then recursively calls
itself to process the rest of the rules in ∆prog. The resulting updates are the union of
the updates from firing ∆r and ∆prog.
Given the example scenario in Figure 4, at this moment node A dequeues the update
+path(@A,C,2,[A,B,C]) from the network queue Q at the top of Figure 4, and puts it into the
unprocessed update list UA (rule DeQueue). Node A then locally processes the update by
firing all rules that are triggered by the update, and generates new updates Uin and Uext. In
the resulting state, the local state of node A (ΨA) is updated with path(@A,C,2,[A,B,C]), and
UA now includes Uin. The network queue is also updated to include Uext (rule NodeStep).
Our operational semantics does not specify the time gaps between two consecutive re-
ductions and, therefore, does not determine time points as associated with a concrete
trace—such as C τÝÑ C1, where τ represents the time at which a concrete transition takes
place. Instead, a trace (without time points) generated by the operational semantics—e.g.,
C ÝÑ C1—is an abstraction of all its corresponding annotations with time points that satisfy
monotonicity. In our assertions and proofs, we use time points only to specify a relative
order between events on a specific trace, so their concrete values are irrelevant.
Incremental maintenance. Now we explain in more detail how the database of a node
is maintained incrementally by processing updates in its internal update list Uin one at a
time. Following the strategy proposed in declarative networking [54], the rules in a NDlog
program are rewritten into ∆ rules, which can efficiently generate all the updates triggered
by one update. For any given rule r that contains k body tuples, k ∆ rules of the following
form are generated, one for each i P r1, ks.
∆ppagHq :́ pν1pagB1q, ..., pνi´1pagBi´1q,∆pipagBiq, pi`1pagBi`1q, ..., pkpagBkq, a1, ..., am
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∆pi in the body denotes the update currently being considered. ∆p in the head denotes
new updates that are generated as the result of firing this rule. Here pνi denotes a tuple of
name pi in the database Ψ or the internal update list Uin. In comparison, pi (without ν)
denotes a tuple of name pi only in Ψ. For example, the ∆ rules for sp2 are:
sp2a ∆pathp@z, d, c, pq :́ ∆linkp@s, z, c1q, pathp@s, d, c2, p1q, c :“ c1` c2, p :“ z::p1.
sp2b ∆pathp@z, d, c, pq :́ linkνp@s, z, c1q,∆pathp@s, d, c2, p1q, c :“ c1` c2, p :“ z::p1.
Rules sp2a and sp2b are ∆ rules triggered by updates of the link and path relation respectively.
For instance, when node A processes +path(@A,C,2,[A,B,C]), only rule sp2b is fired. In this
step, pathν includes the tuple path(@A,C,2,[A,B,C]), while path does not. On the other hand,
linkν and link denote the same set of tuples, because Uin does not contain any tuple of name
link. The rule evaluation then generates +path(@B,C,3,[B,A,B,C]), which will be communicated
to node B and further triggers rule sp2b at node B. Such update propagates until no further
new tuples are generated.
Rule Firing. We present in Figure 6 the set of rules for firing a single ∆ rule given an
insertion update. We write Ψν to denote the table resulted from updating Ψ with the
current update: Ψν “ ΨZ u.
Rule InsExists specifies the case where the tuple to be inserted (i.e. qip~tq) already exists.
We do not need to further propagate the update. Rule InsNew handles the case where
new updates are generated by firing rule r . In order to fire a rule r , we need to map its
bodies to concrete tuples in the database or the update list. We use an auxiliary function
ρpΨν ,Ψ, r, i,~tq to extract the complete list of substitutions for variables in the rule. Here i
and ~t indicate that qip~tq is the current update, where qi is the ith body tuple of rule r. Every
substitution σ in that set is a general unifier of the body tuples and constraints. Formally:
(1) ~t “ σpagBiq,
(2) @j P r1, i´ 1s, D~s,~s “ σpagBjq and qjp~sq P Ψν
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fireSingleRpι,Ψ, u,∆rq “ pΨ1,Uin,Uextq
pn, qip~tqq P Ψ
fireSingleRpι,Ψ,`qip~tq,∆rq “ pΨ, rs, rsq
InsExists
∆r “ ∆pp@ι1, agsq :́ ¨ ¨ ¨ ,∆qipagBiq ¨ ¨ ¨
qip~tq R Ψ ags does not contain any aggregate
Σ “ ρpΨν ,Ψ, r, i,~tq Σ1 “ selpΣ,Ψνq U “ genUpdpΣ,Σ1, p,Ψνq
if ι1 “ ι then Ui “ U ,Ue “ rs otherwise Ui “ rs,Ue “ U
fireSingleRpι,Ψ,`qip~tq,∆rq “ pΨ,Ui,Ueq
InsNew
∆r “ ∆pp@ι, agsq :́ ¨ ¨ ¨ ,∆qipagBiq ¨ ¨ ¨ qip~tq R Ψ
ags contains an aggregate Fagr tσ1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , σku “ ρpΨν ,Ψ, r, i,~tq
Ψ1 “ ΨZ tpaggp@ι, σ1pagsqq, ¨ ¨ ¨ , paggp@ι, σkpagsqqu
Aggpp, Fagr,Ψ1q “ pp@ι, ~sq pp@ι, ~sq P Ψ
fireSingleRpι,Ψ,`qip~tq,∆rq “ pΨ1, rs, rsq
InsAggSame
∆r “ ∆pp@ι, agsq :́ ¨ ¨ ¨ ,∆qipagBiq ¨ ¨ ¨ qip~tq R Ψ
ags contains an aggregate Fagr tσ1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , σku “ ρpΨν ,Ψ, r, i,~tq
Ψ1 “ ΨZ tpaggp@ι, σ1pagsqq, ¨ ¨ ¨ , paggp@ι, σkpagsqqu
Aggpp, Fagr,Ψ1q “ pp@ι, ~sq
pp@ι, ~s1q P Ψ ~s and ~s1 share the same key but different aggregate value
fireSingleRpι,Ψ,`qip~tq,∆rq “ pΨ1, r´pp@ι, ~s1q,`pp@ι, ~sqs, rsq
InsAggUpd
∆r “ ∆pp@ι, agsq :́ ¨ ¨ ¨ ,∆qipagBiq ¨ ¨ ¨
qip~tq R Ψ ags contains an aggregate Fagr tσ1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , σku “ ρpΨν ,Ψ, r,~tq
Ψ1 “ ΨZ tpaggp@ι, σ1pagsqq, ¨ ¨ ¨ , paggp@ι, σkpagsqqu
Aggpp, Fagr,Ψ1q “ pp@ι, ~sq Epp@ι, ~s1q P Ψ
such that ~s and ~s1 share the same key but different aggregate value
fireSingleRpι,Ψ,`qip~tq,∆rq “ pΨ1, r`pp@ι, ~sqs, rsq
InsAggNew
Figure 6: Insertion rules for evaluating a single ∆ rule
14
(3) @j P ri` 1, ns, D~s,~s “ σpagBjq and qjp~sq P Ψ
(4) @k P r1,ms, σraks is true
We write ras to denote the constraint that a represents. When a is an assignment (i.e.,
x :“ fp~tq), ras is the equality constraint x “ fp~tq; otherwise, ras is a.
When multiple tuples with the same key are derived using a rule, a selection function sel
is introduced to decide which substitution to propagate. In NDlog run time, similar to a
relational database, a key value of a stored tuple pp~tq uniquely identifies that tuple. When
a different tuple pp~t1q with the same key is derived, the old value pp~tq and any tuple derived
using it need to be deleted. For instance, we can demand that each pair of nodes in the
network have a unique path between them. This is equivalent to designating the first two
arguments of path as its key. As a result, path(A,B,1,[A,B]) and path(A,B,2,[A,D,B]) cannot
both exist in the database.
We also use a genUpd function to generate appropriate updates based on the selected
substitutions. It may generate deletion updates in addition to an insertion update of
the new value. For example, assume that path(A,B,3,[A,C,D,B]) is in Ψν . If we were to
choose path(A,B,1,[A,B]) because it appears earlier in the update list, then genUpd returns
t`path(A,B,1,[A,B]),´path(A,B,3,[A,C,D,B])u. We leave the definitions of sel and genUpd ab-
stract here, as there are many possible strategies for implementing these two functions.
Aside from the strategy of picking the first update in the queue (illustrated above), another
possible strategy is to pick the last, as it is the freshest. Once the strategy of sel is fixed,
genUpd is also fixed. However, the only relevant part to the logic we introduce later is
that the substitutions used for an insertion update come from the ρ function, and that the
substitutions satisfy the property we defined above. In other words, our program logic can
be applied to a number of different implementation of sel and genUpd.
The rest of the rules in Figure 6 deal with generating an aggregate tuple. Rule InsAggNew
applies when the aggregate is generated for the first time. We only need to insert the
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new aggregate value to the table. Additional rules (i.e. InsAggSame and InsAggUpd) are
required to handle aggregates where the new aggregate is the same as the old one or replaces
the old one.
To efficiently implement aggregates, for each tuple p that has an aggregate function in its
arguments, there is an internal tuple pagg that records all candidate values of p. When there
is a change to the candidate set, the aggregate is re-computed. For example, bestpathagg
maintains all candidate path tuples.
We also require that the location specifier of a rule head containing an aggregate function
be the same as that of the rule body. With this restriction, the state of an aggregate is
maintained in one single node. If the result of the aggregate is needed by a remote node,
we can write an additional rule to send the result after the aggregate is computed.
Rule InsAggSame applies when the new aggregates is the same as the old one. In this case,
only the candidate set is updated, and no new update is propagated. Rule InsAggUpd
applies when there is a new aggregate value. In this case, we need to generate a deletion
update of the old tuple before inserting the new one.
Figure 7 summaries the deletion rules. When the tuple to be deleted has multiple copies,
we only reduce its reference count. The rest of the rules are the dual of the corresponding
insertion rules.
We revisit the example in Figure 4 to illustrate how incremental maintenance is performed
on the shortest-path program. Upon receiving +path(@A,C,2,[A,B,C]), ∆ rule sp2b will be trig-
gered and generate a new update +path(@B,C,3,[B,A,B,C]), which will be included in Uext as
it is destined to a remote node B (rule InsNew). The ∆ rule for sp3 will also be triggered,
and generate a new update +bestPath(@A,C,2,[A,B,C]), which will be included in Uin (rule
InsAggNew). After evaluating the ∆ rules triggered by the update +path(@A,C,2,[A,B,C]),
we have Uin “ t+bestPath(@A,C,2,[A,B,C])u and Uext “ t+path(@B,C,3,[B,A,B,C])u. In addi-
tion, bestpathagg, the auxiliary relation that maintains all candidate tuples for bestpath, is
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pn, qip~tqq P Ψ n ą 1
fireSingleRpι,Ψ,´qip~tq,∆rq “ pΨ, rs, rsq
DelExists
∆r “ ∆pp@ι1, agsq :́ ¨ ¨ ¨ ,∆qipagBiq ¨ ¨ ¨ p1, qip~tqq P Ψ
ags does not contain any aggregate tσ1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , σku “ selpρpΨν ,Ψ, r, i,~tq,Ψνq
U “ r´pp@ι1, σ1pagsqq, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,´pp@ι1, σkpagsqqs
if ι1 “ ι then Ui “ U ,Ue “ rs otherwise Ui “ rs,Ue “ U
fireSingleRpι,Ψ,´qip~tq,∆rq “ pΨ,Ui,Ueq
DelNew
∆r “ ∆pp@ι, agsq :́ ¨ ¨ ¨ ,∆qipagBiq ¨ ¨ ¨ p1, qip~tqq P Ψ
ags contains an aggregate Fagr tσ1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , σku “ ρpΨν ,Ψ, r, i,~tq
Ψ1 “ Ψztpaggp@ι, σ1pagsqq, ¨ ¨ ¨ , paggp@ι, σkpagsqqu
Aggpp, Fagr,Ψ1q “ pp@ι, ~sq pp@ι, ~sq P Ψ
fireSingleRpι,Ψ,´qip~tq,∆rq “ pΨ1, rs, rsq
DelAggSame
∆r “ ∆pp@ι, agsq :́ ¨ ¨ ¨ ,∆qipagBiq ¨ ¨ ¨ p1, qip~tqq P Ψ
ags contains an aggregate Fagr tσ1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , σku “ ρpΨν ,Ψ, r, i,~tq
Ψ1 “ Ψztpaggp@ι, σ1pagsqq, ¨ ¨ ¨ , paggp@ι, σkpagsqqu
Aggpp, Fagr,Ψ1q “ pp@ι, ~sq
pp@ι, ~s1q P Ψ ~s and ~s1 share the same key but different aggregate value
fireSingleRpι,Ψ,´qip~tq,∆rq “ pΨ1, r´pp@ι, ~s1q,`pp@ι, ~sqs, rsq
DelAggUpd
∆r “ ∆pp@ι, agsq :́ ¨ ¨ ¨ ,∆qipagBiq ¨ ¨ ¨ p1, qip~tqq P Ψ
ags contains an aggregate Fagr tσ1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , σku “ ρpΨν ,Ψ, r, i,~tq
Ψ1 “ Ψztpaggp@ι, σ1pagsqq, ¨ ¨ ¨ , paggp@ι, σkpagsqqu
Aggpp, Fagr,Ψ1q “ NULL
fireSingleRpι,Ψ,´qip~tq,∆rq “ pΨ1, r´pp@ι, ~s1qs, rsq
DelAggNone
Figure 7: Deletion rules for evaluating a single ∆ rule
also updated to reflect that a new candidate tuple has been generated. It now includes
bestpath(@A,C,2,[A,B,C]).
Discussion. The semantics introduced here will not terminate for programs with a cyclic
derivation of the same tuple, even though set-based semantics will. Most routing protocols
do not have such issue (e.g., cycle detection is well-adopted in routing protocols). Prior
work [63] has proposed improvements to solve this issue, which is not crucial for the sound-
ness of the proposed program logic.
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CHAPTER 3
Theorem Proving with Program Logic
In recent years, we have witnessed an explosion of services provided over the Internet. These
services are increasingly transferring customers’ private information over the network and
used in mission-critical tasks. Central to ensuring the reliability and security of these
services is a secure and efficient Internet routing infrastructure. Unfortunately, the Internet
infrastructure, as it stands today, is highly vulnerable to attacks. The Internet runs the
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), where routers are grouped into Autonomous Systems
(AS) administrated by Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Individual ASes exchange route
advertisements with neighboring ASes using the path-vector protocol. Each originating AS
first sends a route advertisement (containing a single AS number) for the IP prefixes it
owns. Whenever an AS receives a route advertisement, it adds itself to the AS path, and
advertises the best route to its neighbors based on its routing policies. Since these route
advertisements are not authenticated, ASes can advertise non-existent routes or claim to
own IP prefixes that they do not. These faults may lead to long periods of interruption of
the Internet; best epitomized by recent high-profile attacks [25, 67].
In response to these vulnerabilities, several new Internet routing architectures and proto-
cols for a more secure Internet have been proposed. These range from security extensions
of BGP (Secure-BGP (S-BGP) [49], ps-BGP [81], so-BGP [82]), to “clean-slate” Internet
architectural redesigns such as SCION [91] and ICING [60]. However, none of the proposals
formally analyzed their security properties. These protocols are implemented from scratch,
evaluated primarily experimentally, and their security properties shown via informal rea-
soning.
Existing protocol analysis tools [12, 27, 31] are rarely used in analyzing routing protocols
because they are considerably more complicated than cryptographic protocols: they often
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Figure 8: Architecture of a unified framework for implementing and verifying secure routing
protocols.
compute local states, are recursive, and their security properties need to hold on arbitrary
network topologies. As the number of models is infinite, model-checking-based tools in
general cannot be used to prove the protocol secure.
To overcome this limitation, STRANDS explores a novel proof methodology to verify these
protocols. First, STRANDS augments NDLog with cryptographic libraries to provide com-
pact encoding of secure routing protocols. We call our language SANDlog (stands for Se-
cure and Authenticated Network Datalog). We develop a program logic for reasoning about
SANDlog programs that execute in an adversarial environment. The properties proved
on a SANDlog program hold even when the program interact with potentially malicious
programs in the network.
Based on the program logic, we implement a verification condition generator (VCGen),
which takes as inputs the SANDlog program and user-provided annotations, and outputs
intermediary proof obligations as a Coq file, where proof can be filled. VCGen is integrated
into the SANDlog compiler, an cryptography-augmented extension to the declarative net-
working engine RapidNet [70]. The compiler is able to translate our SANDlog specification
into executable code, which is amenable to implementation and evaluation.
We summarize our technical contributions:
1. We define a program logic for verifying SANDlog programs in the presence of adver-
saries (Section 3.2). We prove that our logic is sound.
2. We implement VCGen for automatically generating proof obligations and integrate
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VCGen into a compiler for SANDlog (Section 3.3).
3. We encode S-BGP and SCION in SANDlog, verify path authenticity properties of
these protocols, and run them in simulation (Section 3.4).
3.1. SANDlog
We specify secure routing protocols in a distributed declarative programming language
called SANDlog. SANDlog inherits the expressiveness of NDLog, and is augmented with
security primitives (e.g. asymmetric encryption) necessary for specifying secure routing
protocols. The security primitives are encoded as user-defined functions in SANDlog pro-
grams. Figure 9 gives detailed explanation of these functions. Users can add additional
cryptographic primitives to SANDlog based on their needs.
We can construct a more secure variant of the shortest path protocol by deploying signature
authentication in the rules involving inter-node communications. For example, the following
rule sp2 1 is extended from rule sp2 in Figure 3 with inter-node communication encrypted.
sp2 1 pathp@z, d, c, p, sigq :́
linkp@s, z, c1q, pathp@s, d, c2, p1, sig1 q, c :“ c1` c2, p :“ z::p1,
pubKp@s, d, pkq, f verifypp1, sig1 , pkq “ 1, privKp@s, skq, sig :“ f signpp, skq.
In rule sp2 1, a signature sig for the path becomes an additional argument to the path tuple.
When node s receives such a tuple, it verifies the signature of the path f verifypp1, sig, pkq.
When s sends out a path to its neighbor, it generates a signature by assigning sig :“
f signpp, skq. Here f sign and f verify are user-defined asymmetric cryptographic functions,
Function Description
f sign asym(info, key) Create a signature of info using key
f verify asym(info, sig, key) Verify that sig is the signature of info using key
f mac(info, key) Create a message authentication code of info using key
f verifymac(info, MAC, key) Verify info against MAC using key
Figure 9: Cryptographic functions in SANDlog
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such as RSA.
The semantics of SANDlog is similar to that of NDLog. The execution of security primitives
is identical to user-defined functions in NDLog.
3.2. A Program Logic for SANDlog
To verify correctness of secure routing protocols encoded in SANDlog, we introduce a pro-
gram logic for SANDlog. The program logic enables us to prove program invariants—that
is, properties holding throughout the execution of SANDlog programs—even if the nodes
running the program interact with potential attackers, whose behaviors are unpredictable.
In our case study, we show that a large number of desirable properties of secure routing
protocols that we are interested in are safety properties and can be proved by introducing
appropriate programs’ invariant properties.
Attacker model. We assume connectivity-bound network attackers, a variant of the
Dolev-Yao network attacker model. The attacker can perform cryptographic operations
with correct keys, such as encryption, decryption, and signature generation, but is not al-
lowed to eavesdrop or intercept packets. This attacker model manifests itself in our formal
system in two places: (1) the network is modeled as connected nodes, some of which run
the SANDlog program that encodes the prescribed protocol and others are malicious and
run arbitrary SANDlog programs; (2) safety of cryptography is admitted as axioms.
Syntax. We use first-order logic formulas, denoted ϕ, as property specifications. The
atoms, denoted A, include predicates and term inequalities. The syntax of the logic formulas
is shown below.
Atoms A ::“ P p~tq@pι, τq | sendpι, tppP, ι1,~tqq@τ | recvpι, tppP,~tqq@τ
| honestpι, prog, τq | t1 bop t2
Formulas ϕ ::“ J |K |A |ϕ1 ^ ϕ2 |ϕ1 _ ϕ2 |ϕ1 Ą ϕ2 |  ϕ | @x.ϕ | Dx.ϕ
Variable Ctx Σ ::“ ¨ |Σ, x Logical Ctx Γ ::“ ¨ |Γ, ϕ
Predicate P p~tq@pι, τq means that tuple P p~tq is derived at time τ by node ι. The first
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Σ; Γ $ ϕ Σ; Γ, ϕ $ ϕ1
Σ; Γ $ ϕ1
Cut
ϕ P Γ
Σ; Γ $ ϕ
Init
Σ; Γ, ϕ $ ¨
Σ; Γ $  ϕ
 I
Σ; Γ $  ϕ
Σ; Γ, ϕ $ ¨
 E
Σ; Γ $ ϕ1 Σ; Γ $ ϕ2
Σ; Γ $ ϕ1 ^ ϕ2
^I
i P r1, 2s,Σ; Γ $ ϕ1 ^ ϕ2
Σ; Γ $ ϕi
^E
i P r1, 2s,Σ; Γ $ ϕi
Σ; Γ $ ϕ1 _ ϕ2
_I
Σ; Γ $ ϕ1 _ ϕ2 Σ; Γ, ϕ1 $ ϕ Σ; Γ, ϕ2 $ ϕ
Σ; Γ $ ϕ
_E
Σ, x; Γ $ ϕ
Σ; Γ $ @x.ϕ
@I
Σ; Γ $ @x.ϕ
Σ; Γ $ ϕrt{xs
@E
Σ; Γ $ ϕrt{xs
Σ; Γ $ Dx.ϕ
DI
Σ; Γ $ Dx.ϕ Σ, a; Γ, ϕra{xs $ ϕ1 a is fresh
Σ; Γ $ ϕ1
DE
Figure 10: Rules in first-order logic.
element in ~t is a location identifier ι1, which may be different from ι. When a tuple
P pι1, ...q is derived at node ι, it is sent to ι1. This send action is captured by predicate
sendpι, tppP, ι1,~tqq@τ . Correspondingly, predicate recvpι, tppP,~tqq@τ denotes that node ι has
received a tuple P p~tq at time τ . A user could determine send and recv tuples by inspecting
rules whose head tuple locates differently from body tuples. For example, the head tuple
pathp@z, d, c, pq in the rule sp2 of the shortest-path program (Figure 3) corresponds to a
tuple sendps, tpppath, z, pz, d, c, pqqq@t in our logic. honestpι, progpιq, τq means that node ι
starts to run program progpιq at time τ . Since predicates take time points as an argument,
we are effectively encoding linear temporal logic (LTL) in first-order logic [45]. The domain
of the time points is the set of natural numbers. Each time point represents the number of
clock ticks from the initialization of the system.
Logical judgments. The logical judgments in our program logic use two contexts: con-
text Σ containing all the free variables; and context Γ containing logical assumptions.
(1) Σ; Γ $ ϕ (2) Σ; Γ $ progpiq : ti, yb, yeu.ϕpi, yb, yeq
Judgment (1) states that ϕ is provable given the assumptions in Γ. Judgment (2) is an
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Σ; Γ $ progpiq : ti, yb, yeu.ϕpi, yb, yeq
@r P rlOfpprogq, pr “ hp~vq :́ p1p~s1q, ..., pmp~smq, q1p~u1q, ..., qnp~unq, a1, ..., akq
Σ; Γ $ @i,@t,@~y, p ~y “ fvprqq
ľ
jPr1,ms
ppjp~sjq@pi, tq^ϕpj pi, t, ~sjqq^
ľ
jPr1,ns
recvpi, tppqj , ~ujqq@t^ Ą ϕhpi, t, ~vq
ľ
jPr1,ks
rajs
@p P hdOfpprogq, ϕp is closed under trace extension
Σ; Γ $ progpiq : ti, yb, yeu.
ľ
pPhdOfpprogq
@t,@~x, yb ď t ă ye ^ pp~xq@pi, tq Ą ϕppi, t, ~xq
Inv
Σ; Γ $ ϕ
Σ; Γ $ progpiq : ti, yb, yeu.ϕpi, yb, yeq Σ; Γ $ honestpι, progpιq, tq
Σ; Γ $ @t1, t1 ą t, ϕpι, t, t1q
Honest
Figure 11: Rules in program logic
assertion about SANDlog programs, i.e., a program invariant. We write ϕp~xq when ~x are
free in ϕ. ϕp~tq denotes the resulting formula of substituting ~t for ~x in ϕp~xq. Recall that
prog is parametrized over the identifier of the node it runs on. The program invariant
is parametrized over not only the node ID i, but also the starting point of executing the
program (yb) and a later time point ye. Judgment (2) states that any trace T containing
the execution of a program prog by a node ι, starting at time τb, satisfies ϕpι, τb, τeq, for
any time point τe later than τb. Note that the trace could also contain threads that run
malicious programs. Since τe is any time after τb (the time prog starts), ϕ is an invariant
property of prog.
Inference rules. The inference rules of our program logic include all standard first-order
logic ones (e.g. Modus ponens), shown in Figure 10. Reasoning about the ordering between
time points are carried out in first-order logic using theory on natural numbers (in Coq, we
use Omega). We choose first-order logic because it is better supported by proof assistants,
23
such as Coq.
In addition, we introduce two key rules (Figure 11) into our proof system. Rule Inv proves
an invariant property of a program prog. The program invariant takes on a specific form
as the conjunction of all the invariants of the tuples derived by prog, and means that
if any head tuple is derived by prog, then its associated property should hold; formally:
@t,@~x, yb ď t ă ye ^ pp~xq@pi, tq Ą ϕppi, t, ~xq, where p is the name of the head tuple, and
ϕppi, t, ~xq is an invariant property associated with pp~xq. For example, p can be path, and
ϕppi, t, ~xq be that every link in argument path must have existed in the past. In the INV
rule, the function rlOf pprogq returns rules generating derivation tuples for a given program,
and the function fvprq returns all free variables in a given rule.
Intuitively, the premises of Inv need to establish that each derivation rule’s body tuples
and its associative invariants together imply the invariant of the rule’s head tuple. For each
derivation rule r in prog, we assume that the body of r is arranged so that the first m tuples
(i.e. p1p~s1q, ..., pmp~smq) are derived by prog, the next n tuples (i.e. q1p~u1q, ..., qnp~unq) are
received from the network, and constraints (i.e. a1, ..., ak) constitute the rest of the body.
For tuples derived by prog (i.e. pj ’s), we can safely assume that their invariants ϕpj hold
at time t. On the other hand, properties of received tuples (i.e. qj) are excluded from the
premises, as in adversarial environment, these messages are not trusted by default.
Each premise of the INV rule provides the strongest assumption that allows us to prove the
conclusion in that premise. In most cases, arithmetic constraints are enough for proving
the invariant. But in some special cases—for example, the invariant explicitly specifies the
existence of a received tuple—the predicate representing the action of a tuple receipt is
needed in the assumption. In other words, ϕpj is the inductive hypothesis in this inductive
proof. In our case study, we frequently need to invoke the inductive hypothesis to complete
the proof.
We make sure that each tuple in an SANDlog program is either derived locally or received
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from the network, but not both. For a program that violates this property, the user can
rewrite the program by creating a copy tuple of a different name for the tuple that can
be both derived locally or received from the network. For example, the path tuple in the
shortest-path program in Figure 3 could be both derived locally (rule sp1 ) and received from
a remote node (rule sp2 ). The user could rewrite the head tuple path in sp2 to recvPath to
differentiate it from path. In this way, the invariant property associated with the path tuple
can be trusted and used in the proof of the program invariant.
We also require that an invariant ϕp be closed under trace extension. Formally: if T (
ϕpι, t, ~sq and T is a prefix of T 1, then T 1 ( ϕpι, t, ~sq. For instance, the property that node ι
has received a tuple p before time t is closed under trace extension, while the property that
node ι never sends p to the network is not closed under trace extension.
We do not allow invariants to be specified over base tuples. The INV rule cannot be used
to derive properties of base rules (e.g., link), because the function rlOf pq only returns rules
for derivation tuples.
As an example, we use INV to prove a simple program invariant of the shortest-path program
in Figure 3. The property is specified as
ϕsp = progpxq : tx, yb, yeu.
p@t,@y,@c,@pt, yb ď t ă ye ^
pathpx, y, c, ptq@px, tq Ą
pDz, c1, linkpx, z, c1q@px, tq _
linkpz, x, c1@pz, tqqq ^
p@t,@y,@c,@pt, yb ď t ă ye ^
bestPathpx, y, c, ptq@px, tq Ą true
Intuitively, ϕsp specifies an invariant property for the path tuple, which says a path tuple
must imply a path tuple to/from the direct neighbor. ϕsp also assigns true as the invariant
property for bestPath tuples. The proof is established using INV (Figure 12). The whole
proof has three premises, each corresponding to a rule in the shortest-path program in
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Σ; Γ $ @s,@d,@c,@t,
plinkps, d, cq@ps, tq ^ p “ rs, dsq Ą
pDz, c1, linkps, z, c1q@ps, tq _ linkpz, s, c1q@pz, tqq
Σ; Γ $ @s,@d,@c1,@c2,@p1,@z,@t,
plinkps, z, c1q@ps, tq ^ recvps, tpppath, s, d, c2, p1qq@t ^
c “ c1` c2 ^ p “ z::p1q Ą
pDz2, c2, linkpz, z2, c2q@pz, tq _ linkpz2, z, c1q@pz2, tqq
Σ; Γ $ true
Σ; Γ $ ϕsp
Inv
Figure 12: Proof of ϕsp
Figure 3. For example, in the second premise corresponding to sp2, we include the local link
tuple and the received path as well as constraints in the assumption, while leaving out the
invariant property of the path tuple, because a received path tuple should not be trusted in
an adversarial environment.
The Honest rule proves properties of the entire system based on the program invariant. If
ϕpi, yb, yeq is the invariant of prog, and a node ι runs the program prog at time tb, then
any trace containing the execution of this program satisfies ϕpι, tb, teq, where te is a time
point after tb. SANDlog programs never terminate: after the last instruction, the program
enters a stuck state. The Honest rule is applied to honest principles (nodes) that execute
the prescribed protocols. The invariant property of an honest node holds even when it
interacts with other malicious nodes in the network, which is required by the soundness of
the inference rules, as explained below.
Soundness. We prove the soundness of our logic with regard to the trace semantics. First,
we define the trace-based semantics for our logic and judgments in Figure 13. Different from
semantics of first-order logic, in our semantics, formulas are interpreted on a trace T . We
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T ( P p~tq@pι, τq iff Dτ 1 ď τ , C is the configuration on T prior to time τ 1,
pι,Ψ,U , progpιqq P C, at time τ 1, pι,Ψ,U , progpιqq ãÑ pι,Ψ1,U 1 ˝ Uin, progpιqq,Ue,
and either P p~tq P Uin or P p~tq P Ue
T ( sendpι, tppP, ι1,~tqq@τ iff C is the configuration on T prior to time τ ,
pι,Ψ,U , progpιqq P C, at time τ , pι,Ψ,U , progpιqq ãÑ S 1,Ue and P p@ι1,~tq P Ue
T ( recvpι, tppP,~tqq@τ iff Dτ 1 ď τ , C τ
1
ÝÑ C1 P T ,
Q is the network queue in C, P p~tq P Q, pι,Ψ,U , progpιqq P C1 and P p~tq P U
T ( honestpι, progpιq, τq iff at time τ , node ι’s local state is (ι, [], [], prog (ι))
Γ ( progpiq : ti, yb, yeu.ϕpi, yb, yeq iff Given any trace T such that T ( Γ,
and at time τb, node ι’s local state is (ι, [], [], progpιq)
given any time point τe such that τe ě τb, it is the case that T ( ϕpι, τb, τeq
Figure 13: Trace-based semantics
elide the rules for first-order logic connectives. A tuple P p~tq is derivable by node ι at time
τ , if P p~tq is either an internal update or an external update generated at a time point τ 1
no later than τ . A node ι sends out a tuple P pι1,~tq if that tuple was derived by node ι.
Because ι1 is different from ι, it is sent over the network. A received tuple is one that comes
from the network (obtained using DeQueue). Finally, an honest node ι runs prog at time τ ,
if at time τ and the local state of ι at time τ is the initial state with an empty table and
update queue.
The semantics of invariant assertion states that if a trace T contains the execution of prog
by node ι (formally defined as the node running prog is one of the nodes in the configuration
C), then given any time point τe after τb, the trace T satisfies ϕpι, τb, τeq. Here, the semantic
definition requires that the invariant of an honest node holds in the presence of attackers,
because we examine all traces that include the honest node in their configurations. This
means that those traces can contain arbitrary other nodes, some of which are malicious.
Our program logic is proven to be sound with regard to the trace semantics:
Theorem 1 (Soundness). 1. If Σ; Γ $ ϕ, then for all grounding substitution σ for Σ,
given any trace T , T ( Γσ implies T ( ϕσ;
2. If Σ; Γ $ progpiq : ti, yb, yeu.ϕpi, yb, yeq, then for all grounding substitution σ for Σ,
Γσ ( pprogqσpiq : ti, yb, yeu.pϕpi, yb, yeqqσ.
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Proof. By mutual induction on the derivation E . The rules for standard first-order logic
formulas are straightforward. We focus on the case when E ends in the Honest rule.
Case: The last step of E is Honest.
E =
E1 :: Σ; Γ $ progpiq : ti, yb, yeu.ϕpi, yb, yeq E2 :: Σ; Γ $ honestpι, progpιq, tq
Σ; Γ $ @t1, t1 ą t, ϕpι, t, t1q
Honest
Given σ, T s.t. T ( Γσ, by I.H. on E1 and E2
(1) Γσ ( pprogqσpiq : ti, yb, yeu.pϕpi, yb, yeqqσ
(2) T ( phonestpι, progpιq, tqqσ
By (2),
(3) at time tσ, ισ starts to run program (pprogqσ)
By (1) and (3), given any T s.t. T ą tσ
(4) T ( ϕσpισ, tσ, T q
Therefore,
(5) T ( p@t1, t1 ą t, ϕpι, t, t1qqσ
Case: E ends in Inv rule.
Given T , σ such that T ( Γσ, and at time τb, node ι’s local state is (ι, [], [], progpιq),
given any time point τe such that τe ě τb,
let ϕ “ p
Ź
pPhdOfpprogq @t,@~x, τb ď t ă τe ^ pp~xq@pι, tq Ą ϕppι, t, ~xqqσ
we need to show T ( ϕ
By induction on the length of T
subcase: |T | “ 0, T has one state and is of the form τÝÑ C
By assumption (ι, [], [], rprogsι) P C
Because the update list is empty, Eσ1, s.t. T ( ppp~xq@pι, tqqσσ1
Therefore, T ( ϕ trivially.
subcase: T “ T 1 τÝÑ C
We examine all possible steps allowed by the operational semantics.
To show the conjunction holds, we show all clauses in the conjunction are true by
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construct a generic proof for one clause.
case: DeQueue is the last step.
Given a substitution σ1 for t and ~x s.t. T ( pτb ď t ă τe ^ pp~xq@pι, tqqσσ1
By the definitions of semantics, and DeQueue merely moves messages around
(1) ppp~xqqσσ1 is on trace T 1
(2) T 1 ( pτb ď t ă τe ^ pp~xq@pι, tqqσσ1
By I.H. on T 1,
(3) T 1 ( p@t,@~x, τb ď t ă τe ^ pp~xq@pι, tq Ą ϕppι, t, ~xqqσ
By (2) and (3)
(4) T 1 ( ϕppι, t, ~xqσσ1
By ϕp is closed under trace extension and (4),
T ( ϕppι, t, ~xqσσ1
Therefore, T ( ϕ by taking the conjunction of all the results for such p’s.
case: NodeStep is the last step. Similar to the previous case, we examine every tuple
p generated by prog to show T ( ϕ. When p was generated on T 1, the proof
proceeds in the same way as the previous case. We focus on the cases where p is
generated in the last step.
We need to show that T ( p@t,@~x, τb ď t ă τe ^ pp~xq@pι, tq Ą ϕppι, t, ~xqqσ
Assume the newly generated tuple is ppp~xq@pι, τpqqσσ1, where τp ě τ
We need to show that T ( pϕppι, τp, ~xqqσσ1
subcase: Init is used
In this case, only rules with an empty body are fired (r “ hp~vq :́ .).
By expanding the last premise of the Inv rule, and ~v are all ground terms,
(1) E1 :: Σ; Γ $ @i,@t, ϕhpi, t, ~vq
By I.H. on E1
(2) T ( p@i,@t, ϕhpi, t, ~vqqσ
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By (2)
T ( pϕhpι, τp, ~yqqσσ1
subcase: RuleFire is used.
We show one case where p is not an aggregate and one where p is.
subsubcase: InsNew is fired
By examine the ∆r rule,
(1) exists σ0 P ρpΨν ,Ψ, r, k, ~sq such that ppp~xq@pι, tqqσσ1 “ ppp~vq@pι, tqqσ0
(2) for tuples (pj) derived by node ι, ppjp~sjqqσ0 P Ψν or ppjp~sjqqσ0 P Ψ
By operational semantics, pj must have been generated on T 1
(3)T 1 ( ppjp~sjq@pι, τpqqσ0
By I.H. on T 1 and (3), the invariant for pj holds on T 1
(4) T 1 ( pϕpj pι, τp, ~sjqqσ0
By ϕp is closed under trace extension
(5) T ( ppjp~xjq@pι, τpq ^ ϕpj pι, τp, ~sjqqσ0
For tuples (qj) that are received by node ι, using similar reasoning as above
(6) T ( precvpi, tppqj , ~sjqq@τpqσ0
(7) For constraints (aj), T ( ajσ0
By I.H. on the last premise in Inv and (5) (6) (7)
(8) T ( pϕppi, τp, ~vqqσ0
By (1) and (8), T ( pϕppi, τp, ~yqqσσ1
subsubcase: InsAggNew is fired.
When p is an aggregated predicate, we additionally prove that
every aggregate candidate predicate pagg has the same invariant as p.
That is (1) T ( p@t,@~x, τb ď t ă τe ^ paggp~xq@pι, tq Ą ϕppι, t, ~xqqσ
The reasoning is the same as the previous case.
We additionally show that (1) is true on the newly generated paggp~tq.
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The intuition behind the soundness proof is that the invariant properties ϕp specified for
the predicate p are local properties that will not be affected by the attacker. For instance,
we can specify basic arithmetic constraints of arguments derived by the honest node and
the existence of base tuples. These invariants can be checked by examining the program of
the honest node and are not affected by how the honest node interacts with the rest of the
nodes in the network. We never use any invariant of received tuples, because they could
be sent from an attacker, and the attacker does not need to generate those tuples following
protocols. However, we can use the fact that those received tuples must have arrived at the
honest node; otherwise, the rule will not fire. In other words, we trust the runtime of an
honest node.
Discussion. Our program logic enables us to prove invariant properties that hold even in
adversarial environment. The network trace T in Theorem 1 could involve attacker threads
who run arbitrary malicious programs. For example, a trace may contain attacker threads
who keep propagating invalid route advertisement for a non-existent destination. Properties
proved with our logic, however, still hold in such traces. The key observation here is that in
the rule inv, the correctness of the program property does not rely on received tuples, which
could have been manipulated by malicious attackers. This guarantee is further validated
by our logic semantics and soundness, where we demand that a proved conclusion should
hold in any trace.
Our program logic could possibly prove false program invariants for SANDlog programs
only generating empty network traces. An example program is as follows:
r1 pp@aq :́ qp@aq.
r2 qp@aq :́ pp@aq.
A user could assign false to both p and q, and prove the program invariant with the rule inv.
However, this program, when executing in bottom-up evaluation, produces an empty set of
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tuples. The inv rule is still sound in this case as there is no trace that generates tuples p
and q. Instead, a SANDlog program should have rules of the form “p :-” to generate base
tuples. If a false program invariant is given for such a program, the user is obliged to prove
$ false in the logic, which is impossible.
3.3. Verification Condition Generator
Our prototype implementation is built on top of RapidNet [59], a declarative networking
engine. RapidNet takes a SANDlog program as input, rewrites each rule into a set of ∆
rules (see Section 2.1.2), and compiles each ∆ rule into a series of relational operators, such
as projection, selection and join.
We augmented RapidNet with libraries handling cryptographic functions. We also equipped
RapidNet with a verification condition generator (VCG), which extracts proof obligations
from SANDlog programs into Coq’s logic (i.e., shallow embedding). We could target other
interactive theorem provers such as Isabelle HOL as well.
Library extensions to RapidNet are implemented similarly to those described in prior
work [93]. Thus, we focus on describing the implementation of VCG, which generates
lemmas corresponding to the last premise of the rule Inv. VCG takes as input, the abstract
syntax tree of a SANDlog program sp and its user-defined type annotation tp, and outputs
a Coq file that contains (1) definitions for types, predicates, and functions; (2) lemmas for
rules in the SANDlog program; and (3) axioms based on Honest rule. The annotation tp is
supposed to be provided by the programmer, and contains typing information of the form
parg : typeq, for all arguments in relations and functions. tp is necessary for VCG, because
SANDlog is untyped. Next we illustrate the process of shallow embedding in detail.
Generating definitions. VCG uses Algorithm 1 to generate four kinds of definitions:
types, predicates, functions and invariant properties. VCG scans through the types in the
type annotation file and inserts one type definitions for each distinct type (lines 4 – 9). For
instance, given pIPAddress : stringq in the annotation, VCG generates Variable string: Type.
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Definition for the type time is hard-coded .
Lines 10 to 20 generate definitions for relations. For each distinct relation name p in a
SANDlog program, we define a predicate of the same name, whose arguments are composed
of the arguments of p, a node identifier, and a time point. For example, with linkp@n,mq and
the type annotation:(n:string) (m:string), VCG outputs the following predicate definition. It
represents the predicate linkpn,mq@pn, tq.
Variable link: string Ñ string Ñ string Ñ time Ñ Prop.
Lines 21 to 29 generate definitions for user-defined functions. For each user-defined func-
tion, we define a data constructor of the same name, unless it corresponds to a Coq’s
built-in operator. We also include a time point as an additional argument. For exam-
ple, VCG generates the following definition for f signpinfo, keyq with typing information:
(info:string)(key:string) (f signpq:string).
Variable fsign: string Ñ string Ñ time Ñ string.
VCG also defines a skeleton for invariant properties of the relations in each rule head (lines
30 – 38). The arguments of an invariant property are the same as those in the relation, plus
a location specifier and a time point. VCG generates a question mark as the place holder for
the concrete definition of the invariant properties, which will be provided by the user. As an
example, consider the rule head of sp1 in Figure 3 of Chapter 2. The invariant property of
the relation path(@s, d, c, p), with typing information (s:string) (d:string) (c:nat)(p:string),is
defined as follows:
Definition p-path: (attr 0:string)(attr 1:string)(attr 2:nat)(attr 3:string)
(loc:string)(t:time): Prop:=?
Generating lemma statements. Let us use the program in Figure 3 of Chapter 2 as
an example. The lemma generated for sp1 is shown below, where p-path represents the
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invariant associated with the path tuple. Next we explain how it is generated in detail. The
pseudo-code is shown in Algorithm 2. The algorithm writes to a Coq file using the keyword
Write. All the arguments to Write are strings. For simplicity, we omit the double quotes
around strings and string operations.
Lemma r1: forall(s:node)(d:node)(c:nat)(p:list node)(t:time),
link s d c s t Ñ p = cons (s (cons d nil)) Ñ p-path s t s d c p t.
VCG first fetches a rule (lines 5 – 6). Next, it generates a unique name for the lemma and
universal quantification of free variables in that rule (lines 7 – 11). In this phase, VCG
generates the first line of the lemma shown above, assuming the annotated sp1 is:
pathp@ps : nodeq, pd : nodeq, pc : natq, pp : list[node]qq :́ linkp@s, d, cq, p :“ rs, ds.
Next, VCG processes the rule body by applying the function ParsingBody (lines 20 – 38)
to each element in it. Elements are separated by commas. The input to ParsingBody
is either a relation, an assignment, or a binary operation. When processing a relation,
VCG generates (1) the predicate that corresponds to the relation (lines 22 – 25) and (2)
the invariant associated with the relation (lines 26 – 31). For assignments and binary
operations, VCG translates them into corresponding operations in Coq (lines 32 – 37).
ParseBody function uses ParsingTerm (Algorithm 3) to process expressions in the body
elements. There are four forms of expressions: variables, constances, functions, and arith-
metic operations. A variable or constance is translated as it is (lines 2 – 5). A function (lines
6 – 15) can either have a correspondent in Coq libraries or be defined by VCG; VCG gener-
ates the definition for a function only when no correspondent can be found in Coq libraries.
For the former case, VCG translates the function into the corresponding form in Coq (e.g.
f removeFirstplq ñ tlplq); for the latter one, VCG simply applies the defined function to
the function arguments (e.g. f signpinfo, keyq ñ f sign info key t). In both cases, each
argument itself is an expression, and is processed recursively with ParsingTerm. As an
example, the second line of Lemma r1 before p-path is the result of processing the rule body
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of sp1.
Finally, VCG generates the conclusion of the lemma – which is the invariant associated with
the rule head (lines 14 – 18) – and complete the translation process. Users can instruct
VCG to generate multiple sets of lemmas over the same SANDlog program, if there are
multiple invariants to be proved.
Axioms. For each invariant ϕp of a rule head p, VCG produces an axiom (Algorithm 4) , in
the form @i, t, ~x,Honestpiq Ą pp~xq@pi, tq Ą ϕppi, ~xq, where Honestpnq fi honestpn, prog,´8q.
For example, consider the rule sp1 in Figure 3 of Chapter 2. The corresponding axiom
generated by VCG is as follows:
Axiom geneProp-path: (attr 0:string)(attr 1:string) (attr 2:nat)
(attr 3:string)(loc:string)(t:time),
Honest loc Ñ path attr 0 attr 1 attr 2 attr 3 loc t Ñ
p-path attr 0 attr 1 attr 2 attr 3 loc t.
These axioms are conclusions derived from the Honest rule after invariants are verified.
Soundness of these axioms is backed by the soundness theorem (Theorem 1). Since we
always assume that the program starts at time ´8, the condition that t ą ´8 is always
true, thus omitted.
3.4. Case Studies
In this section, we investigate two proposed secure routing solutions: S-BGP (Section 3.4.1)
and SCION (Section 3.4.2). We encode both solutions in SANDlog and prove that they
preserve route authenticity, a key property stating that route announcements are trust-
worthy. Our case studies not only demonstrate the effectiveness of our program logic, but
provide a formal proof supporting the informal guarantees given by the solution designers.
Interested readers can find SANDlog specification and formal verification of both solutions
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Algorithm 1 Generate Proof Obligation – Definitions
1: function GeneDefition(sp, tp)
2: (* sp: SANDlog program *)
3: (* tp: Type annotation *)
4: (* time is a type *)
5: Write Definition time := nat.
6: (* Type definition *)
7: for all pv : typeq P tp do
8: if “Variable type” not defined then
9: Write Variable type: Type.
10: (* Predicate definition *)
11: Write Variable Honest: string Ñ Prop.
12: for all pp@ι, ~xq P sp do
13: if “Variable p” not defined then
14: Write Variable p:
15: id type1 Ð tppιq
16: Write id type1 Ñ
17: for all arg P ~x do
18: type1 Ð tppargq
19: Write type1 Ñ
20: Write id type1 Ñ timeÑ Prop.
21: (* Function definition *)
22: for all pf namep~yqq P sp do
23: if f name has no correspondents in Coq library &
24: “Variable f name” not defined then
25: Write Variable f name:
26: for all arg P ~y do
27: type2 Ð tppargq
28: Write type2 Ñ
29: type3 Ð tppf namep~yqq
30: Write type3.
31: (* Invariant definition *)
32: for all pp@ι, ~xq P HeadTuplepspq do
33: Write Definition p-p:
34: id type1 Ð tppιq
35: Write (attr 0 : type1)
36: for iÐ 1, lenp~xq do
37: type1 Ð tpp~xpiqq
38: Write (attr i : type1)
39: Write ploc : id type1qpt : timeq : Prop :“?
40: end function
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Algorithm 2 Generate Proof Obligation – Lemma statements.
1: function GeneLemma(sp, tp)
2: (* sp: SANDlog program *)
3: (* tp: Type annotation *)
4: for iÐ 1,NumberOfRulespspq do
5: pH :́ bodyq Ð Rulespspqpiq
6: Where H “ php@ι1, ~yq
7: Write Lemma ri: forall
8: (* Quantify variables *)
9: for all arg P fvpH, bodyq do
10: type1 Ð tppargq
11: Write (arg:type)
12: for all ele P body do
13: ParsingBody(ele)
14: Write p-ph
15: for all arg P ~y do
16: ParsingTerm(arg)
17: (* add node id and time as arguments *)
18: Write ι t.
19: end function
20: function ParsingBody(body piece)
21: if body piece = pp@ι, ~xq then
22: Write pred p
23: for all arg P pι, ~xq do
24: ParsingTerm(arg)
25: Write ι t Ñ
26: if pp@ι, x̃q P HeadTuplepspq &
27: pp@ι, ~xq not a received tuple then
28: Write prop p
29: for all arg P pι, ~xq do
30: ParsingTerm(arg)
31: Write ι t Ñ
32: else if body piece = (a :“ b) or
33: (a bop b) then
34: ParsingTerm(a)
35: if a :“ b then Write =
36: else Write bop
37: ParsingTerm(b)
38: end function
Algorithm 3 Generate Proof Obligation – Function ParsingTerm()
1: function ParsingTerm(exp)
2: if exp is variable x then
3: Write x
4: else if exp is constance c then
5: Write “c”
6: else if exp “ fnamep~yq then
7: if fname is defined then
8: Write “fname ”
9: for all arg P ~y do
10: ParsingTerm(arg)
11: Write tÑ ”
12: else
13: Write Corresponding built-in Coq function
14: for all arg P ~y do
15: ParsingTerm(arg)
16: end function
online (http://netdb.cis.upenn.edu/secure_routing/.)
3.4.1. S-BGP
Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP) [75] is a comprehensive solution that aims to
eliminate security vulnerabilities of BGP, while maintaining compatibility with original
BGP specifications. S-BGP requires that each node sign the route information (route
attestation) using asymmetric encryption (e.g. RSA [73]) before advertising the message
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Algorithm 4 Generate Proof Obligation – Axioms
1: function GeneAxiom(sp, tp)
2: (* sp: SANDlog program *)
3: (* tp: Type annotation *)
4: (* Invariant definition *)
5: for all pp@ι, ~xq P HeadTuplepspq do
6: Write Axiom geneProp-p:forall
7: Where pι : id type1q P tp
8: Write (attr 0 : type1)
9: for iÐ 1, lenp~xq do
10: Where p~xpiq : type1q P tp
11: Write (attr i:type’)
12: Write ploc : id type1qpt : timeq,
13: Write pred-p
14: for iÐ 0, lenp~xq do
15: Write attr i
16: Write loc t Ñ
17: Write Honest loc Ñ
18: Write p-p
19: for iÐ 0, lenp~xq do
20: Write attr i
21: Write loc t.
22: end function
to its neighbor. The route information is supposed to include the destination address
(represented by an IP prefix), the known path to the destination, and the identifier of the
neighbor to whom the route information will be sent. The sender also attaches a signature
list to the route information, containing all signatures received from the previous neighbors.
A node receiving the route attestation would not trust the routing information unless all
signatures inside are properly checked.
Encoding. Figure 14 presents our encoding of S-BGP in SANDlog. The meaning of tuples
in the program can be found in Figure 15.
In rule r1 of Figure 14, when a node N receives an advertise tuple from its neighbor Nb, it gen-
erates a verifyPath tuple, which serves as an entry point for recursive signature verification.
In rule 2, N recursively verifies all signatures in Osl, which stands for “original signature
list”. Sl in verifyPath is a sub-list of Osl, representing the signatures that have not been
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r1 verifyPath(@N,Nb,Pfx,Pvf,
Sl,OrigP,Osl) :-
advertise(@N,Nb,Pfx,RcvP,Sl),
link(@N,Nb),
Pvf := f_prepend(N,RcvP),
OrigP := Pvf,
Osl := Sl,
f_member(RcvP,N) == 0,
Nb == f_first(RcvP).
r2 verifyPath(@N,Nb,Pfx,PTemp,
Sl1,OrigP,Osl) :-
verifyPath(@N,Nb,Pfx,Pvf,
Sl,OrigP,Osl),
publicKeys(@N,Nd,PubK),
f_size(Sl) > 0,
f_size(Pvf) > 1,
PTemp := f_removeFirst(Pvf),
Nd := f_first(PTemp),
SigM := f_first(Sl),
MsgV := f_prepend(Pfx,Pvf),
f_verify(MsgV,SigM,PubK) == 1,
Sl1 := f_removeFirst(Sl).
r3 route(@N,Pfx,C,OrigP,Osl) :-
verifyP(@N,Nd,Pfx,Pvf,
Sl,OrigP,Osl),
f_size(Sl) == 0,
f_size(Pvf) == 1,
C:= f_size(OrigP) - 1.
r4 route(@N,Pfx,C,P,Sl) :-
prefixs(@N,Pfx),
List := f_empty(),
C := 0,
P := f_prepend(N,List),
Sl := f_empty().
r5 bestRoute(@N,Pfx,a_MIN<C>,P,Sl) :-
route(@N,Pfx,C,P,Sl).
r6 signature(@N,Msg,Sig) :-
bestRoute(@N,Pfx,C,BestP,Sl),
privateKeys(@N,PriK),
link(@N,Nb),
Pts := f_prepend(Nb,BestP),
Msg := f_prepend(Pfx,Pts),
Sig := f_sign(Msg,PriK).
r7 advertise(@Nb,N,Pfx,BestP,NewSl) :-
bestRoute(@N,Pfx,C,BestP,Sl),
link(@N,Nb),
Pts := f_prepend(Nb,BestP),
Msg == f_prepend(Pfx,Pts),
signature(@N,Msg,Sig),
NewSl := f_prepend(Sig,Sl).
Figure 14: S-BGP encoding
checked. When all signatures have been verified — this is ensured by “f sizepSlq ““ 0” in
rule 3 — N accepts the route and stores the path as a route tuple in the local database. Rule
4 also allows N to generate a route tuple storing the path to its self-owned IP prefixes (i.e.
prefixp@N,Pfxq). Given a specific destination Pfx, in rule 5, N aggregates all route tuples
storing paths to Pfx, and computes a bestPath tuple for the shortest path. The bestPath
is intended to be propagated to downstream ASes. Before propagation, however, S-BGP
requires N to sign the path information. This is captured in rule 6, where N uses its private
key (i.e. privateKeysp@N,PriKq) to generate a signature based on the selected bestPath tuple.
Finally, in rule 7, N embeds the routing information (i.e. bestPath) along with its signature
(i.e. signature) into a new route advertisement (i.e. advertise), and propagates the message
to its neighbors.
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linkp@n, n1q there is a link between n and n1.
routep@n, d, c, p, slq p is a path to d with cost c.
sl is the signature list associated with p.
prefixp@n, dq n owns prefix (IP addresses) d.
bestRoutep@n, d, c, p, slq p is the best path to d with cost c.
sl is the signature list associated with p.
verifyPathp@n, n1, d, p, sl, a path p to a destination d is verified against signature list sl.
pOrig, sOrigq p is a sub-path of pOrig, and s is a sub-list of sOrig.
signaturep@n,m, sq n creates a signature s of message m with private key.
advertisep@n1, n, d, p, slq n advertises path p to neighbor n1 with signature list sl.
Figure 15: Tuples for progsbgp
Property specification. Route authenticity of S-BGP ensures that no route announce-
ment can be tampered with by an attacker. In other words, it requires that any route
announcement accepted by a node is authentic. We encode it as ϕauth1 below.
ϕauth1 =@n,m, t, d, p, sl,
Honestpnq ^ advertisepm,n, d, p, slq@pn, tq Ą goodPathpt, d, pq
ϕauth1 is a general topology-independent security property. It asserts that whenever an
honest node n, denoted as Honestpnq, sends out an advertise tuple to its neighbor m, the
property goodPathpt, d, pq holds. Honestpnq means that n runs S-BGP and n’s private key is
not compromised. Formally:
Honestpnq fi honestpn, progsbgppnq,´8q.
Here, the starting time is set to be the earliest possible time point. SANDlog’s semantics
allows a node to begin execution at any time after the specified starting time, so using
´8 gives us the most flexibility. goodPathpt, d, pq is recursively defined in Figure 16, which
asserts that all links in the path p towards the destination d exist no later than t. Each
link (m, n) is represented by two tuples: link(@n, m) and link(@m, n). These two tuples
reside on two endpoints respectively.
To be more specific, the definition of goodPathpt, d, pq involves three cases (Figure 16). The
base case is when p contains only one node. We require that d be one of the prefixes owned
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Honestpnq Ą Dt1, t1 ď t ^ prefixpn, dq@pn, t1q
goodPathpt, d, n :: nilq
Honestpnq Ą Dt1, t1 ď t ^ linkpn, n1q@pn, t1q goodPathpt, d, n :: nilq
goodPathpt, d, n1 :: n :: nilq
Honestpnq Ą Dt1, t1 ď t ^ linkpn, n1q@pn, t1q ^ Dt2, t2 ď t ^ linkpn, n2q@pn, t2q
goodPathpt, d, n :: n2 :: p2q
goodPathpt, d, n1 :: n :: n2 :: p2q
Figure 16: Definitions of goodPath
by n (i.e., the prefix tuple is derivable). When p has two nodes n1 and n, we require that
the link from n to n1 exist from n’s perspective, assuming that n is honest, but impose no
constraint on n1’s database, because n1 has not received the advertisement. The last case
is when the length of p is larger than two; we check that both links (from n to n1 and from
n to n2) exist from n’s perspective, assuming n is honest. In the last two rules, we also
recursively check that the subpath also satisfies goodPath.
goodPath can serve as a template for a number of useful properties. For example, by substi-
tuting link (n,n2) with announce link (n, n2), we are able to express whether a node is willing
to let its neighbor know of that link. We can also require each subpath be authorized by
the sender.
Axiom of signature. To use the authenticity property of signatures in the proof of
ϕauth1, we include the following axiom Asig in the logical context Γ. This axiom states that
if a signature s is verified by the public key of a node n1, and n1 is honest, then n1 must
have generated a signature tuple. Predicate verifypm, s, kq@pn, tq means that node n verifies,
using key k at time t, that s is a valid signature of message m.
Asig = @m, s, k, n, n1, t, verifypm, s, kq@pn, tq ^ publicKeyspn, n1, kq@pn, tq ^
Honestpn1q Ą Dt1, t1 ă t ^ signaturepn1,m, sq@pn1, t1q
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Verification. Our goal is to prove that ϕauth1 is an invariant property that holds on all
possible execution traces. However, directly proving ϕauth1 is hard, as it involves verification
over all the traces. Instead, we take the indirect approach of using our program logic to prove
a program invariant, which is stronger than ϕauth1, and, more importantly, whose validity
implies the validity of ϕauth1. To be concrete, we show that progsbgp has the following
invariant property ϕI :
(a) ¨; ¨ $ progsbgppiq : ti, yb, yeu.ϕIpi, yb, yeq
where ϕI is defined as:
ϕIpi, yb, yeq “
Ź
pPhdOfpprogsbgpq @t ~x, yb ď t ă ye ^ pp~xq@pi, tq Ą ϕppi, t, ~xq
Every ϕp in ϕI denotes the invariant property associated with each head tuple in progsbgp,
and needs to be specified by the user. Table 1 gives the invariants associated with all head
tuples in the program. Especially, the invariant associated with the advertise tuple (goodPath)
is the same as the conclusion of ϕauth1.
We prove (a) using the inv rule in Section 3.2, by showing that all the premises hold. The inv
rule has two types of premises: (1) Premises that ensure each rule of the program maintains
the invariant of its rule head; and (2) Premises that ensure all invariants for head tuples are
closed under trace extension. Premises of the second type are guaranteed through manual
inspection of all the invariants, thus omitted in the formal proof. In terms of premises of the
first type, since progsbgp has seven rules, this corresponds to seven premises to be proved.
For example, the premise corresponding to rule 2 is represented by (a0), shown below.
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Rule Head Tuple Invariant
r1,r2 verifyPath (N,Nb,Pfx,Pvf, Dl,Osl “ l``Pvf ^
Sl,OrigP,Osl)@(N,t) pgoodPathpt,Pfx,Pvfq Ą goodPathpt,Pfx,Oslqq
r3,r4 route (N,Pfx,C,OrigP,Osl)@(N,t) goodPath (t,Pfx,OrigP)
r5 bestRoute (N,Pfx,C,P,Sl)@(N,t) goodPath (t,Pfx,OrigP)
r6 signature (N,Msg,Sig)@(N,t) Dp,m, pfx,Msg “ pfx :: nei :: p
r7 advertise (Nb,N,Pfx,BestP,NewSl) goodPath (t,Pfx,Nb::BestP)
Table 1: Tuple invariants in ϕI for S-BGP route authenticity
(a0) ¨; ¨ $ @N,@Nb,@Pfx,@Pvf,@Sl,@Sl1,@OrigP,@Osl,@t,@Nd,
@PubK,@m,@p,@SigM,@MsgV,@PTemp,@Osl,
verifyPathpN,Nb,Pfx,Pvf,SL,OrigP,Oslq@pN,tq ^
Dl,Osl “ l``Sl ^
pgoodPathpt,Pfx,Pvfq Ą goodPathpt,Pfx,Oslqq ^
publicKeyspN,Nd,PubKq@pN,tq ^
lengthpSlq ą 0 ^
lengthpPvfq ą 0 ^
Pvf “ m :: Nd :: p ^
PTemp “ Nd :: p ^
Sl “ SigM :: Sl1 ^
MsgV “ Pfx :: Pvf ^
verifypMsgV,SigM,PubKq@pN,tq Ą
pDl,Osl “ l``Sl1 ^
pgoodPathpt,Pfx,PTempq Ą goodPathpt,Pfx,Oslqqq
Here, pDl,Osl “ l``Sl1 ^ pgoodPathpt,Pfx,PTempq Ą goodPathpt,Pfx,Oslqqq is the invariant
of rule 2’s head tuple verifyPath (Figure 1). Other rule-related premises are constructed in
a similar way. We prove all the premises in Coq, thus proving (a).
After (a) is proved, by applying the Honest rule to (a), we can deduce ϕ “ @n t,Honestpnq Ą
ϕIpn, t,´8q. ϕI can then be injected into the assumptions (Γ) by VCGen (as do ϕI1) and
is safe to be used as a theorem in proving other properties. Finally, ϕauth1 is proved by
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discharging ϕ Ą ϕauth1 in Coq with standard elimination rules.
Proof details. Among the others, the premise corresponding to rule 2 in the program
turns out to be the most challenging one, as it involves recursion and signature verification.
Recursion in rule 2 makes it hard to find the proper invariant specification for the head tuple
verifyPath, as the invariant needs to maintain correctness for both the head tuple and the
body tuple, which have different arguments. In our specification, we specify the invariant in
a way that reversely verify the signature list by checking the signature for the longest path
first. More concretely, we use an implication, stating that if the path to be verified satisfies
the invariant goodPath, then the entire path satisfies the invariant goodPath (Table 1).
Another challenge in proving the invariant for verifyPath is to reason about the existence
of link tuples at the previous nodes. We solve the problem in two steps: (1) we prove a
stronger auxiliary program invariant (a1), which asserts the existence of the local link tuple
when a node signs the path information. (2) we then use the axiom Asig to allow a node
who verifies a signature to assure the existence of the link tuple at the remote node who
signs the signature.
More concretely, (a1) is defined as:
(a1) ¨; ¨ $ progsbgppiq : ti, yb, yeu.ϕI1
In (a1), all head tuples p other than signature and advertise takes on the same invariant
ϕlink1pp, n, d, tq:
ϕlink1pp, n, d, tq “ Dp
1,
p “ n :: p1 ^ pp1 “ nil Ą prefixpn, dq@pn, tqq ^
@p2,m1, p1 “ m1 :: p2 Ą linkpn,m1q@pn, tq
It states that node n is the first element in path p, and the link tuple from n to its neighbor
in p exists in n’s database.
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For signature and advertise, we introduce another property:
ϕlink2pp, n, d, n
1, tq= linkpn, n1q@pn, tq ^
Dp1, p “ n :: p1 ^ pp1 “ nil Ą prefixpn, dq@pn, tqq ^
@p2,m1, p1 “ m1 :: p2 Ą linkpn,m1q@pn, tq
ϕlink2pp, n, d, n
1, tq extends ϕlink1pp, n, d, tq by including the receiving node n1 as an argument,
asserting that the link between n and n1 also exists. And the invariants of signature and
advertise are:
ϕsignaturepi, t, n,m, sq “ Dn
1, d,m “ d :: n1 :: p ^ ϕlink2pp, n, d, n1, tq
ϕadvertisepi, t, n
1, n, d, p, slq “ ϕlink2pp, n, d, n1, tq
We prove (a1) using the Inv rule. Then, by applying Honest rule to (a1) and only keeping
the clause in ϕI2 related to signature, we derive the following:
(a2) ¨; ¨ $ @n,@t,@m,
Honestpnq ^ signaturepn,m, sq@pn, tq Ą
Dn1, d, pm “ d :: n1 :: p ^ ϕlink2pp, n, d, n1, tq
(a2) connects an honest node’s signature to the existence of related link tuples at a previous
node in the path p.
Next, we use (a2) along with Asig to prove (a0). Applying Asig to tuples publicKeys and verify
in (a0), we can get:
(a3) ¨; ¨ $ @Nd,@MsgV,@SigM,@t,
HonestpNdq Ą Dt’, t’ ă t ^ signaturepNd, MsgV,SigMq@pNd,t’q
We further apply (a2) to (a3) to obtain:
(a4) ¨; ¨ $ @Nd,@t,@MsgV,
Dn1, d, p,Nd “ d :: n1 :: p ^ ϕlink2pp,Nd, d, n1, tq
Combining (a4) and the assumptions in (a0), we are able to prove the conclusion of (a0).
Other premises can be proved similarly. For non-recursive rules, the premises for them are
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Honestpnq Ą Dt1, t1 ď t ^ prefixpn, dq@pn, t1q
goodPath2pt, d, n :: nilq
Honestpnq Ą Dt1, c, s, t1 ď t ^ linkpn, n1q@pn, t1q ^ routepn, d, c, n :: nil, slq@pn, t1q
goodPath2pt, d, n :: nilq
goodPath2pt, d, n1 :: n :: nilq
Honestpnq Ą Dt1, t1 ď t ^ linkpn, n1q@pn, t1q ^
Dt2, c, s, t2 ď t ^ linkpn, n2q@pn, t2q ^
routepn, d, c, n :: n2 :: p2, slq@pn, t1q
goodPath2pt, d, n :: n2 :: p2q
goodPath2pt, d, n1 :: n :: n2 :: p2q
Figure 17: Definitions of goodPath2
straightforward. The detailed proof can be found online.
Discussion. ϕauth1 is a general template for proving different kinds of route authenticity.
For example, S-BGP satisfies a stronger property that guarantees authentication of each
subpath in a given path p. The property, called goodPath2pt, d, pq, is defined in Figure 17.
The meaning of the variables remains the same as before.
Compared with goodPath, the last two rules of goodPath2 additionally assert the existence
of a route tuple. The predicate routepn, d, c, n :: p1, slq@pn, t1q states that node n generates
a route tuple for path n :: p1 at time t1, and that sl is the signature list that authenticates
the path n :: p1. This property ensures that an attacker cannot use n’s route advertisement
for another path p1, which happens to share the two direct links of n. More specifically,
given p “ n1 :: n :: n2 :: p1 and p1 “ n1 :: n :: n2 :: p2, with p1 ‰ p2 , an attacker could not
replace p with p1 without being detected. However, a protocol that only requires a node n
to sign the links to its direct neighbors would be vulnerable to such attack.
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3.4.2. SCION
SCION [91] is a clean-slate design of Internet routing architecture that offers more flexible
route selection and failure isolation along with route authenticity. Our case study focuses
on the routing mechanism proposed by SCION. We only provide high-level explanation
of SCION. Detailed encoding can be found under the following link (http://netdb.cis.
upenn.edu/secure_routing/).
In SCION, Autonomous Domains (AD) — a concept similar to Autonomous Systems (AS)
in BGP — are grouped into different Trust Domains (TD). Inside each Trust Domain,
top-tier ISP’s are selected as the TD core, which provide routing service inside and across
the border of TD. Figure 18 presents an example deployment of SCION with two TD’s.
Each AD can communicate with its neighbors. The direction of direct edges represents
provider-customer relationship in routing; the arrow goes from a provider to its customer.
1 
5 
4 
2 
3 7 
6 
1
0 
7 
8 
TD 1 TD 2 
Core Core 
Figure 18: An example deployment of SCION
To initiate the routing process, a TD core periodically generates a path construction an-
nouncement, called a beacon, to all its customer ADs. Each non-core AD, upon receiving a
beacon, (1) verifies the information inside the beacon, (2) attaches itself to the path inside
the received beacon to construct a new beacon, and (3) forwards the new beacon to its
customer ADs. Each beacon represents a path towards the TD core (e.g. path “1-2-3” in
Figure 18). After receiving k beacons , an downstream AD selects m paths out of k and
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uploads them to the TD core, thus finishing path construction (k and m can be set by the
administrator). When later an AD n intends to send a packet to another AD n1, it first
queries the TD core for the paths that n1 has uploaded, and then constructs a forwarding
path combining its own path to the TD core with the query result. For example, in Fig-
ure 18, when node 4 wants to communicate with node 3, it would query from the TD core
for path “1-2-3”, and combine it with its own path to the TD core (i.e. “4-5”), to get the
desired path “4-5-1-2-3”.
In Table 2, we summarize the SANDlog encoding of the path construction phase in SCION.
Definitions of important tuples can be found in Figure 19. The path construction beacon
plays an important role in SCION routing mechanism. A beacon is composed of four fields:
an interface field, a time field, an opaque field and a signature. The interface field in
SCION is identical to the announced path in S-BGP. An interface field contains a list of
AD identifiers representing the routing path. As its name suggests, the interface field also
includes each AD’s interfaces to direct neighbors in the path — SCION calls the interface
to an AD’s provider as ingress and the one to a customer as egress. Each AD attaches his
own identifier along with its ingress and egress to the end of the received interface field,
generating the new interface field. For example, in Figure 18, assume the ingress interface
of AD 2 against AD1 is “a”, and the egress interface of AD 2 against AD 4 is “b”. Given
an interface field {c::1} from AD 1 — c represents the egress interface of AD 1 against AD
2 — the newly generated interface field at AD 2 targeting AD 4 will be {c::1::a::b::2}.
The time field is a list of time stamps which record the arrival time of the beacon at each
AD. The opaque field adds a message authentication code (MAC) on each AD’s ingress and
egress fields using the AD’s private key, for the purpose of path authentication during data
forwarding. The final part is called the signature list. Each AD constructs a signature by
signing the above threes fields (i.e. the interface field, the opaque field and the time field)
along with the signature received from preceding ADs. The newly generated signature is
appended to the end of the signature list.
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Rule Summary Head Tuple
b1: TD core generates a signature. signaturep@core, info, sig, timeq
b2: TD core signs beacon global information. signaturep@core, info, sig, timeq
b3: TD core initiates an opaque field. macp@core, info, hashq
b4: TD core initiates global info of beacon. beaconPrepp@core, glb, sigG, timeq
b5: TD core sends a new beacon to neighbor. beaconInip@nei, core, td, itf ,
tl, ol, sl, sigGq
b6: AD receives a beacon from TD core. beaconRevp@ad, td, td, itf ,
tl, ol, ing, sigGq
b7: AD receives a beacon from non-core AD. beaconRevp@ad, td, ing, itf ,
tl, ol, sl, sigGq
b8: AD verifies global information. beaconToVerip@ad, td, itf , l, ol,
sl, sigG, itfv, posq
b9: AD recursively verifies signatures. beaconToVerip@ad, td, itf , tl, ol,
sl, sigG, itfv, posq
b10: AD validates a beacon. verifiedBeaconp@ad, td, ing, itf ,
tl, ol, sl, sigGq
b11: AD creates signature for new beacon. signaturep@ad, info, sig, timeq
b12: AD initiates opaque field for new beacon. macp@ad, info, hashq
b13: AD sends the new beacon to neighbor. beaconFwdp@nei, ad, td, itf ,
tl, ol, sl, sigGq
pc1: AD extracts path information. upPathp@ad, td, itf , ol, tlq
pc2: AD initiates path upload. pathUploadp@nei, ad, src, core,
itf , ol, op, posq
pc3: AD sends path to upstream neighbor. pathUploadp@nei, ad, src, core,
itf , ol, op, posq
pc4: TD core stores received path. downPathp@core, src, itf , opq
Table 2: SANDlog encoding of path construction in SCION
49
coreTDp@n, c, td, ctf q c is the core of TD td with certificate ctf attesting to that fact
providerp@n,m, igq m is n’s provider, with traffic into n through interface ig
customerp@n,m, egq m is n’s customer, with traffic out of n through interface eg
beaconInip@m,n, td, itf , containing a path, is initialized by n and sent to m.
itf , tl, ol, sl, sgq tl is a list of time stamps,
ol is a list of opaque fields, whose meaning is not relevant here.
sl is list of signatures for route attestation.
sg is a signature for certain global information,
which is not relevant here.
verifiedBeaconp@n, td, itf is the stored interface fields from n to the TD core in td.
itf, tl, ol, sl, sgq Rest of the fields have the same meaning as those in beaconIni
beaconFwdp@m,n, td, itf is forwarded to m with corresponding signature list sl
itf , tl, ol, sl, sgq. Rest of the fields have the same meaning as those
in beaconIni
upPathp@n, td, itf , opqU is a list of opaque fields indicating a path.
opqU , tlq Rest of the fields have the same meaning as those in beaconIni.
pathUploadp@m,n, src is the node (AD) who initiated the path upload process.
src, c, itf , opqD, c is TD core of an implicit TD.
opqU , ptq opqD is the opaque fields uploaded.
pt indicates the next opaque field in opqU to be checked.
itf and opqU have the same meaning as those in upPath.
Figure 19: Tuples for SCION
SCION also satisfies similar route authenticity properties as S-BGP. Each path in SCION
is composed of two parts: a path from the sender to the TD core (called “up path”) and a
path from the TD core to the receiver (called “down path”). We only prove the properties
for the up paths. The proof for the down paths can be obtained similarly by switching
the role of provider and customer. Tuples provider and customer in SCION can be seen as
counterparts of the link tuple in S-BGP, and tuple beaconIni and tuple beaconFwd correspond
to tuple advertise. The definition of route authenticity in SCION, denoted ϕauthS, is defined
as:
ϕauthS = @n,m, t, td, itf , tl, ol, sl, sg,
honestpnq ^
pbeaconInip@m,n, td, itf , tl, ol, sl, sgq@pn, tq _
beaconFwdp@m,n, td, itf , tl, ol, sl, sgq@pn, tqq
Ą goodInfopt, td,n, sl, itf q
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coreTDpad, c, td, ctf q@pad, tq
Honestpcq Ą Dt1, t1 ď t ^ customerpc, n, cegq@pc, t1q
goodInfopt, td, ad,nil, c :: ceg :: n :: nilq
coreTDpad, c, td, ctf q@pad, tq
Honestpnq Ą Dt1, t1 ď t ^ providerpn, c,nigq@pn, t1q ^ customerpn,m,negq@pn, t1q
^ Dtd1, tl, ol, sg, s, verifiedBeaconpn, td1, c :: ceg :: n :: nig :: nil, tl,
ol, s :: nilq@pn, t1q
goodInfopt, td, ad,nil, pc :: ceg :: n :: nilqq
goodInfopt, td, ad, s :: nil, c :: ceg :: n :: nig :: neg :: m :: nilq
Honestpnq Ą Dt1, t1 ď t ^ providerpn, h,nigq@pn, t1q ^ customerpn,m,megq@pn, t1q
^ Dtd1, tl, ol, sg, s, sl, verifiedBeaconpn, td1, p1``h :: hig :: heg :: n :: nig,
tl, ol, s :: slq@pn, t1q.
goodInfopt, td, ad, sl, p1 ``h :: hig :: heg :: n :: nilq
goodInfopt, td, n, s :: sl, p1``h :: hig :: heg :: n :: nig :: neg :: m :: nilq
Figure 20: Definitions of goodInfo
Formula ϕauthS asserts a property goodInfopt, td, n, sl, itf q on any beacon tuple generated
by node n, which is either a TD core or an ordinary AD. The definition of goodInfo is
shown in Figure 20. Predicate goodInfopt, td,n, sl, itf q takes five arguments: t represents
the time, td is the identity of the TD that the path lies in, n is the node that verifies the
beacon containing the interface field itf , and sl is the signature list associated with the
path. goodInfopt, td,n, sl, itf q makes sure that each AD present in the interface field itf does
have the specified links to its provider and customer respectively. Also, for each non-core
AD, there always exists a verified beacon corresponding to the path from the TD core to it.
More concretely, the definition of goodInfo considers three cases. The base case is when
a TD core c initializes an interface field c :: ceg :: n :: nig :: nil and sends it to AD n.
We require that c be a TD core and n be its customer. The next two cases are similar,
they both require the current AD n have a link to its preceding neighbor, represented by
provider, as well as one to its downstream neighbor, represented by customer. In addition, a
verifiedBeacon tuple should exist, representing an authenticated route stored in the database,
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with all inside signatures properly verified. The difference between these two cases is caused
by two possible types of an AD’s provider: TD core and non-TD core.
The proof strategy is exactly the same as that used in proof of goodPath about S-BGP. To
prove ϕauthS, we first prove progscion has a stronger program invariant ϕI :
(b) ¨; ¨ $ progscipnq : ti, yb, yeu.ϕIpi, yb, yeq
where ϕIpi, yb, yeq is defined as:
ϕIpi, yb, yeq “
Ź
pPhdOfpsciq @t,@~x, yb ď t ă ye ^ pp~xq@pi, tq Ą ϕppi, t, ~xq.
Especially, ϕp for beaconIni and beaconFwd are as follows:
ϕbeaconInipi, t,m, n, td, itf , tl, ol, sl, sgq “ goodInfopt, td, n, sl, itf q
ϕbeaconFwdpi, t,m, n, td, itf , tl, ol, sl, sgq “ goodInfopt, td, n, sl, itf q
As in S-BGP, (b) can be proved using Inv rule, whose premises are verified in Coq. After
(b) is proved, we can deduce ϕ1 “ @n, t1,Honestpnq Ą ϕIpn, t1,´8q by applying Honest rule
to (b). Finally, ϕauthS is proved by showing that ϕ1 Ą ϕauthS, which is straightforward.
At the end of the path construction phase, an AD needs to upload its selected paths to the
TD core for future queries (i.e. rules pc1´ pc4 in Table 2). The uploading process uses the
forwarding mechanism in SCION, which provides hop-by-hop authentication. An AD who
wants to send traffic to another AD attaches each data packet with the opaque field extracted
from a beacon received during the path construction phase. The opaque field contains MACs
of the ingress and egress of all ADs on the intended path. When the data packet is sent
along the path, each AD en-route re-computes the MAC of intended ingress and egress
using its own private key. This MAC is compared with the one contained in the opaque
field. If they are the same, the AD knows that it has agreed to receiving/sending packets
from/to its neighbors during path construction phase and forwards the packet further along
the path. Otherwise, it drops the data packet.
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The formal definition of data path authenticity in SCION is defined as:
ϕauthD = @m,n, t, src, core, itf , opqD, opqU , pt,
honestpnq ^
pathUploadp@m,n, src, core, itf , opqD, opqU , ptq@pn, tq Ą
goodFwdPathpt,n, opqU , ptq
Formula ϕauthD asserts property goodFwdPathpt,n, opqU , ptq on any tuple pathUpload sent
by a customer AD to its provider. goodFwdPathpt,n, opqU , ptq has four arguments: t is
the time. n is the node who sent out pathUpload tuple. opqU is a list of opaque fields for
forwarding. pt is a pointer to opqU , indicating the next opaque field to be checked. Except
time t, all arguments in goodFwdPathpt,n, opqU , ptq are the same as those in pathUpload, as
described in Figure 19. goodFwdPathpt,n, opqU , ptq states that whenever an AD receives a
packet, it has direct links to its provider and customer as indicated by the opaque field in the
packet. In addition, it must have verified a beacon with a path containing this neighboring
relationship.
The definition of goodFwdPathpt,n, opqU , ptq is given in Figure 21. There are four cases. The
base case is when pt is 0, which means nothing has been verified. In this case goodFwdPath
holds trivially. If pt is equal to the length of opaque field list, meaning all opaque fields
have been verified already, then based on SCION specification, the last opaque field should
be that of the TD core. Being a TD core requires a certificate (coreTD), and a neighbor
customer along the path (customer). When pt does not point to the head or the tail of
the opaque field list, node n should have a neighbor provider(provider), and a neighbor
customer(customer). It must also have received and processed a verifiedBeacon during path
construction. The second and third cases both cover this scenario. The second case applies
when a node n’s provider is TD core, while in the third case, n’s provider and customer are
both ordinary TDs.
SCION uses MAC for integrity check during data forwarding, so we use the following axiom
about MAC. It states that if a node n verifies a MAC, using n1’s key k, there must have
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pt “ 0
goodFwdPathpt,n, opqU , ptq
Honestpnq Ą Dt1,m, td, ctf, t1 ď t
^ coreTDpn, n, td, ctf q@pn, t1q
^ customerpn,m, cegq@pn, t1q
goodFwdPathpt,n, opq1``rceg :: mac :: nils :: nil,
lengthpopq1``rceg :: mac :: nils :: nilqq
0 ă pt ^ pt ă lengthpopq1``rnig :: neg :: mac1 :: nils :: rceg :: mac :: nils :: nil ^
Honestpnq Ą Dt1, h,m, t1 ď t
^ providerpn, h,nigq@pn, t1q
^ customerpn,m,megq@pn, t1q
^ Dtd1, tl, sg, sl, verifiedBeaconpn, td1, h :: ceg :: n :: nig,
tl, rceg :: mac :: nils :: nil, sl, sgq@pn, t1q
goodFwdPathpt,n, opq1``rnig :: neg :: mac1 :: nils :: rceg :: mac :: nils :: nil, ptq
0 ă pt ^
pt ă lengthpopq1``rnig :: neg :: mac1 :: nils :: rhig :: heg :: mac :: nils``opq2q ^
Honestpnq Ą Dt1, h,m, t1 ď t
^ providerpn, h,nigq@pn, t1q
^ customerpn,m,megq@pn, t1q
^ Dtd1, tl, sg, sl, p1, p2, verifiedBeaconpn, td1, p1``h :: hig :: heg :: n :: nig,
tl, p2``rhig :: heg :: mac :: nils :: nil, sl, sgq@pn, t1q
goodFwdPathpt,n, opq1``rnig :: neg :: mac1 :: nils :: rhig :: heg :: mac :: nils``opq2, ptq
Figure 21: Definitions of goodFwdPath
been a node n2 who created the MAC at an earlier time t 1.
Amac = @msg,m, k, n, n1, t,
verifyMacpmsg,m, kq@pn, tq ^ privateKeyspn, n1, kq@pn, tq ^
Dn2,Honestpn2q Ą Dt1, t1 ă t ^ privateKeyspn2, n1, kq@pn2, tq ^
macpn2,msg,mq@pn2, t1q
In SCION, each node should not share its own private key with other nodes. This means,
for each specific MAC, only the node who generated it can verify its validity. This fact
simplifies the axiom:
A1mac = @msg,m, k, n, t,
verifyMacpmsg,m, kq@pn, tq ^ privateKeyspn, kq@pn, tq ^
Honestpnq Ą Dt1, t1 ă t ^ macpn,msg,mq@pn, t1q
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The rest of the proof follows the same strategy as that of goodPath and goodInfo. Interested
readers can refer to our proof online for details.
3.4.3. Comparison between S-BGP and SCION
In this section, we compare the difference between the security guarantees provided by S-
BGP and SCION. In terms of practical route authenticity, there is little difference between
what S-BGP and SCION can offer. This is not surprising, as the kind of information
that S-BGP and SCION sign at path construction phase is very similar. Though both use
layered-signature to protect the routing information, signatures in S-BGP are not technically
layered—ASes in S-BGP only sign the path information, not including previous signatures.
On the other hand, ADs in SCION sign the previous signature so signatures in SCION are
nested. Consider an AS n in S-BGP that signed the path p twice, generating two signatures:
s and s1. An attacker, upon receiving a sequence of signatures containing s, can replace s
with s1 without being detected. This attack is not possible in SCION, as attackers cannot
extract signatures from a nested signature.
SCION also provides stronger security guarantees than S-BGP in data forwarding. Though
S-BGP does not explicitly state the process of data forwarding, we can still compare its
IP-based forwarding to SCION’s forwarding mechanism. Like BGP, an AS running S-BGP
maintains a routing table on all BGP speaker routers that connect to peers in other domains.
The routing table is an ordered collection of forwarding entries, each represented as a pair
of xIP prefix, next hopy. Upon receiving a packet, the speaker searches its routing table
for IP prefix that matches the destination IP address in the IP header of the packet, and
forwards the packet on the port corresponding to the next hop based on table look-up. This
next hop must have been authenticated, because only after an S-BGP update message has
been properly verified will the AS insert the next hop into the forwarding table.
However, SCION provides stronger security guarantee over S-BGP regarding the last hop
of the packet. An AS n running S-BGP has no way of detecting whether a received packet
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is from legitimate neighbor ASes who are authorized to forward packets to n. Imagine that
n has two neighbor ASes, m and m1. n knows a route to an IP prefix p and is only willing
to advertise the route to m. Ideally, any packet from m1 through n to p should be rejected
by n. However, this may not happen in practice for AS’s who run S-BGP for routing. As
long as its IP destination is p, a packet will be forwarded by n, regardless of whether it is
from m or m1. On the other hand, SCION routers would discard such packets by verifying
the MAC in the opaque field, since m cannot forge the MAC embedded in the beacon.
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CHAPTER 4
Automated Verification and Debugging
with Symbolic Execution
The program logic introduced in Chapter 3 is powerful, as its specification language –i.e.,
first-order logic – is expressive enough to specify most common properties in distributed
systems. However, to verify properties specified in our logic, a tedious and laber-intensive
manual proof is required. It is also beyond the ability of a system manager to use proof
assistants efficiently. What is worse is that when the proofs cannot be constructed, it is
nontrivial to find out what went wrong. Either there are bugs in the program, or the invari-
ants used in the proofs are not correct. There is little tool support for identifying problems
under these circumstances. Therefore, in this part of the dissertation, we aims at developing
a static analysis-based technique to analyze the safety properties of NDlog programs au-
tomatically. When properties do not hold, our tool provides a concrete counterexample to
further aid program debugging. The properties that we are interested in include invariants
of the network and desirable behavior of nodes in the network. For instance, we would
like to know if every forward entry corresponds to a route announcement packet, or if a
successfully delivered packet indicates proper forwarding table setup in the switches that
the packet traverses. One observation we have is that a large fragment of the interesting
properties of networks can be expressed in a simple fragment of first-order logic. Leveraging
this limited expressive power, we are able to develop static analysis for NDlog programs.
Our static analysis examines the structure of the NDlog program and builds a summary
data structure for all derivations of that program. Properties specified in the restricted
format of first-order logic are checked on the summary data structure with the help of
the SMT solver Z3 [88]. The challenge is how to deal with recursive programs. For such
programs, the number of possible derivations for recursive predicates is infinite. We use
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a concise representation for recursive predicates, so all possible derivations can be finitely
represented. To evaluate our analysis, we built a prototype tool, and verified several safety
properties of a number of SDN controller programs, where the SDN’s controller program
and switch logic are specified in NDlog.
The proposed static analysis makes the following technical contributions.
• We developed algorithms for automatically analyzing a class of safety properties of
NDlog programs.
• We proved the soundness and completeness of our algorithms for non-recursive pro-
grams, and the soundness of our algorithms for recursive programs.
• We implemented a prototype tool and verified a number of safety properties of SDN
controller programs.
As our driving example, we will use the erroneous program in Figure 22. The non-recursive
set of rules in the program computes one-, two-, and three-hop reachability information
within a network. There is an error in rule r2, where onehop X Z C2 should be onehop Z Y
C2, thus this program cannot derive three-hop paths.
ThreeHops (With a deliberate error in r2) :
r1 onehop(@X,Y,C) :- link(@X,Y,C).
r2 twohops(@X,Z,C) :- link(@X,Z,C1),
onehop(@X,Z,C2),C = C1+C2.
r3 threehops(@X,Y,C) :- onehop(@X,Z,C1),
twohops(@Z,Y,C2),C=C1+C2.
r4 threehops(@X,Y,C) :- twohops(@X,Z,C1),
onehop(@Z,Y,C2),C=C1+C2.
Figure 22: An erroneous NDlog program for demonstration purpose. The rule r2 is wrong
as it uses onehop X Z C2 as its body relation, which should be onehop Z Y C2
4.1. Overview
We first present an overview of our solution. The static analysis mainly consists of two
processes: a process that summarizes all derivations of predicates in an auxiliary data
structure, which we call a derivation pool, and a process that queries properties on the
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derivation pool. NDlog programs are represented abstractly as dependency graphs. Re-
cursive programs are more complicated than non-recursive programs, so we explain the
algorithms for non-recursive programs first, before we discuss extensions to support recur-
sive programs. The dependency graph and the properties to be checked are of the same form
for both recursive and non-recursive programs. Next, we formally define the dependency
graph and the format of the properties.
Dependency graph A dependency graph can be formally defined as follows:
Predicate type τ ::“ Pred | bt Ą τ
Dependency graph G ::“ pNp List,Nr List,E Listq
Predicate node Np ::“ pnID, p:τ, cycq | pnID, p:τ, ncycq
Rule node Nr ::“ prID, hd, body, cq
Edge E ::“ prID,nIDq | pnID, rIDq
Rule head hd ::“ pp~xq
Rule body body ::“ p1p ~x1q, ¨ ¨ ¨ , pnp ~xnq
Rule constraints c ::“ e1 bop e2 | c1^c2 | c1_c2 | Dx.c
A dependency graph has two types of nodes, predicate nodes, denoted Np, and rule nodes,
denoted Nr . Each predicate node corresponds to a tuple in the program. A predicate node
consists of a unique ID for the node, the name of the predicate and its type, and a tag
indicating whether the predicate is on a cycle in the graph. The tag cyc means that the
node is on a cycle and ncyc means the opposite. Each rule node corresponds to a rule in the
program. A rule node consists of a unique ID, the head of the rule, the body of the rule,
which is a list of predicates, and the constraints. The edges, denoted E, are directional.
Each edge points either from a rule node to the predicate node which is the head of that
rule node, or from a predicate node to a rule node where the predicate is in the rule body.
To make variable substitution easier, each predicate takes unique variables as arguments.
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For instance, the following two NDlog rules are equivalent, but r1 is the normal form.
r1: p(x,y) :- q(x1), s(y1), x1=y1, x=x1, y=y1.
r2: p(x,y) :- q(x), s(y), x=y.
The dependency graph for ThreeHops is shown in Figure 23, where boxes represent nodes
in the graph and arrows represent edges in the graph.
link: (int, int, int) →!pred!
onehop: (int, int, int) →!pred!
twohops: (int, int, int) →!pred!
threehops  (int, int, int) →!pred!
r1;  head: onehop x y z; body: link a b c!
constraints: x=a, y=b, z=c!
r2; head: twohop x y z; !
body: link a b c, onehop a’ b’ c’!
constraints: x=a, y=b’, z=c+c’ a=b’, b=b’!
r3; head: threehops x y z; !
body: onehop a b c, twohops a’ b’ c’!
constraints: x=a, y=b’, z=c+c’,  b=a’!
r4; head: threehops x y z; !
body: twohops a b c, onehop a’ b’ c’!
constraints: x=a, y=b’, z=c+c’, b=a’!
Figure 23: A dependency graph for the ThreeHops program(buggy)
Properties We focus on safety properties, which state that bad things have not happened
yet. We use trace-based semantics of NDlog [63, 19]. The advantage of trace-based semantics
over fixed point semantics is that the order in which predicates are derived can be clearly
specified using traces. Fixed point semantics only care about what is derivable in the end,
and are not precise enough to capture transient faults that appear only in the middle of the
execution of network protocols.
To allow for automated analysis, we restrict the form of properties to be the following:
ϕ “ @ ~x1.p1p ~x1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ @ ~xn.pnp ~xnq ^ cpp ~x1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ~xnq Ą
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D~y1.q1p~y1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ D ~ym.qmp ~ymq ^ cqp ~x1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ~xn, ~y1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ~ymq
The meaning of the property is the following: if all of the predicates pi are derivable, and
their arguments satisfy constraint cp, then each of the predicate qj must be in one of the
derivations of pi, and the constraint cq must be true. We implicitly require qis to be derived
before pis. A lot of the correctness properties can be specified using formulas of this form.
For instance, we can specify the following three properties of our ThreeHops program:
Q1: @x, y, z, threehops x y z Ą Dx1, z1, twohops x x1 z1
Q2: @x, y, z, threehops x y z
Ą Dx1, x2, z1, z2, z3, link x x1 z1 ^ link x1 x2 z2
^ link x2 y z3
Q3: Dx, y, z, threehops x y z
Q1 states that to derive threehops x y z, it is necessary to derive twohops x x1 z1, for some
x1 and z1. Q1 does not hold because there are two ways to derive threehops and one of
them does not contain such a twohops tuple as a sub-derivation. Q2 states that to derive a
threehops tuple, three links connecting those two nodes are necessary. Q2 should hold. Q3
states that threehops tuple is derivable for some x, y, and z.
4.2. Analyzing Non-recursive Programs
In this section, we first explain how to compute the derivation pool for a non-recursive
NDlog program. Then, we show how to check properties. Next, we show how to incorporate
network constraints into our property checking algorithm. Finally, we prove the correctness
of our algorithm and analyze its time complexity.
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4.2.1. Derivation Pool Construction
For a non-recursive program, its derivation pool maps each predicate to the set of all
derivation trees rooted at that predicate. It is formally defined as follows.
Derivation pool dpool ::“ ¨ | dpool, pnID, p:τq ÞÑ ∆
Entries ∆ ::“ ¨ |∆, pc,Dq
Derivation D ::“ pBT , pp~xqq | prID, pp~xq,D Listq
We write dpool to denote derivation pools. We write ∆ to denote lists of pairs of a constraint
and a derivation tree, denoted D. At a high-level, D can be instantiated to be a valid
derivation of pp~tq using rules in the program, if c is satisfiable. A derivation tree, D, is
inductively defined. The base tuples, denoted pBT , pp~xqq, are the leaf nodes. A non-leaf
node consists of the unique rule ID of the last rule of the derivation, the conclusion of that
rule (pp~xq), and the list of derivation trees for the body predicates of that rule (D List). We
write dpoolppq to denote dpoolpnID, p:τq, which returns ∆.
Figure 24 and 25 present the main functions used for constructing a derivation pool from a
dependency graph. The top-level function GenDPool is defined in Figure 24. This function
follows the topological order of the nodes in the dependency graph G. We keep track of a
working set P , which is the set of nodes whose derivations can be summarized currently.
We also keep track of the set of edges that the function has not traversed yet. The function
terminates when all of the edges in the dependency graph have been traversed and the
derivations for all of the predicates in the dependency graph are built. In the body of
GenDPool, we remove one predicate node p from P , and build all derivations for it. A base
tuple’s only possible derivation is one with itself as the leaf node. The constraint associated
with this derivation is the trivial true constraint J (Line 8). When p is not a base tuple,
derivations for tuples that p’s derivations depend on have been stored in dpool. The GenDs
function constructs derivations for p given the dependency graph and the current derivation
pool (explained later).
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1: function GenDPool(G)
2: E Ð G’s edges
3: P Ð G’s predicate nodes that have no incoming edges
4: while E ‰ empty || P ‰ empty do
5: remove pnID, p:τq from P
6: ~xÐ freshpp:τq
7: if p is a base tuple then
8: dpoolÐ dpoolrpnID, pq ÞÑ tpJ, pBT , pp~xqqqus
9: else
10: dÐ GenDs(G, dpool, pnID, p:τq)
11: dpoolÐ dpool Y d
12: (* done processing p, remove edges *)
13: P,E ÐremoveEdges(P , E, G, nID)
14: end while
15: end function
16:
17: function removeEdges(P , E, G, nID)
18: remove outgoing edges of nID from E
19: for each rID with no edges of form p , rIDq in E do
20: remove edges (rID, nID) from E
21: for each pnID, p:τq with no incoming edges in E do
22: add pnID, p:τq to P
23: end function
Figure 24: Construct derivation pools for non-recursive programs
After the derivations for a predicate p are constructed, outgoing edges from p are removed
(Line 13), so predicates that depend on p can be processed in later iterations. Function
RemoveEdges removes outgoing edges from p, and outgoing edges from rule nodes that now
do not have incoming edges. This may result in predicates enqueued into P for the next
iteration of processing.
Function GenDs (Figure 25) takes the dependency graph, the derivation pool that has been
constructed so far, and a predicate p, as arguments, and returns all derivation pool entries
for p. The body of GenDs calls GenDRule to construct derivations for each rule that
derives p. The function GenDRule makes use of List map and fold operations to construct
all possible derivations of p from a rule of the form r : pp~xq:-q1p~y1q, ..., qnp ~ynq, c. dpool has
already stored all possible derivations for each qi. We need to compute all combinations of
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1: function GenDs(G, dpool, pnID, p:τq)
2: ∆ Ð tu
3: for each rule with ID rID where (rID, nID) in G do
4: ∆ Ð ∆YGenDRule(G, dpool, pnID, p:τq,rID)
return ∆
5: end function
6:
7: function GenDRule(G, dpool, pnID, p:τq, rID)
8: ppp~yq, Q, crq Ð GprIDq
9: D Ð List.map (LookUp dpool) Q
10: D1 ÐList.FoldRight MergeDLL D nil
11: ~xÐ freshppp~yqq
12: return List.Map (completeD cr rID pp~yq ~x) D1
13: end function
14:
15: function MergeD(dci, dc2i)
16: pσ2i, c2i, d2iq Ð dc2i
17: pσi, ci, diq Ð dci
18: pσ1i, c
1
i, d
1
iq Ð freshpci, diq
19: return pσiσ1i Y σ2i, c1i ^ c2i, d1i::d2iq
20: end function
21:
22: function LookUp(dpool, qp~xq)
23: return List.Map (extractD ~x) dpoolpqq
24: end function
25:
26: function extractD(~x, pc, dq)
27: prID, pp~yq, dlq Ð d
28: return p~y{~x, c, dq
29: end function
30:
31: function completeD(cr, rID, pp~yq, ~x, d)
32: pσ, c, dlq Ð d
33: return pc ^ crr~x{~ysσ, prID, pp~xq, dlqq
34: end function
Figure 25: Generate derivation pool for one predicate
the derivations for qis. The LookUp function on line 11 collects the list of derivations for
one body tuple and the list map function returns the list of derivations for all body tuples.
More precisely, the LookUp function returns a list of tuples of the form pσ, c, dq, where
d is a derivation, c is the constraint associated with that derivation, and σ is a variable
substitution. The domain of σ is qi’s arguments in the rule node, and the range of σ is
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qi’s arguments in the conclusion of the derivations. We need these substitutions because
we alpha-rename the derivations. The constraint in the rule node needs to use the correct
variables. Line 12 uses list fold operation to generate all possible derivations. Function
MergeDLL and MergeDL are helper functions to generate the list of derivations. Function
MergeD is the function that takes as arguments, the list of derivations from qm to qi`1
and one derivation for qi, and prepends the derivation for qi to the list of derivations from
qm up to qi. Here, the substitutions need to be merged and the resulting constraint is the
conjunction of the two constraints. Finally on line 14, function completed generates a well-
formed derivation for p using the rule ID and the list of derivations for qis. The constraint
associated with this derivation of p is the conjunction of constraints for the derivation of
qi and the constraint in the rule body. The substitutions are applied to the constraint c,
because all derivations are alpha-renamed and use fresh variables.
Example Constraint Pool A simplified derivation pool for onehop, twohops, and threehops
is shown below. To ease presentation, we rewrite the derivation pool using equality con-
straints. onehop has only one derivation, using rule r1. A derivation D is a tuple consisting
of four fields: the name of the last rule in the derivation; the conclusion of the derivation;
the constraint associated with this derivation; and the list of derivations of the premises
of the last rule. We instantiate the rules with concrete variables. The constraint in D is
true, denoted J; as there is no constraint in r1. The predicate twohops also has only one
derivation, using r2. The premises of r2 are link and onehop. Since link is a base tuple,
we simply represent its derivation as the tuple itself. The sub-derivation of onehop is the
same as in the previous case. The constraint for deriving onehop is the conjunction of three
constraints: c1 is the constraint for deriving onehop, c2 for the base tuple link, and c3 the
rule constraint of rule r2. Here c2 is true, because no constraint is imposed on base tuples.
onehop
D: pr1, onehop x1 x2 x3, tlink x1 x2 x3uq
65
c “ J
twohops
D: pr2, twohops x1 x2 x3
tlink x1 x2 y3, pr1, onehop x1 x2 z3, tlink x1 x2 z3uuq
c “ J ^ J ^ x3 “ y3 ` y3
threehops
D1: (r3, threehops x1 x2 x3,
tpr1, onehop x1, y2, y3, tlink x1 y2 y3uq
pr2, twohops y2 x2 s3,
tlink y2 x2 t3, pr1, onehop y2 x2 u3, tlink y2 x2 u3uququq
c “ J ^ J ^ J ^ s3 “ t3 ` u3 ^ x3 “ y3 ` s3
D2: (r4, threehops x1 x2 x3,
tpr2, twohops x1 y1 s3,
tlink x1 y1 t3, pr1, onehop x1 y1 u3, tlink x1 y1 u3uuq
pr1, onehop y1, x2, y3, tlink y1 x2 y3uquq
c “ J ^ J ^ J ^ s3 “ t3 ` u3 ^ c5 “ x3 “ y3 ` s3
Tuple threehops has two derivations, one uses r3, the other uses r4. Both derivations con-
tain sub-derivations of onehop and twohops. The constraints for deriving threehops include
constraint for deriving twohops, onehop, and the rule constraint of r3 (r4).
4.2.2. Property Query
Figure 26 shows the property query algorithm for non-recursive programs. The top-level
function CkProp takes the derivation pool and the property as arguments. On line 3,
we separate the property into the list of predicates to the left of the implication (P ),
the constraint to the left of the implication (cp), the list of predicates to the right of the
implication (Q), and the constraint to the right of the implication pcqq. Next, similar to
the derivation pool construction, we construct all possible combinations of the derivations
of all the pis in P between lines 5 to 9. We omit the definition of MergeDerivation, as it
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1: function CkProp(dpool, ϕ)
2: pP, cp, Q, cqq Ð ϕ
3: LÐ LookUpRecpdpool, P q
4: D ÐMergeDerivation L
5: for each pσ, cd, dq in D do
6: z ÐCkPropD(cd, cpσ, d,Q, cqσ)
7: if z “ invalidpd, σrq then
8: return invalidpd, σrq
9: return valid
10: end function
11:
12: function CkPropD(cd, cp, d,Q, cq)
13: if Check sat cd ^ cp = (sat, σp) then
14: (* find all occurrences of q in d *)
15: Σ ÐList.map (Unify d) Q
16: if nil P Σ then
17: (* some qi does not appear in d *)
18: return invalid(d, σp)
19: else
20: Σq ÐMergeLL Σ
21: c1q ÐConj(Σq, cq)
22: ca Ð cp ^ cd ^ c1q
23: if Check sat ca “ psat, σaq then
24: return invalid(d, σa)
25: else
26: return valid
27: else
28: (* Constraints for p1 . . . pn and cp are unsat *)
29: return valid
30: end function
Figure 26: Property query
is similar to MergeDLL. The only difference is that we do not need to alpha-rename the
derivations. Next, we check that for each possible derivation of pis in D, all of qis appear in
the derivation, and the constraint cq holds (lines 10 to 14) using function CkPropD. If for
all possible derivations of pis, we can always find derivations of qis such that the constraint
cq holds, ϕ holds (line 14).
The function CkPropD checks that in the list of derivations d, with constraints cd, whether
all the predicates in Q appear in d, and cq is true. On Line 18, we first check whether all
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1: function CkPropDC(cd, cp, d,Q, cq, β, cb)
2: if Check sat cd ^ cp “ psat, σp) then
3: Σb ÐList.map (Unify d) β
4: Σ1b ÐMergeLL Σb
5: (* Given Σ1b “ σb1:: ¨ ¨ ¨ ::σbµ, c1b “
Źµ
`“1 cbσb` *)
6: c1b ÐConj(Σ1b, cb)
7: (* find all occurrences of q in d *)
8: Σ ÐList.map (Unify d) Q
9: if nilP Σ then
10: (* check network constraints *)
11: if Check sat cd ^ cp ^ pc1bq “ psat, σcq then
12: (* Network constraints are met *)
13: return invalid(d, σc)
14: else
15: return valid
16: else
17: Σq ÐMergeLL Σ
18: c1q ÐConj(Σq, cq)
19: cs Ð cd ^ cp ^ c1q ^ c
1
b
20: if Check sat cs “ psat, σsq then
21: (* Network constraints are met *)
22: return invalidpd, σsq
23: else
24: return valid
25: else
26: (* Constraints for p1 . . . pn and cp are unsat *)
27: return valid
28: end function
Figure 27: Property query with network constraints
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the pis are derivable and constraint cp is satisfiable. If the conjunction of the derivation
constraint cd and cp is not satisfiable, then the precedent of ϕ is false, so ϕ is trivially true
for that derivation. So, we return valid in the else branch (line 40). If the conjunction is
satisfiable, then there are substitutions for variables so that all the pis are derivable and the
constraint cp is satisfiable. Next, we need to check whether all qis are derivable. On line 20,
function Unify identifies a list of occurrences of qi in the derivation d. That is, for each qip~yiq
appearing in d, Unify returns the list of substitutions: p~y1{~xq::p~y2{~xq:: ¨ ¨ ¨ ::p ~yn{~xq::nil, where
~x is qi’s arguments in ϕ. The list map function returns the list of the list of occurrences for
all the qis in Q. We call it “UNIFY” because we unify the variables that are qi’s arguments
in ϕ with qi’s arguments in the derivation d. This substitution will be applied to constraint
cq later. If some qi does not appear in d, then Unify will return an empty list nil. Therefore,
on line 21, we check whether each qi will appear at least once in d. If it is not the case, then
we return invalid with the current derivation and one satisfying substitution that makes
pis true for constructing a counterexample. Otherwise, we check whether the constraint
cq can be satisfied. Before doing so, on line 30, we first compute the list of all possible
combinations of occurrences of qis. Again, the function MergeLL is similar to MergeDLL
and we omit the details. Now on line 32, for each possible appearance of qis in d, Σq is a list
of substitutions, each of which, when applied to cq, makes cq use the same variables as those
in the derivation. We ask whether the negation of cq together with the derivation constraint
and the constraint on the arguments of pis are satisfiable. If this is not satisfiable, then we
know that there exists a substitution for variables so that the property ϕ holds. Otherwise,
we return the derivation and the satisfying substitution that makes pis and qis derivable,
but cq false for counterexample construction.
4.2.3. Network Constraints
Sometimes, the network being analyzed has certain network constraints constraints; for in-
stance, every node in the network has only one outgoing link. Our property query algorithm
needs to take into consideration these network constraints. If we ignore these constraints,
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the counterexample generated by the tool may not be useful as the counterexample could
violate the network constraints.
Network constraints that our analysis can handle have similar form as the properties:
@ ~x1.b1p ~x1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ @ ~xk.bkp ~xkq Ą cbp ~x1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ~xkq, where bi is a base tuple. Figure 27 shows the
algorithm for checking properties on networks with constraints. For clarity, we explain the
case with one network constraint. Extending the algorithm to handle multiple constraints
is straightforward.
The top-level function CkPropC (omitted here) is almost the same as CkProp, except
that it takes a network constraint (ϕnet) as an additional argument and uses the function
CkPropDC, which additionally checks network constraints compared to CkPropD. The
function CkPropDC takes as additional arguments, a list base tuples B and the constraint cb
in the network constraint. In the body of CkPropDC, we first check whether the constraint
on pis is satisfiable (line 2). If it is not, then this derivation does not violate the property we
are checking (line 37). Next, between lines 3 to 10, we find all occurrences of the base tuples
in the constraint ϕnet . We find all possible combinations of substitutions for arguments of
these base tuples as they appear in the derivation d. For each occurrence of the base tuples,
the constraint cb needs to be true, so we compute the conjunction of all the cbs. To given
an example, if the constraint is @x, bpxq Ą x ą 0. If d has two occurrences of b, bpyq and
bpzq, then c1b “ y ą 0^z ą 0.
Next, we collect the list of the occurrences of qis, the same as before (line 12). If some qis
do not appear in d (line 13), we additionally check whether this derivation d satisfies the
network constraint (line 15). If it is the case, then we find a counterexample. Otherwise, d
does not violate the property being checked.
Then, we compute the combination of all possible occurrences of qis in derivation d (line 26)
as usual, and find the substitutions that make qis appear in d. We compute the conjunction
of all  cqs (line 28). If the conjunction of cd, cp, and the conjunction of all the cbs are found
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in lines 3 - 10, and the conjunction of all the  cqs is satisfiable, then networks constraints
are met although d does not satisfy the property being checked, and we report an error
(lines 30 - 34).
4.2.4. Analysis of the Algorithms
Correctness. We first prove that our derivation pool construction is correct. Lemma 2
states that an entry for a predicate p in the derivation pool maps to a valid derivation of p
if the constraints of that derivation is satisfiable; and that if a predicate p is derivable, then
there must be a corresponding entry in the derivation pool. The function DGraph generates
a dependency graph for prog, which can be straightforwardly defined. The semantics of
NDlog programs are bottom up, so a set of base tuples B is needed to start the execution
of the program. We write σ1ěσ to mean that σ1 extends σ. B denotes a set of ground
base tuples of prog. We write prog, B ( d:pp~tq to mean that d is a derivation of pp~tq using
program prog and base tuples B. We write pc, d1:pp~xqq P dpoolppq to mean that pc, d1q is an
entry in the derivation pool dpool for the predicate p and that d1 is a derivation tree with
pp~xq as the root.
Lemma 2 (Correctness of derivation pool construction).
DGraphpprogq “ G and GenDPoolpGq “ dpool
1. If prog, B ( d1:pp~tq, then Dσ s.t. pcp~xcq, dp ~xdq:pp~xqq P dpoolppq, dp ~xdqσ “ d1 and
( cp~xcqσ.
2. If pcp~xcq, dp ~xdq:pp~xqq P dpoolppq and ( cp~xcqσ where dompσq “ ~xc, then @σ1 s.t. σ1 ě σ
and dompσ1q “ ~xd, DB s.t. B “ tb | b is a base tuple and appears in dp ~xdqσ1u and
prog, B ( dp ~xdqσ1:pp~xqσ1.
Using the result of Lemma 2, we prove our property checking algorithm is correct with
regard to the formula semantics.
Theorem 3 (Correctness of property query).
ϕ “ @ ~x1.p1p ~x1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ @ ~xn.pnp ~xnq ^ cpp ~x1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ~xnq Ą
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D~y1.q1p~y1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ D ~ym.qmp ~ymq ^ cqp ~x1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ~xn, ~y1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ~ymq DGraphpprogq “ G and
GenDPoolpGq “ dpool,
1. CkProppdpool, ϕq “ valid implies @B, prog, B ( ϕ.
2. CkProppdpool, ϕq “ invalidpd, σq, implies DB s.t. prog, B * ϕ.
When network constraints are provided, we prove that the property checking algorithm is
correct with regard to the network constraints on base tuples.
Theorem 4 (Correctness of property query with constraints).
ϕ “ @ ~x1.p1p ~x1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ @ ~xn.pnp ~xnq ^ cpp ~x1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ~xnq Ą
D~y1.q1p~y1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ D ~ym.qmp ~ymq ^ cqp ~x1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ~xn, ~y1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ~ymq
ϕnet “ @ ~u1.b1p ~u1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ @ ~uk.bnp ~ukq Ą cbp ~u1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ~ukq
DGraphpprogq “ G and GenDPoolpGq “ dpool,
(1) CkPropCpdpool, ϕnet , ϕq “ valid implies @B, either prog, B ( ϕ or B * ϕnet.
(2) CkPropCpdpool, ϕnet , ϕq “ invalidpd, σq implies DB s.t. prog, B * ϕ and B ( ϕnet.
Time complexity. We give an upper bound on the time complexity of the property query
algorithm (Figure 26). Given an NDlog program with R rules; each rule contains at most
W body tuples. Also assume |Q| “ m and |P | “ n. The time complexity of our algorithm
is OppRnWRqnmWRnq. In practice, R and W are usually small. For example, in our case
study, R is bounded by 11 and W is bounded by 5. In this case, R and W can be viewed
as constants.
In CkPropD, we assume |Q| “ m, and d contains at most Dq instances for each qi in Q.
Also, assume each query of Z3 takes a constant time t. Therefore, the size of Σq in line 29
is bounded by pDqqm, and the running time of the loop (line 30 - line 34) is bounded by
pDqq
mt. So the time complexity of CkPropD is OppDqqmtq.
The time complexity of CkProp in Figure 26 is dominated by the loop in the algorithm,
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i.e., line 10 - line 13. Suppose each pi in P has at most Dp instances in d, and |P | “ n,
then for D in line 10, we have |D| ď pDpqn. Based on the above discussion, each loop takes
OppDqq
mtq. Therefore in the worst case, CkProp takes OppDpqnpDqqmtq to finish.
We give more detailed estimate of Dp and Dq. Assume the input NDlog program Prog has
R rules, and each rule has at most W body tuples. Define the height H of a derivation tree
as the number of rules on the longest path from the root predicate to any leaf predicate.
Also, let Dppkq represent the maximum possible number of derivations for a predicate all
of whose derivation trees have height at most k. Notice that Prog is non-recursive, so we
have k ă“ R, and Dp “ Dppkq. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 5. Given k ě 1 (k is a natural number), Dppkq ď R
řk´1
j“0 W
j
.
Proof. We prove Theorem 5 with mathematical induction. The base case is straightforward.
When k “ 1, we have Dpp1q ď R. This is true because k “ 1 means that the head predicate
can only be derived using one rule with base tuples as bodies. Since there are at most R
rules, the maximum number of derivations for the predicate is R. For the inductive case,
assume Theorem 5 holds for k “ n´ 1, which means Dppn´ 1q ď R
řn´2
j“0 W
j
. Now consider
a predicate p1 whose derivation trees’ maximum height is n. Given a rule r that derives p1,
each body tuple of r has all its derivation trees’ height bounded by n´ 1. Remember that
r has at most W body tuples. Thus the number of all possible derivations of p1 using rule
r is bounded by Dppn´ 1qW . Since there could be at most R rules that derives p1, we have
Dppnq ď RpDppn´ 1qqW “ R
řn´1
j“0 W
j
.
Based on Theorem 5, Dp “ OpRW
R
q. Next, we calculate Dq. Given a qi in Q, notice
that qi must appear in one of all derivations of p1is in P , which means the number of qi’s
appearance is bounded by the number of nodes that could exist in all the derivations. Each
such derivation has height at most R, with each node in the derivation having at most W
children. Therefore, the maximum number of nodes in a derivation is WR. Since there are
n derivations corresponding to p1is in P , we have Dq “ nWR. Replace Dp and Dq in the
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time complexity of CkProp, we have OppDpqnpDqqmtq “ OppRnW
R
qnmWRnq.
4.3. Extension to Recursive Programs
The dependency graph for a recursive program contains cycles. The derivation pool con-
struction algorithm presented in Figure 24 does not work for recursive programs because it
relies on the topological order of nodes in the dependency graph. In this section, we show
how to augment our data structures and algorithms to handle recursive programs.
4.3.1. Derivation Pool for Recursive Predicates
When p is recursively defined, dpool maps p to a pair pc,∆q, where ∆ has the same meaning
as before. The additional constraint c is an invariant of p: c is satisfiable if and only if p is
derivable.
Constraint pool dpool ::“ ¨ ¨ ¨ | dpool, pnID, p:τq ÞÑ pc,∆q
Derivation D ::“ ¨ ¨ ¨ | prec, pp~xqq
Annotation A ::“ ¨ |A, pnID, p:τq ÞÑ p~x, cq
Derivation trees include a new leaf node prec, pp~xqq, where p appears on a cycle in the
dependency graph. This leaf node is a place holder for the derivation of p. We write A to
denote annotations for recursive predicates, provided by the user. A maps a predicate p to
a pair p~x, cq, where ~x is the arguments of p and c is the constraint which is satisfiable if and
only if p is derivable.
The structure of the derivation pool construction remains the same. We highlight the
changes in Figure 28. The main difference is that now when a cycle is reached, the annota-
tions are used to break the cycle. The working set P , which contains the set of nodes that
can be processed next, includes not only predicate nodes that do not have incoming edges,
but also includes nodes that depend on only body tuples that have annotations. Consider
the following scenario: Rule r1 derives p and has two body tuples q1 and q2. Let’s assume
that there is no edge from q1 to r1, as q1 has been processed and q2 has an annotation in
A. In this case, we will place p in the working set. The above mentioned change is encoded
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in the new RemoveEdges function in Figure 28.
The second change is in constructing derivation pool entries for a predicate p. In the non-
recursive case, each derivation tree of a predicate p corresponds to the application of a rule
to the list of derivation trees for the body tuples of that rule. In the recursive case, if one
of the body tuples, say q, is on a cycle, when we process p, q’s entries in dpool have not
been constructed. However, the constraint under which q can be derived is given in the
annotation A. In this case, we use prec, qp~xqq as a place holder for derivations for q, and
use the constraint in A as the constraint for this derivation. The change is reflected in the
LookUp function for collecting possible derivations of the body predicates (lines 21-23).
Finally, annotations need to be verified. The GenDs function checks the correctness of
the annotations after all the predicates have been processed (lines 5-15). For a recursive
predicate, the derivation pool maps it to a summary constraint and a list of possible deriva-
tions (a pair pc,∆q). The requirement of the summary constraint for p is that it has to
be satisfiable if and only if there is at least one derivation for the recursive predicate p.
That is, this summary constraint has to be logically equivalent to the disjunction of the
constraints associated with all possible derivations of p in ∆. We consider two cases for a
predicate on a cycle of the dependency graph: (1) there is an annotation for it in A and (2)
there is no annotation. For both cases, we need to collect all the possible constraints for
deriving p from ∆. Function EX Disj computes the disjunction of constraints in ∆. Each
constraint is existentially quantified over the arguments that do not appear in p. For case
(1), we need to check that the annotation is logically equivalent to the disjunction of the
constraints for all possible derivations of p (line 10). If this is the case, then the annotated
constraint together with ∆ is returned; otherwise, an error is returned, indicating that the
invariant doesn’t hold. For case (2), we return the disjunctive formula returned by EX Disj
(Lines 15). When p is not recursive, only ∆ is returned (line 17).
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4.3.2. Property Query
We use the same property query algorithm for non-recursive program. This obviously
has limitations, because the derivations of recursive predicates are not expanded. The
imprecision of the analysis comes from the following two sources. The first is that derivations
represented as prec, pp~xqq may contain predicates needed by the antecedent of the property
(the qis in ϕ). Without expanding these derivations, the algorithm may report that ϕ
is violated because qis cannot be found, even though this is not the case in reality. The
second is that network constraints cannot be accurately checked. When we find a suitable
derivation d that contains all the qis such that cq holds, checking the network constraints
on d requires us to expand prec, pp~xqqs in d. The algorithm may report that the property
holds, even though, the witness it finds does not satisfy the network constraints. Similarly,
when the algorithm reports that the property does not hold, the counterexample may not
satisfy the network constraints. For the analysis to be precise, we would need annotations
for recursive predicates to provide invariants for recursive predicates. Our case studies do
not require annotations. Expanding the algorithm to handle recursive predicates precisely
remains our future work.
4.3.3. Analysis of the Algorithms
Correctness. Similar to the non-recursive case, we prove the correctness of derivation
pool construction. We only prove the soundness of the query algorithm. Because derivations
of recursive predicates are summarized as prec, pp~xqq, the correctness of the derivation pool
construction needs to consider the unrolling of prec, pp~xqq.
First, we define a relation dpool $ dk, σk  k`1 dk`1, σk`1 (for k ě 0) to mean that a
derivation dk with the substitution σk can be unrolled using derivations to dpool to another
derivation dk`1 and a new substitution σk`1. The rules defining this relation allow the
prec, q leafs in the derivation to be gradually expanded, starting from the root and moving
up the tree.
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We write dk to denote the derivation after unrolling a derivation d for a sequence of k steps:
d, σ0  0 d, σ0  1 d1, σ1  2 . . .  i di, σi  i`1 di`1, σi`1  i`1 . . .  k dk, σk. The  i`1
rules ensure that each di has no prec, q leafs from the root up to the i ´ 1th level Step
di, σi  i`1 di`1, σi`1 expands the prec, q leafs at the ith level of di, and thus di`1 has no
prec, q leafs from the root up to the ith level.
Figure 29 shows the inference rules for proving correctness of recursive cases. Rule Base
does not extend the derivation. Rule WkInd weakens the index from k to a larger number
n when derivation d does not contain any recursive subderivations of form prec, q. Given a
derivation prID, pp~xq, d1:: . . . ::dn::nilq with no prec, q leafs from the root up to the k ´ 1th
level, and whose subderivations d1, . . . , dn that can be expanded to subderivations d11, . . . , d1n
which have no prec, q leafs from the root to the k ´ 1th level, then rule Rnrec expands
prID, pp~xq, d1:: . . . ::dn::nilq to derivation prID, pp~xq, d11:: . . . ::d1n::nilq, which has no prec, q
leafs from the root up to the the kth level. The last rule, Rrec, is the key rule that expands
the derivation of the recursive predicate p at the root in one step. Recursive derivation
prec, pp~xqq with substitution σ is expanded to a derivation d:pp~xq P ∆p whose constraint c
is satisfiable for some substitution σ Y σ1.
We write d0, σ0 ÞÝÑ dk, σk as shorthand notation for the above sequence of steps.
Lemma 6 shows that the derivation pool construction algorithm is correct with respect to an
unrolling of the derivation. If a predicate p is derivable, then the derivation pool will have
an entry for for p which can be unrolled into that concrete derivation. For every natural
number `, if there is a skeleton derivation d for p in the derivation pool and the corresponding
constraint to derive d is satisfiable, then either we can unroll d to a concrete derivation d1 for
p within ` steps, where d1 does not contain any subderivations of form prec, qp ~xqqq, or after
unrolling d for ` steps, the resultant derivation d1 contains some recursive subderivations of
form prec, qp ~xqqq, and if every prec, qp ~xqqq can be unrolled to a concrete derivation, then the
derivation d for predicate p can be unrolled to a concrete derivation.
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We state the key points of the lemma in this section.
Lemma 6 (Correctness of derivation pool construction (recursive)). DGraphpprogq “ G,
and GenDPoolpG,Aq “ dpool
1. If prog, B ( d:pp~tq, then either p is not on a cycle in G and Dpcp~xcq, d1p ~xd1q:pp~xqq P
dpoolppq, Dσ2d where ( cp~xcqσ2d| ~xc, s.t. using substitution σ2d, d1p ~xd
1
q can be unrolled
into d, or p is on a cycle in G and Dpcpp~xq,∆pq P dpoolppq, Dσ2d s.t. ( cpp~xqσ2d|~x, s.t.
using substitution σ2d, prec, pp~xqq can be unrolled into d.
2. @` P N,
(a) If pcp~xcq, dp ~xdq:pp~xqq P dpoolppq and ( cp~xcqσ, either Dd1p ~xdq s.t. d1p ~xd1q does
not contain any prec, q, dp ~xdq can be unrolled to d1p ~xd1q in ` steps, and d1p ~xd1q
can be unrolled to d with an appropriate extension of substitution σ, or Dd1p ~xd1q
s.t. d1p ~xd1q contains some prec, sp ~xsqq, dp ~xdq can be unrolled to d1p ~xd1q in ` steps,
and @prec, sp ~xsqq P d1p ~xd1q, Dds, `s s.t. prec, sp ~xsqq can be unrolled to ds with an
appropriate extension of substitution σ| ~xs implies Dd2 s.t. prog, B ( d2 and dp ~xdq
and be unrolled to d2 with an appropriate extension of substitution σ.
(b) If pcrec:pp~xq,∆pq P dpoolppq and ( crec:pp~xqσ, then either Dd1p ~xdq s.t. d1p ~xd1q does
not contain any prec, q, prec, pp~xqq can be unrolled to d1p ~xd1q in ` steps, and d1p ~xd1q
can be unrolled to d with an appropriate extension of substitution σ, or Dd1p ~xd1q
s.t. d1p ~xd1q contains some prec, sp ~xsqq, prec, pp~xqq can be unrolled to d1p ~xd1q in `
steps, and @prec, sp ~xsqq P d1p ~xd1q, Dds, `s s.t. prec, sp ~xsqq can be unrolled to ds
with an appropriate extension of substitution σ| ~xs implies Dd2 s.t. prog, B ( d2
and prec, pp~xqq can be unrolled to d2 with an appropriate extension of substitution
σ.
As we discussed in Section 4.3.2, we cannot show a general correctness theorem without
annotations for recursive predicates. We can only prove the soundness of the algorithm
when there is no network constraint.
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Lemma 7 (Soundness of property query).
ϕ “ @ ~x1.p1p ~x1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ @ ~xn.pnp ~xnq ^ cpp ~x1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ~xnq Ą
D~y1.q1p~y1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ D ~ym.qmp ~ymq ^ cqp ~x1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ~xn, ~y1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ~ymq
DGraph(prog) = G and GenDPoolpG,Aq “ dpool and
CkProppdpool, ϕq “ valid implies @B, prog, B ( ϕ.
Time complexity. The time complexity of the property query algorithm on recursive pro-
grams is the same as that of non-recursive programs. More concretely, we also use CkProp
to check properties on recursive programs, so the time complexity remains OppDpqnpDqqmtq.
In addition, the estimate about Dp and Dq remains the same as in non-recursive case. Ob-
serve that the height of a derivation in the derivation pool is still bounded by R. This is
because in the derivation pool construction algorithm (Figure 28), each rule node is pro-
cessed at most once. Therefore a path in a derivation from the root predicate to any leaf
predicate could have at most R rules. So we directly have Dq “ nWR. For Dp, Theorem 5
also holds true. The base case is unchanged. For the inductive step, the body tuple now
could be a recursive tuple with user’s annotation. However, since we do not expand the
derivations for recursive tuples, but collect its annotation as a constraint, the number of
derivations for the recursive tuple is effectively one, which satisfies the inductive hypothesis.
The rest of the proof is the same. In conclusion, Theorem 5 remains true. Together with
the bound on the height of derivations (i.e., R), this means that Dp “ OpRW
R
q. And the
whole complexity remains unchanged.
4.4. Case Study
We apply our tool to the verification of software-defined networking (SDN) applications.
SDN is an emerging networking technique that allows network administrators to program
the network through well-defined interfaces (e.g., OpenFlow protocol [57]). SDNs intention-
ally separate the control plane and the data plane of the network. A centralized controller is
introduced to monitor and manage the whole network. The controller provides an abstrac-
tion of the network to network administrators, and establishes connections with underlying
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switches. Recently, declarative programming languages have been used to to write SDN
controller applications [61]. Like any program, these applications are not guaranteed to be
bug-free. We show the effectiveness of our tool in validating and debugging several SDN
applications. We demonstrate that the tool can unveil problems in the process of SDN ap-
plication development, ranging from software bugs, incomplete topological constraints and
incorrect property specification. All verifications in our case study are completed within
one second.
4.4.1. Verification Process
We first provide a high-level description of the verification process. When analyzing a
property, the user is expected to provide three types of inputs: (1) formal specification
of the property in the form discussed in Section 5.2; (2) formal specification of initial
network constraints (e.g., topological constraints and switch default setup); and (3) formal
specification of invariants on recursive tuples.
Our tool takes the above user specifications along with the NDlog program as inputs. It first
checks the correctness of the invariants on recursive tuples. After invariants are validated,
the tool runs the main algorithm for verification, and outputs either “True” if the property
holds, or “False” if the property is not valid. For invalid properties, the tool also generates
a concrete counterexample to help the programmer debug the program.
4.4.2. Ethernet Source Learning
The first case study we consider is Ethernet source learning, which allows switches in a
network to remember the location of end hosts through incoming packets. More specifically,
three kinds of entities are deployed in the network: (1) end hosts (servers or desktops)
at the edge of the network that send packets to the network through connected switches,
(2) switches that forward a packet if the packet matches a flow entry in the forwarding
table, or relay the packet to the controller for further instruction if there is a table miss,
and (3) a controller that connects to all switches in the network. The controller learns the
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position of an end host through packets relayed from a switch, and installs a corresponding
flow entry in the switch for future forwarding.
Encoding We encode the behaviors of each component in NDlog. Figure 30 presents the
NDlog encoding of Ethernet Source Learning (progESL). In a typical scenario, an end host
initiates a packet and sends it to the switch that it connects to (rh1). The switch recursively
looks up its forwarding table to match against the received packet (rs1, rs2). If a flow entry
matches the packet, it is forwarded to the port indicated by the “Action” part of the entry
(rs3). Otherwise, the switch wraps the packet in an OpenFlow message, and relays it to the
controller for further instruction (rs5). On receiving the OpenFlow message, the controller
first extracts the location information of the source address in the packet (the OpenFlow
message registers incoming port for each packet), and installs a flow entry matching the
source address in the switch (rc1). The controller then instructs the switch to broadcast
the mismatched packet to all its neighbors other than the upstream neighbor who sent the
packet (rc2). Rules rs5 and rs6 specify the reaction of the switch corresponding to Rules
rc1 and rc2 respectively — the switch either inserts a flow entry into the forwarding table
(rs5) or broadcasts the packet (rs6) as instructed.
Network constraints We use the basic network constraints in Figure 31 to limit the
topology of the network that runs Ethernet source learning.
We demand that an end host always initiates packets using its own address as source, and the
switch it connects to cannot be the source or the destination (constraints on initPacket).
In addition, the controller cannot share addresses with switches (constraints on ofconn),
and a switch cannot have a link to itself (constraints on single swToHst). Also, each switch
should have only one link connecting the neighbor host, and no two hosts can connect to
the same port of a switch (constraints on any two swToHsts).
Verification results We verify a number of safety properties that are expected to hold
in a network running the Ethernet Source Learning program. Table 3 lists all the properties
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of the program that we investigate. Here we discuss properties in detail.
Property ϕESL2 specifies that whenever an end host receives a packet not destined to it,
the switch that it connects to has no matching flow entry for the destination address in the
packet. Though this property is seemingly true, our tool returns a negative answer, along
with a counterexample shown in Figure 32. The counterexample reveals a scenario where
an endhost (H4) receives a broadcast packet destined to another machine (H3) (Execution
trace (1) in Figure 32), but the switch it connects to (S1) has a flowEntry that matches the
destination MAC address in the packet (Execution trace (2) in Figure 32).
In the counterexample, switch S1 receives a packet xSrc : H6, Dst : H3y through port
2 from the upstream switch S2 ( 1 ). Since S1 does not have a flow entry for the desti-
nation address H3, it relays the packet wrapped in an OpenFlow message (i.e. ofPacket)
to the controller C1( 2 ). The controller then instructs S1 to broadcast the packet to all
neighbors except S2 ( 3 ). However, before Server H4 receives the broadcast packet, a new
packet xSrc : H3, Dst : H4y could reach switch S1( 4 ), triggering an ofPacket message
to the controller ( 5 ). The controller would then set up a new flow entry at switch S1,
matching destination H3 ( 6 , 7 ). It is possible that due to network delay, server H4 receives
its copy of the broadcast packet just now( 8 ). Therefore, the execution trace generates
packet (H4,S1,H6,H3), swToHst (S1,H4,1) (i.e. the link between S1 and H4), and flowEntry
(S1,H3,2,1), with Mac ““ DstMac (H3 “ H3).
Our tool also generates a counterexample for another seemingly correct property—ϕESL3 .
This property specifies that whenever an end host receives a packet destined to it, the
switch it connects to has a flowEntry matching the end host’s MAC address. The generated
counterexample (Figure 33) shows that a packet could reach the correct destination by
means of broadcast — a corner case that can be easily missed with manual inspection. In
the counterexample, switch S1 receives a packet destined to server H4( 1 ). Since there is
no flow entry in the forwarding table to match the destination address, switch S1 informs
the controller of the received packet ( 2 ), and further broadcasts the packet under the
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controller’s instruction ( 3 ). In this way, server H4 does receive a packet destined to it ( 4 ),
but switch S1 does not have a flow entry matching H4.
With further inspection, the above counterexamples, are attributed to incorrect specification
of network properties, rather than bugs in the programs. In the first case, a stricter property
would specify that a received broadcast message indicates an earlier table miss. While in
the second one, the property fails to consider the possibility of specific broadcast messages
in the execution.
4.4.3. Firewall
Our second case study is a stateful firewall, which is usually deployed at the edge of a
corporate network to filter untrusted packets from the Internet. Compared to a stateless
firewall, which makes decision purely based on specific fields of a packet, a stateful firewall
allows richer access control depending on flow history. For example, the firewall can allow
traffic from an outside end host to reach machines inside the local domain only if the
communication was initiated by the internal machines.
Encoding We implement a SDN-based stateful firewall, which can set up filtering policies
under the instruction of the controller. The detailed encoding of the program can be found
in Figure 35. The firewall enforces the following policy: end-hosts in the corporate domain
can send traffic to the outside world but, for security reasons, traffic from an end-host
outside the domain can only enter the domain if that end-host has previously received
traffic from some end-host within the domain. The network is configured as follows. Two
types of hosts are connected to a switch: (i) trusted hosts (within the organization) via
port 1; and (ii) untrusted hosts (outside the organization) via port 2. Packets from trusted
hosts are always forwarded to untrusted hosts. Packets from untrusted hosts are forwarded
to trusted hosts only if the source host has previously received a packet from a trusted host.
Key tuples generated at each node executing the program are listed in Table 4. Table 5
summarizes all the rules in the firewall program.
83
Network constraints The network constraints for the base tuples in the firewall program
are given in Figure 36.
Verification results We verify a number of properties about the stateful firewall, which
are listed below. All the properties are valid.
Property ϕFW 1 states that for every packet a trusted host receives from an untrusted host
via Switch, in the past the switch has received a packet sent from some trusted host (via
port 1) to the untrusted host (via port 2). Property ϕFW 2 states that if the flow table on
the switch contains an entry between Src (via untrusted port) and Dst (via trusted port),
then in the past the switch has received a packet sent from some Host (via trusted port) to
Src. Property ϕFW 3 states that the trusted controller memory records a connection between
Switch and a host, then in the past some trusted source had sent a packet to that host.
4.4.4. A Weak Firewall
To further evaluate our tool, we modify the above stateful firewall slightly to construct
a “weaker” firewall. The new firewall differs by not requiring packets received from the
trusted port to be forwarded to the Internet.
Encoding We present our implementation of the program (progWeakFW ) in Figure 38.
Key tuples generated at each node executing the program are listed in Table 6. The firewall
forwards traffic from trusted hosts in the local domain without interference (r1), and also
notifies the controller of the destination address in the packet (r2). When the firewall
receives a packet from the Internet, it relays the packet to the controller for further decision
(r4). If the source address was once registered at the controller, the controller would install
a flow entry in the firewall (r5), allowing packets of the same flow to access the internal
domain in the future (r3).
Network constraints The network constraints for this modified version of firewall are
shown in Figure 39. They are similar to those given in the case study of firewall (Sec-
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tion 4.4.3), but with an additional link tuple.
Verification results We check the property ϕWeakFW over the weak firewall:
ϕWeakFW “
@Host,Port,Src,SrcPort,Switch,
pktReceivedpHost,Port,Src,SrcPort,Switchq Ą
DCntrl, trustedControllerMemoryp@Cntrl,Switch,Srcq
The property specifies that source destinations of all packets reaching internal machines are
trusted by the controller. Surprisingly, our tool gives a counterexample for this property
(Figure 34), which depicts the scenario that an internal machine H3 sends a packet to
another internal machine H4 in the same domain through the firewall F1. Because the
controller C1 never registers local machines, the property is violated.
Despite its simplicity, we find the counterexample interesting, because it can be interpreted
in different ways; each corresponds to a different approach to fixing the problem. The
counterexample can be viewed as revelation of a program bug. The user can add a patch
to the program and re-verify the property over the updated program. Alternatively, the
counterexample could be linked to incomplete specification of network constraints that
internal machines should never send internal traffic to the firewall. The fix would then
be to insert extra constraints over base tuples of the program. In addition, the problem
could also stem from the property specification, since users may only care about traffic
from outside the domain. In this case, we can change the property specification, specifying
that if a packet is from an external machine, the source address must be registered at the
controller before. In real deployment, it is up to the user to decide which interpretation is
most appropriate.
4.4.5. Load Balancing
The third case study is load balancing. When receiving packets to a specific network service
(e.g., web page requests), a typical load balancer splits the packets on different network
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paths to balance traffic load. There are a number of strategies for load balancing, e.g.,
static configuration or congestion-based adjustment. In our case study, we implement a load
balancer which load balances traffic towards a specific destination address, and determines
the path of a packet based on the hash value of its source address.
Encoding Figure 40 presents our implementation of load balancer implemented in NDlog
(progLB). Key tuples generated at each node executing the program are listed in Table 7.
We summarize the program in Table 8.
When the load balancer receives a packet, it first inspects its destination address. If the
destination address matches the address that the load balancer is responsible for, the load
balancer would generate a hash value of the source destination of the packet (r1). The hash
value is used to select the server to which the packet should be routed. The load balancer
replaces the original destination address in the packet with the address of the selected server,
and forwards the packet to the server (r2). In addition, the load balancer has a default rule
that forwards traffic not destined to the designated address without interference (r3).
Network constraints The network constraints are shown in Figure 41.
Verification result The property that we verify for load balancing is called flow affinity,
that is, if two servers receives packets requesting the same service—which means the packets
share the same initial destination address—the source addresses of the packets must be
different. Formally:
@Server1 ,Server2 ,Src1 ,Src2 ,
recvPacketpServer1 ,Src1 ,ServiceAddrq
^recvPacketpServer2 ,Src2 ,ServiceAddrq
^Server1 ‰ Server2 Ą
Src1 ‰ Src2
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The property does not hold in the given protocol specification, and a counterexample is
given by our tool (Figure 42). In the counterexample, two load balancers responsible for
different network service could co-exist in the network, and if a server sends packets to both
load-balancers, requesting the same service, it is possible that the packets are routed to
different servers.
Similar to the case of the firewall, the programmer can fix the counterexample of the load
balancer by patching the program, adding network assumption (e.g., assuming no server is
connected to two load-balancers), or changing property specification (e.g., “load-balanced
packets that are forwarded out of different ports of the load balancer do not share the same
source address”).
4.4.6. Ethernet Address Resolution
The final case study we focus on is the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) in an Ethernet
network. End hosts use ARP to request the destination MAC address corresponding to an
IP address that they want to communicate to. Traditionally, the ARP requests are broadcast
through the domain. In our case study, we replace the broadcast with a centralized controller
that answers ARP requests.
Encoding Figure 43 presents an implementation of our NDlog encoding of SDN-based
ARP (progARP). Key tuples generated at each node executing the program are listed in
Table 9.
Network constraints The network constraints of ARP are defined in Figure 44.
Verification results We verified two safety properties on the ARP program (Figure 10).
All properties are valid.
4.4.7. Discussion
We discuss our experience of using the tool and insights obtained from the case studies.
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Overhead of Annotations Our tool demands that the user specify annotations for re-
cursive predicates in recursive programs (Section 4.3.1). Since this is a manual process and
requires domain-specific knowledge of the user, the whole verification time depends largely
on the time spent in annotation specification. Based on our empirical experience when
verifying recursive programs in the case study (e.g., Ethernet source learning), most anno-
tations are straightforward – which involve simple equality/inequality between attributes,
and in certain cases, could be empty at all (e.g., ϕESL4 in Table 3). In most scenarios, the
discovery of annotations takes only several minutes.
Cause of property violation The counterexamples we discuss above reveal a common
pattern: when a predicate in the program has multiple derivations, proving properties over
the predicate becomes harder. The situation is even worse when a property involves multiple
predicates, each with multiple derivations. The increased complexity of predicate deriva-
tions makes it error-prone for human programmers to write correct programs or specify
correct properties, and serves as the core cause of property violation. Naturally, the fixes
we proposed for counterexamples generally fall into two categories: (1) enriching the prop-
erty specification to include the missing derivations, or (2) changing the program to remove
the uncovered derivations.
Iterative application development Another observation is that reasonable network
assumptions (e.g., topological constraints) helps prune scenarios that would not appear in
actual executions, and generate insightful counterexamples. For example, a counterexam-
ple may suggest a topology where a switch has a link to itself. A programmer may start
with trivial network assumptions and let the tool guide the exploration of corner cases and
gradually add (implicit) network assumptions that are not obvious to the programmer. In
fact, our tool enables the programmer to iteratively develop applications. The generated
counterexamples could help the programmer understand (1) applicable domain of the pro-
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gram (feedback of missing network constraints); (2) implementation correctness (feedback
of bugs in the program); and/or (3) expected behavior of the program (feedback of incor-
rect property specification). After the programmer fix the problem, she or he can redo the
verification repeatedly until the specified property holds.
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1: function GenDs(G, dpool, pnID, p:τq)
2: ∆ Ð tu
3: for each rule with ID rID where (rID,nID) in G do
4: ∆ Ð ∆YGenDRule(G, dpool, pnID, p:τq,rID)
5: if pnID, p:τq is on a cycle then
6: (* gather all constraints *)
7: p~x, cq Ð Ex DisJ(∆)
8: if Appq “ p~y, cAq then
9: (* check annotation *)
10: if Check sat  pcAr~x{~ysôcq“psat, q then
11: return annotation error
12: else
13: return pcA,∆q
14: else
15: return pc,∆q
16: else
17: return ∆
18: end function
19:
20: function LookUp(dpool, qp~xq)
21: if q P A then
22: p~y, cAq Ð Apqq
23: return p~y{~x, cA, prec, qp~yqq::nilq
24: else
25: if dpoolpqq “ ∆ then
26: return List.Map (extractD ~x) ∆
27: else
28: dpoolpqq “ pcqp~yq,∆qq
29: return p~y{~x, c, prec, qp~yqq::nilq
30: end function
31:
32: function LookUpRec(dpool, qp~xq)
33: if dpoolpqq “ ∆ then
34: return List.Map (extractD ~x) ∆
35: else
36: dpoolpqq “ pcqp~yq,∆qq
37: return List.Map (ExtractD ~x) ∆q
38: end function
39:
40: function RemoveEdges(P , E, G)
41: remove outgoing edges of nID from E
42: for each rID with no edges of form p , rIDq in E do
43: remove edges (rID, nID) from E
44: if pnID, p : τq has no incoming edges in E then
45: add pnID, p : τq to P
46: if every pnID1, q : τ 1q s.t. pnID1, rIDq, prID,nIDq P E, pnID1, q : τ 1q in A then
47: add pnID, p : τq to P
48: end function
Figure 28: Construct derivation pools for recursive programs
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Base
dpool $ d, σ  0 d, σ
WkInd
dpool $ d, σ  k d, σ k ă n d does not contain prec, q as subderivations
dpool $ d, σ  n d, σ
Rnrec
@i P r1, ns, dpool $ di, σ  k d1i, σi σ1 “
Ťn
i“1 σi
dpool $ prID, pp~xq, d1:: . . . ::dn::nilq, σ  k`1 prID, pp~xq, d11:: . . . ::d1n::nilq, σ1
Rrec
dpoolppq “ pcp,∆pq pcp~zcq, dp~zdq:pp~zqq P ∆p ~zd1 “ freshp~zdz~zq
( cp~zcqr~zd
1
{p~zdz~zqsr~x{~zspσ Y σ
1q
dpool $ prec, pp~xqq, σ  1 dp~zdqr~zd1{p~zdz~zqsr~x{~zs, σ Y σ1
Figure 29: Inference rules for correctness proof of recursive NDlog programs
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/* Controller program */
rc1 flowMod(@Switch, SrcMac, InPort) :-
ofconn(@Controller, Switch),
ofPacket(@Controller, Switch, InPort, SrcMac, DstMac).
rc2 broadcast(@Switch, InPort, SrcMac, DstMac) :-
ofconn(@Controller, Switch),
ofPacket(@Controller, Switch, InPort, SrcMac, DstMac).
/* Switch program */
rs1 matchingPacket(@Switch, SrcMac, DstMac, InPort, TopPriority) :-
packet(@Switch, Nei, SrcMac, DstMac),
swToHst(@Switch, Nei, InPort),
maxPriority(@Switch, TopPriority).
rs2 matchingPacket(@Switch, SrcMac, DstMac, InPort, NextPriority) :-
matchingPacket(@Switch, SrcMac, DstMac, InPort, Priority),
flowEntry(@Switch, MacAdd, OutPort, Priority),
Priority > 0, DstMac != MacAdd, NextPriority := Priority - 1.
rs3 packet(@OutNei, Switch, SrcMac, DstMac) :-
matchingPacket(@Switch, SrcMac, DstMac, InPort, Priority),
flowEntry(@Switch, MacAdd, OutPort, Priority),
swToHst(@Switch, OutNei, OutPort),
Priority > 0, DstMac == MacAdd.
rs4 ofPacket(@Controller, Switch, InPort, SrcMac, DstMac) :-
ofconn(@Switch, Controller),
matchingPacket(@Switch, SrcMac, DstMac, InPort, Priority),
Priority == 0.
rs5 flowEntry(@Switch, DstMac, OutPort, Priority) :-
flowMod(@Switch, DstMac, OutPort),
ofconn(@Switch, Controller),
maxPriority(@Switch, TopPriority), Priority := TopPriority + 1.
rs6 packet(@OutNei, Switch, SrcMac, DstMac) :-
broadcast(@Switch, InPort, SrcMac, DstMac),
swToHst(@Switch, OutNei, OutPort), OutPort != InPort.
/* Host program */
rh1 packet(@Switch, Host, SrcMac, DstMac) :-
initPacket(@Host, Switch, SrcMac, DstMac),
hstToSw(@Host, Switch, OutPort).
rh2 recvPacket(@Host, SrcMac, DstMac) :-
packet(@Host, Switch, SrcMac, DstMac),
hstToSw(@Host, Switch, InPort).
Figure 30: NDlog implementation of progESL
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ϕnet1 initPacketpHost, Switch, Src,Dstq Ą
Host ‰ Switch ^ Host “ Src ^
Host ‰ Dst ^ Switch ‰ Dst.
ϕnet2 ofconnpController, Switchq Ą
Controller ‰ Switch.
ϕnet3 swToHstpSwitch,Host, Portq Ą
Switch ‰ Host ^ Switch ‰ Port ^ Host ‰ Port.
ϕnet4 swToHstpSwitch1, Host1, Port1q ^
swToHstpSwitch2, Host2, Port2q Ą
pSwitch1 “ Switch2 ^ Host1 “ Host2 Ą
Port1 “ Port2q ^
pSwitch1 “ Switch2 ^ Port1 “ Port2 Ą
Host1 “ Host2q.
Figure 31: Network constraints for Ethernet source learning
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Figure 32: A counterexample for property ϕESL2
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Prop Description Formal specification Result
ϕESL1
If the switch has
a routing entry for
a host with MAC
address A, it has
received a packet
sourced from that
host in the past.
@Switch,Mac,OutPort,Priority,
flowEntrypSwitch,Mac,OutPort,
Priorityq
^Mac “ A Ą
DNei,DstMac,
packetpSwitch,Nei,Mac,DstMacq
true
ϕESL2
If an EndHost has
received a packet
that is not destined
for its MAC address,
the switch does not
have a routing entry
for that EndHost’s
MAC address.
@EndHost,Switch,SrcMac,DstMac,
InPort,OPort,Outport,Mac,Priority,
packetpEndHost,Switch,SrcMac,
DstMacq
^swToHstpSwitch,EndHost,OPortq
^flowEntrypSwitch,Mac,Outport,
Priorityq
^DstMac ‰ EndHost Ą
Mac ‰ DstMac
false
ϕESL3
If EndHost has re-
ceived a packet des-
tined for it, then the
switch has a flow en-
try for the EndHost.
@EndHost,Switch,SrcMac,
DstMac,OPort,
packetpEndHost,Switch,SrcMac,
DstMacq
^swToHstpSwitch,EndHost,OPortq
^DstMac “ EndHost Ą
DSwitch1,Mac,Outport,Priority,
flowEntrypSwitch1,Mac,Outport,
Priorityq
^Switch1 “ Switch ^Mac “ DstMac
false
ϕESL4
If the switch has a
flowEntry for a host
with mac address
Mac, then there has
been a flow table
miss in the past for
that particular host
@Switch,Mac,Outport,Priority,
flowEntrypSwitch,Mac,Outport,Priorityq
Ą
DSwitch1,SrcMac,DstMac, InPort,
Priority1,
matchingPacketpSwitch1,SrcMac,
DstMac, InPort,
Priority1q
^Switch1 “ Switch ^ SrcMac “ Mac
^InPort “ Outport ^ Priority1 “ 0
true
Table 3: Safety properties of progESL and verification results
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Figure 33: A counterexample for property ϕESL3
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Figure 34: A counterexample for property ϕWeakFW
Predicate Description
pktReceivedp@Dst,DstPort,Src,
SrcPort,Switchq
Host Dst has received a packet via the Switch
through port DstPort, that was originally
send by host Src through port SrcPort
pktInp@Switch,Src,SrcPort,Dstq A packet sent by host Src through port
SrcPort with target host Dst appeared on the
switch
trustedControllerMemoryp@Controller ,
Switch,Hostq
Controller stores a link between Switch an
(untrusted) Host.
connectionp@Switch,Controllerq There is a connection between Switch and
Controller
perFlowRulep@Switch,Src,SrcPort,
Dst,DstPortq
Switch stores in its memory that untrusted
host Src is allowed to send packets to trusted
host Dst
pktFromSwitchp@Controller ,Switch,
Src,SrcPort,Dstq
Switch asks Controller to check if untrusted
host Src is allow to send a packet to host Dst
Table 4: Relations for progFW
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#define TRUSTED_PORT 1
#define UNTRUSTED_PORT 2
/* (@Switch) Program
* a packet from a trusted host via TRUSTED_PORT
* appeared on switch without a forwarding rule
* we know its from a trusted host since it came via
* TRUSTED_PORT forward packet to untrusted hosts
*/
r1 pktReceived(@Dst, Uport, Src, Tport, Switch):-
pktIn(@Switch, Src, Tport, Dst),
Uport := UNTRUSTED_PORT,
Tport == TRUSTED_PORT.
r2 trustedControllerMemory(@Controller,
Switch, Dst):-
pktIn(@Switch, Src, Tport, Dst),
connection(@Switch, Controller),
Tport == TRUSTED_PORT.
/* (@Switch) Program
* a packet from with a forwarding rule appears on
* the switch Forward according to the rule
* The packet may be from a trusted/untrusted source
*/
r3 pktReceived(@Dst, PortDst, Src, PortSrc, Switch):-
pktIn(@Switch, Src, PortSrc, Dst),
perFlowRule(@Switch, Src, PortSrc, Dst, PortDst).
/* (@Switch) Program
* Packet from untrusted host appeared on
* switch Send it to the controller to check
* if it is trusted
*/
r4 pktFromSwitch(@Controller, Switch, Src,
Uport, Dst):-
pktIn(@Switch, Src, Uport, Dst),
connection(@Switch, Controller),
Uport == UNTRUSTED_PORT.
r5 perFlowRule(@Switch, Src, Uport, Dst, Tport):-
pktFromSwitch(@Controller, Switch, Src, Uport, Dst),
trustedControllerMemory(@Controller, Switch, Src),
Uport == UNTRUSTED_PORT,
Tport := TRUSTED_PORT.
Figure 35: NDlog implementation of progFW
96
Rule Summary
r1 a packet from a trusted host, with destination an untrusted host, appeared on
switch without a forwarding rule. Forward the packet to the untrusted host.
r2 A packet from a trusted host appeared on switch without a forwarding rule.
Insert the target host Dst of the packet into trusted controller memory.
r3 A packet from with a forwarding rule appears on the switch, which forwards
it according to its flow table
r4 A packet from an untrusted host appeared on switch, which sends it to the
controller to check if it can forward the packet to its intended destination
r5 Controller checks a packet originally sent by an untrusted host, found that
there is a previous link between that untrusted host and the switch, and tells
the switch that it can forward the packet by inserting a per flow rule into the
switch for that untrusted host
Table 5: Summary of progFW encoding
ϕFWnet1 connectionpSwitch, Controllerq Ą
Switch ‰ Controller
ϕFWnet2 pktInpSwitch,Src,SrcPort,Dstq Ą
Switch ‰ Src ^ Switch ‰ SrcPort
^Switch ‰ Dst ^ Src ‰ SrcPort
^Src ‰ Dst ^ SrcPort ‰ Dst
ϕFWnet3 pktInpSwitch1 ,Src1 ,SrcPort1 ,Dst1 q
^ pktInpSwitch2 ,Src2 ,SrcPort2 ,Dst2 q
^ Switch1 ‰ Switch2 ^ Src1 “ Src2 Ą
SrcPort1 “ SrcPort2
Figure 36: Network constraints for the firewall program
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ϕFW 1 @Switch,Src,SrcPort,Dst,
pktReceivedpDst,PortDst,Src,PortSrc,Switchq
^ PortDst “ 1 ^ PortSrc “ 2 Ą
DController ,Host,HostPort,
pktInpSwitch,Host,HostPort,Srcq
^HostPort “ 1
ϕFW 2 @Switch,Src,SrcPort,Dst,DstPort,
perFlowRulepSwitch,Src,SrcPort,Dst,DstPortq
^ SrcPort “ 2 ^ DstPort “ 1 Ą
DHost,HostPort,
pktInpSwitch,Host,HostPort,Srcq
^ HostPort “ 1
ϕFW 3 @Controller ,Switch,Host,
trustedControllerMemorypController ,Switch,Hostq Ą
DSrc,SrcPort,
pktInpSwitch,Src,SrcPort,Hostq
^ SrcPort “ 1
Figure 37: Properties for the stateful firewall
Predicate Description
pktReceived(@Dst,DstPort,Src,
SrcPort,Switch)
Dst has received a packet via the Switch
through port DstPort, that was originally
send by host Src through port SrcPort
pktIn(@Switch,Src,SrcPort,Dst) A packet sent by host Src through port
SrcPort with target host Dst appeared on
the switch
trustedControllerMemory(@Controller ,
Switch,Host)
Controller stores a link between Switch
and an (untrusted) Host.
connection(@Switch, Controller) There is a connection between Switch and
Controller
perFlowRule(@Switch,Src,SrcPort,
Dst,DstPort)
Switch stores in its memory that un-
trusted host Src is allowed to send pack-
ets to trusted host Dst
pktFromSwitch(@Controller ,Switch,
Src,SrcPort,Dst)
Switch asks Controller to check if un-
trusted host Src is allow to send a packet
to host Dst
link(@Switch,Dst,PortDst) Switch is linked to Dst via PortDst
Table 6: Relations for progWeakFW
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#define TRUSTED_PORT 1
#define UNTRUSTED_PORT 2
r1 pktReceived(@Dst, Uport, Src, Tport, Switch) :-
pktIn(@Switch, Src, Tport, Dst),
link(@Switch, Dst, Uport),
Tport == TRUSTED_PORT.
r2 trustedControllerMemory(@Controller,
Switch, Dst) :-
pktIn(@Switch, Src, Tport, Dst),
connection(@Switch, Controller),
Tport == TRUSTED_PORT.
r3 pktReceived(@Dst, PortDst, Src,
PortSrc, Switch) :-
pktIn(@Switch, Src, PortSrc, Dst),
link(@Switch, Dst, PortDst),
perFlowRule(@Switch, Src, PortSrc, Dst).
r4 pktFromSwitch(@Controller, Switch,
Src, Uport, Dst) :-
pktIn(@Switch, Src, Uport, Dst),
connection(@Switch, Controller),
Uport == UNTRUSTED_PORT.
r5 perFlowRule(@Switch, Src, Uport, Dst) :-
pktFromSwitch(@Controller, Switch, Src, Uport, Dst),
trustedControllerMemory(@Controller, Switch, Src),
Uport == UNTRUSTED_PORT,
Tport := TRUSTED_PORT.
Figure 38: NDlog implementation of progWeakFW
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ϕWeakFWnet1 connectionpSwitch, Controllerq Ą
Switch ‰ Controller
ϕWeakFWnet2 pktInpSwitch,Src,SrcPort,Dstq Ą
Switch ‰ Src ^ Switch ‰ SrcPort
^Switch ‰ Dst ^ Src ‰ SrcPort
^Src ‰ Dst ^ SrcPort ‰ Dst
ϕWeakFWnet3 pktInpSwitch1 ,Src1 ,SrcPort1 ,Dst1 q
^ pktInpSwitch2 ,Src2 ,SrcPort2 ,Dst2 q
^ Switch1 ‰ Switch2 ^ Src1 “ Src2 Ą
SrcPort1 “ SrcPort2
ϕWeakFWnet4 linkpSwitch,Dst,PortDstq Ą
Switch ‰ Dst ^ Switch ‰ PortDst
^ Dst ‰ PortDst
ϕWeakFWnet5 linkpSwitch1 ,Dst1 ,PortDst1 q
^ linkpSwitch2 ,Dst2 ,PortDst2 q Ą
pSwitch1 “ Switch2 ^ Dst1 “ Dst2
Ą PortDst1 “ PortDst2 q
^ pSwitch1 “ Switch2 ^ PortDst1 “ PortDst2
Ą Dst1 “ Dst2 q
Figure 39: Network constraints for weak firewall
#define NUM_SERVERS 5
r1 packet(@LoadBalancer, Client, Server) :-
initPacket(@Client, Server, LoadBalancer).
r2 hashed(@LoadBalancer, Client, ServerNum, Server) :-
packet(@LoadBalancer, Client, Server),
designated(@LoadBalancer, DesignatedDst),
DesignatedDst == Server,
Value := f_hashIp(Client),
ServerNum := 1+f_modulo(Value, NumServers),
NumServers := NUM_SERVERS.
r3 recvPacket(@Server, Client, ServiceAddr) :-
hashed(@LoadBalancer, Client, ServerNum, ServiceAddr),
serverMapping(@LoadBalancer, Server, ServerNum).
r4 recvPacket(@Server, Client, Server) :-
packet(@LoadBalancer, Client, Server),
designated(@LoadBalancer, DesignatedDst),
Server != DesignatedDst,
ServiceAddr := Server.
Figure 40: NDlog implementation of progLB
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initPacketp@Client,Server ,
LoadBalancer)
Client sends out a packet to LoadBalancer
with intended destination Server .
packetp@LoadBalancer ,Client,
Server)
LoadBalancer received a packet from Client
that has destination Server
designatedp@LoadBalancer ,
DesignatedDst)
For packets arriving on LoadBalancer
with destination address DesignatedDst,
LoadBalancer determines it path of a packet
based on the hash value of its source address.
hashedp@LoadBalancer ,Client,
ServerNum, Server)
LoadBalancer had received a packet whose
destination address matches the address that
it is responsible for. LoadBalancer generates
a hash value of the source address of Client
to obtain an integer ServerNum. ServerNum
is uniquely mapped to Server , to which the
packet is to be routed.
serverMappingp@LoadBalancer ,
Server ,ServerNum)
LoadBalancer stores the bijective mappings of
each destination server to a unique number,
ServerNum
recvPacketp@Server ,Client,
ServiceAddr)
Server has received a packet from source
Client via LoadBalancer .
Table 7: Relations for progLB
Event Rule Summary
Initialize Packets r1 A load balancer receives a packet that a client
has sent out.
A packet appearing on a
load balancer is destined to
the load balancer’s desig-
nated server
r2 A load balancer has received a packet to be
sent to its designated destination. It hashes
the source and uses that result modulo the
number of servers to get a number correspond-
ing to a server.
r3 The load balancer matches the integer ob-
tained by hashing to obtain a server to send
the packet to.
Packet appearing on a load
balancer is not to be sent to
its designated server
r4 The load balancer forwards the packet directly
to the destination as prescribed by the packet.
Table 8: Summary of progLB encoding
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ϕLBnet1 initPacketpv1, v2, v3q Ą
v1 ‰ v2 ^ v2 ‰ v3 ^ v1 ‰ v3
ϕLBnet2 designatedpv4, v5q Ą
v4 ‰ v5
ϕLBnet3 designatedpv9, v10q ^ designatedpv11, v12q
^ v9 “ v11 Ą
v10 “ v12
ϕLBnet4 serverMappingpv6, v7, v8q Ą
v6 ‰ v7 ^ v7 ‰ v8 ^ v6 ‰ v8
ϕLBnet5 serverMappingpv13, v14, v15q
^ serverMappingpv16, v17, v18q
^ v13 “ v16 ^ v14 “ v17 Ą
v15 “ v18
ϕLBnet6 serverMappingpv13, v14, v15q
^ serverMappingpv16, v17, v18q
^ v13 “ v16 ^ v15 “ v18 Ą
v14 “ v17
Figure 41: Network constraints for load balancing
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Figure 42: A counter example for property ϕLB
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/* Constants */
#define BROADCAST="ff:ff:ff:ff:ff", ALL_PORT=0, ARP_TYPE="ARP",
IPV4_TYPE="IPV4", CONTROLLER="controller ", ARP_REQUEST=1,
ARP_REPLY=2, ARP_PRIO=1
x/* Host program */
rh1 packet(@Switch, Host, DstMac, DstIp, SrcMac, SrcIp, Arptype) :-
linkHst(@Host, Switch, Port),
arpRequest(@Host, SrcIp, SrcMac, DstIp, DstMac),
Host == SrcIP, Arptype := ARP_REQUEST, DstMac == BROADCAST.
rh2 arpReply(@Host, SrcIp, SrcMac, DstIp, DstMac) :-
linkHst(@Host, Switch, Port),
packet(@Host, Switch, DstMac, DstIp, SrcMac, SrcIp, Arptype),
Arptype == ARP_REPLY, Type == ARP_TYPE, DstMac == Host.
/* Controller program */
rc1 hostPos(@Controller, SrcIp, Switch, InPort) :-
ofconnCtl(@Controller, Switch),
packetIn(@Controller, Switch, InPort, DstMac, DstIp, SrcMac, SrcIp, Arptype),
Arptype == ARP_REQUEST, DstMac == BROADCAST.
rc2 arpReqCtl(@Controller, SrcIp, SrcMac, DstIp, DstMac) :-
packetIn(@Controller, Switch, InPort, DstMac, DstIp, SrcMac, SrcIp, Arptype),
ofconnCtl(@Controller, Switch), Arptype == ARP_REQUEST.
rc3 arpMapping(@Controller, SrcIp, SrcMac) :-
arpReqCtl(@Controller, SrcIp, SrcMac, DstIp, DstMac).
rc4 arpReplyCtl(@Controller, DstIp, Mac, SrcIp, SrcMac) :-
arpReqCtl(@Controller, SrcIp, SrcMac, DstIp, DstMac),
arpMapping(@Controller, DstIp, Mac).
rc5 packetOut(@Switch, Controller, Port, DstMac, DstIp, SrcMac, SrcIp, Arptype) :-
arpReplyCtl(@Controller, SrcIp, SrcMac, DstIp, DstMac),
ofconnCtl(@Controller, Switch),
hostPos(@Controller, DstIp, Switch, Port), Arptype := ARP_REPLY.
/*Switch program*/
rs1 packetIn(@Controller, Switch, InPort, DstMac, DstIp, SrcMac, SrcIp, Arptype) :-
ofconnSwc(@Switch, Controller),
packet(@Switch, Host, DstMac, DstIp, SrcMac, SrcIp, Arptype),
linkSwc(@Switch, Host, InPort),
flowEntry(@Switch, Arptype, Prio, Actions),
Prio == ARP_PRIO, Actions == CONTROLLER, DstMac == BROADCAST.
rs2 packet(@Host, Switch, DstMac, DstIp, SrcMac, SrcIp, Arptype) :-
packetOut(@Switch, Controller, OutPort, DstMac, DstIp, SrcMac, SrcIp, Arptype),
linkSwc(@Switch, Host, OutPort), Arptype == ARP_REPLY.
Figure 43: NDlog implementation of progARP
103
Predicate Description
packetp@Switch,Host,DstMac,DstIp,
SrcMac,SrcIp,Arptypeq
Switch has received an ARP mes-
sage of Arptype (Request/Reply)
from Host. The message is from
(SrcMac,SrcIp) to (DstMac,DstIp).
packetInp@Controller ,Switch, InPort,
DstMac,DstIp,SrcMac,SrcIp,Arptype)
Initializes the packet above.
linkHstp@Host,Switch,Portq Host is connected to Switch via Port
linkSwcp@Switch,Host, InPortq Switch is connected to Host via
InPort
arpRequestp@Host,SrcIp,SrcMac,
DstIp,DstMacq
An ARP request message at Host of
(SrcMac,SrcIp), querying the MAC
address of DstIp.
hostPosp@Controller ,SrcIp,Switch, InPortq The controller registers the informa-
tion that the host with Source IP Sr-
cIp is connected the port InPort of
Switch.
ofconnCtlp@Controller ,Switchq Controller has a connection to
Switch
arpMappingp@Controller ,SrcIp,SrcMacq Controller remembers that the host
of IP address SrcIp has the MAC ad-
dress SrcMac.
arpReqCtlp@Controller ,SrcIp,SrcMac,
DstIp,DstMacq
An ARP request message sent
from (SrcMac,SrcIp) to Controller ,
querying the MAC address of DstIp.
arpReplyCtlp@Controller ,DstIp,DstMac,
SrcIp,SrcMacq
An ARP reply message answering
SrcMac of SrcIp to the host with
IP address DstIp and MAC address
DstMac,
packetOutp@Switch,Controller ,Port,
DstMac,DstIp,SrcMac,SrcIp,Arptypeq
An OpenFlow message sent from
Controller to Switch, to send an
ARP packet of type Arptype from
SrcIp,SrcMac to DstIp,DstMac
flowEntryp@Switch,Arptype,Prio,Actionsq A flow entry of priority Prio at
Switch that applies Actions to pack-
ets of type Arptype.
Table 9: Relations for progARP
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ϕLBnet1 initPacketpv1, v2, v3q Ą v1 ‰ v2 ^ v2 ‰ v3 ^ v1 ‰ v3
ϕLBnet2 designatedpv4, v5q Ą v4 ‰ v5
ϕLBnet3 designatedpv9, v10q ^ designatedpv11, v12q ^ v9 “ v11 Ą v10 “ v12
ϕLBnet4 serverMappingpv6, v7, v8q Ą v6 ‰ v7 ^ v7 ‰ v8 ^ v6 ‰ v8
ϕLBnet5 serverMappingpv13, v14, v15q
^ serverMappingpv16, v17, v18q
^ v13 “ v16 ^ v14 “ v17 Ą
v15 “ v18
ϕLBnet6 serverMappingpv13, v14, v15q
^ serverMappingpv16, v17, v18q
^ v13 “ v16 ^ v15 “ v18 Ą
v14 “ v17
Figure 44: Network constraints for ARP
Prop Property description Formal specification Result
ϕARP1
If any controller sends an
ARP response for IP ad-
dress IPA, then some end
host had sent a broadcast
ARP request message for
IPA.
@Ctl, IPA,MacA,DstIP,DstMac,
arpReplyCtlpCtl, IPA,MacA,
DstIP,DstMacq Ą
DQmac,
arpRequestpHost,DstIp,DstMac,
IPA,Qmacq
^ Qmac “ 255
true
ϕARP2
If any controller has a
map between IP address
IPA and MAC address
MacA, then host A has
sent a broadcast ARP re-
quest.
@Ctl, IPA,MacA,
arpMappingpCtl, IPA,MacAq Ą
DHost,SrcIP,SrcMac,
DstIP,DstMac,
arpReplypHost, IPA,MacA,
DstIp,DstMacq
^ DstMac “ 255
true
Table 10: Results of checking safety properties of progARP on our tool
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CHAPTER 5
Runtime Analysis with Compressed Provenance
The previous two chapters mainly focus on using formal methods to verify properties of
distributed systems. In reality, formal verification cannot guarantee that a system would run
without failure. One reason is that only the verified properties are expected to hold during
execution, and due to the complexity of applying formal methods to system verification,
such properties are only a fragment of the desirable property space. Another reason is
attributed to the runtime failure – e.g., hardware errors and power outage – that could
not be anticipated during verification stage. The above discussion motivates the need for
supporting runtime diagnostics in distributed systems, by which the network administrator
could identify the root cause of any failure that happens during system execution.
In this part of the dissertation, STRANDS provides runtime analysis of distributed systems
by introducing storage-optimized network provenance, which allows the user to issue queries
over compressed network meta-data about the history execution of a distributed system.
In recent years, network provenance has been successfully applied to various network set-
tings, resulting in proposals for distributed provenance [95], secure network provenance [92],
distributed time-aware provenance [94], negative provenance [85], differential provenance [16].
These proposals demonstrate that database-style declarative queries can be used for main-
taining and querying distributed provenance at scale. Moreover, they are useful for a wide
range of forensic analysis for determining root causes of misconfigurations, errors, attacks,
and have even been shown to allow automated repair of network configurations [84].
One of the main drawbacks of the existing techniques is their potentially significant storage
overhead, when network provenance is incrementally maintained as network events occur
continuously. This is particularly challenging for the data plane of networks that deals with
frequent and high-volume incoming data packets. When there are streams of incoming
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packet events, the provenance information can become prohibitively large. While there is
prior work on the storage efficiency of provenance maintenance in the literature [15][46][94],
there is no solution that achieves significant storage reduction in a distributed scenario with
both low network overhead and low query latency. Our contributions are:
System Model. We propose a new network programming model, which specifies dis-
tributed event-based linear programs (DELPs), a restricted variant of NDLog programs.
Each DELP is composed of a set of rules triggered by events, and executes until a fixpoint
is reached. Unlike traditional event-condition-action rules, a DELP has the option of desig-
nating slow changing tuples, which do not change while a distributed fixpoint computation
is happening, but are still amenable to update at intervals. An example of a slow changing
tuple could be a routing entry in a router. We show, through two example applications
(packet forwarding and DNS resolution), that this model is general enough to cover a wide
range of network applications.
Distributed Provenance Compression. Based on the DELP model, we propose two
techniques to store provenance information efficiently. Our second technique combines mul-
tiple provenance trees together, based on a notion of equivalence classes. In each equivalence
class, provenance trees are identical except for a few pre-defined nodes. We compress these
equivalent trees by maintaining only one concrete copy for the shared part, along with the
delta information for each individual provenance tree. We also propose to efficiently iden-
tify equivalence between provenance trees by simply inspecting the values of input events’
attributes, thus reducing the computation overhead in a distributed environment.
Implementation and Evaluation. We implement a prototype of our distributed com-
pression scheme based on the RapidNet declarative networking engine [59]. We enhance
RapidNet to include a rule rewrite engine that maintains provenance at runtime. Provenance
queries are implemented as distributed recursive queries over the maintained provenance
information. We deploy and evaluate our prototype using two popular network applications
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r1 packetp@N,S,D,DT q :́ packetp@L, S,D,DT q,
routep@L,D,Nq.
r2 recvp@L, S,D,DT q :́ packetp@L, S,D,DT q, D ““ L.
Figure 45: An NDlog program for packet forwarding
n1 n2 n3
route
L D N
@n1 n3 n2
route
L D N
@n2 n3 n3
Figure 46: An example deployment of packet forwarding. Node n1 and node n2 has a local
route table indicating routes towards node n3.
– i.e., packet forwarding and DNS resolution – and the performance results show that the
compression techniques achieve comparably low storage demand as well as lower query la-
tency compared to alternative solutions, with only negligible network overhead added to
each monitored network application at runtime.
We use an example query of NDlog (Figure 45) and its deployment in a topology of three
nodes (Figure 46) to help illustrate our design. In the example program of Figure 45, r1
forwards a local packet (packet) to neighbor N by looking up the packet’s destination D in
the local routing table (route). r2 receives a packet and stores it locally in recv table, if the
packet is destined to the local node (D ““ L). In Figure 46, Nodes n1 and n2 both have
a route table, storing the next hop – i.e., n2 for n1 , and n3 for n2 – to reach n3 .
5.1. Background
We first introduce the concept of distributed network provenance, and shows how it is
maintained in a typical Internet-scale network provenance engine ExSPAN [95].
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5.1.1. Distributed Network Provenance
Data provenance [40] can be used to explain why and how a given tuple is derived. Based on
data provenance, prior work [96] also proposes network provenance, which faithfully records
the execution of (possibly erroneous) applications in a (possibly misconfigured) distributed
system. This allows the network administrators to inspect the derivation history of system
states. For example, suppose there is a direct link between n1 and n3 in Figure 46. If
the user prefers the routing with the shortest paths, the routing entry of n1 in Figure 46
would have been erroneous – a correct entry should be routep@n1, n3, n3q. The provenance
engine, agnostic of this error, would record the packet traversal on the path n1 Ñ n2 Ñ n3.
The user can later use this recorded provenance as explanation on why the packet took a
particular route, eventually leading to further investigation into the route table at n1.
Network provenance is typically represented as a directed tree rooted at the queried tuple.
Figure 47 shows the provenance tree of a tuple recvp@n3, n1, n3, “data”q. This provenance
tree records the traversal of packetp@n1, n1, n3, “data”q from node n1 to n3 in Figure 46.
There are two types of nodes in a typical provenance tree: the rule nodes and the tuple nodes.
The rule nodes (i.e., the oval nodes in Figure 47) stand for the rules that are triggered in
the program execution, while the tuple nodes (i.e., the square nodes in Figure 47) represent
tuples that trigger/are derived by the rule execution. Note that the root of a provenance
tree is always a tuple node that represents the queried tuple.
To maintain the provenance, traditional database work [46] often stores data provenance
along with the target tuple for efficient provenance querying. Such centralized provenance
maintenance turns out to be very costly for network provenance – which is typically con-
structed in a distributed fashion – in terms of the extra bandwidth needed to ship the
provenance information.
ExSPAN [96], a representative distributed provenance engine, maintains the provenance
information in a distributed relational database. There are two (distributed) tables in the
109
prov
Loc VID RID RLoc
n3 vid6 rid3 n3
(sha1(recvp@n3, n1, n3, “data”q))
n3 vid5 rid2 n2
(sha1(packetp@n3, n1, n3, “data”q))
n2 vid4 rid1 n1
(sha1(packetp@n2, n1, n3, “data”q))
n2 vid3 NULL NULL
(sha1(routep@n2, n3, n3q))
n1 vid2 NULL NULL
(sha1(packetp@n1, n1, n3, “data”q))
n1 vid1 NULL NULL
(sha1(routep@n1, n3, n2q))
ruleExec
RLoc RID R VIDS
n3 rid3(sha1(r2+n3+vid5)) r2 (vid5)
n2 rid2(sha1(r1+n2+vid3+vid4)) r1 (vid3,vid4)
n1 rid1(sha1(r1+n1+vid1+vid2)) r1 (vid1,vid2)
Table 11: Relational tables (ruleExec and prov) maintaining the provenance tree in Figure 47.
database: a prov table and a ruleExec table. The prov table records the rule triggering of a
derived tuple, while the ruleExec table maintains the body tuples triggering a specific rule.
Table 11 shows an example distributed database storing the provenance tree in Figure 47.
The Loc attribute in the prov table and the RLoc attribute in the ruleExec table indicate
the location of each tuple.
ExSPAN uses a recursive query to retrieve the provenance tree of a queried tuple. For exam-
ple, to query the provenance tree of recvp@n3, n1, n3, “data”q (Figure 47), ExSPAN first com-
putes the hash value vid6 of the tuple, and uses vid6 to find the tuple provpn3, vid6, rid3, n3q
in the prov table. ExSPAN further uses rid3 and n3 to locate ruleExecpn3, rid3, r2, pvid5qq
in the ruleExec table, which represents the provenance node of the rule execution (i.e., r2)
that derives vid6. To further query the body tuples that triggered r2, the querier would
then look up pvid5q in the prov table. This recursive querying continues until it reaches the
base tuples (e.g., routep@n1, n3, n2q).
We adopt the same storage model as ExSPAN. However, our provenance compression scheme
applies generally to any distributed provenance model.
110
packet(@n1,n1,n3, data  
packet(@n2,n1,n3, data  
r1@n1
route(@n1,n3,n2)
r1@n2
route(@n2,n3,n3)
packet(@n3,n1,n3, data  
r2@n3
recv(@n3,n1,n3, data  
Figure 47: A (distributed) provenance tree for execution of packetp@n1, n1, n3, “data”q,
which traversed from node n1 to node n3 in Figure 46.
5.1.2. Motivation for Effective Provenance Compression
A key problem not addressed in prior work on network provenance [95][94] is to reduce
storage effectively while retaining efficiency of the querying process. Provenance information
in a typical network can become very large, especially for distributed applications (e.g.,
network protocols) where event tuples trigger rules in a streaming fashion. For example,
in Figure 46, if n1 initiates a large volume of traffic towards n3 , each packet in the traffic
would generate a provenance tree similar to the one in Figure 47. Given that today’s
routers forward over millions of packets per second, this would incur prohibitively high
storage overhead for the maintenance of distributed provenance on each intermediate node.
On the other hand, querying efficiency of provenance is important as well. Failure in a
company’s cloud network, for example, could cost millions of dollars and quick provenance
retrieval is essential to root-cause analysis of network anomaly. Therefore, though there
are existing solutions that could achieve significant low storage overhead, such as general
content-level compression (e.g., gzip) or replay-based reactive provenance maintenance [94],
new approaches need to be developed to allow for more efficient querying process.
We observe however that the provenance of different packets share significant similarities
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in their structures, presenting opportunities for provenance compression across different
provenance trees. For example, in Figure 46, whenever a new packet is sent from n1 to n3,
an entire provenance tree is created and maintained. However, it is not hard to observe that
all the packets traversing through n1 and n2 take the same route – that is, they join with
the same local route tuples. Therefore, storage of the provenance trees generated by these
packets could be significantly reduced if we manage to remove the observed redundancy.
5.1.3. Challenges and Requirements
The key challenge of provenance compression in a distributed system is to achieve high
storage saving while incurring low network overhead. More specifically, our compression
strategy aims to achieve the following three goals:
• Efficient querying of provenance. A user should be able to query provenance
information efficiently regardless of how provenance is stored. We hence avoid com-
pression techniques that focus on content-level compression (e.g. gzip) – as such
techniques would require the user to decompress the whole provenance information
each time, even if the user is only interested in the provenance of one event – and opt
for conservative compression that preserves the structure of the provenance trees.
• Compression should be effective. Our compression approach should ensure that
significant reduction in provenance storage overhead.
• Compression should have low network overhead. Unlike centralized environ-
ment, a distributed system has limited network resources. Therefore, the compression
technique is expected to have low impact on normal network operations – e.g., incur
low bandwidth overhead.
5.2. Model
Following our background, we next introduce our system model, which includes modeling
of distributed systems, network applications, and provenance information.
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A distributed system DS is modeled as an undirected graph G “ pV , Eq. Each node Ni in
V represents an entity in DS. Two nodes Ni and Nj can communicate with each other if
and only if there is an edge (Ni, Nj) in E . In DS, each node Ni maintains a local state in
the form of a relational database DBi. Tables in DBi can be divided into base tables and
derived tables. Tuples in base tables are manually updated, while tuples in derived tables
are derived by network applications. Figure 46 is an example distributed system with three
nodes.
5.2.1. Network Applications
Each node in DS runs a number of network applications, which are specified in NDlog with
syntactic restriction. The syntactic restriction enables efficient provenance compression
(Section 5.4), while still being expressive enough to model most network applications. In
particular, we have:
Definition 1. An NDlog program Prog=tr1, r2, ..., rnu is a distributed event-driven linear
program (DELP), if Prog satisfies the following three conditions:
• Each rule is event-driven. Each rule ri is in the form: rheads : ´revents, rconditionss,
where revents is a body relation designated by the programmer, and rconditionss are
all non-event body atoms.
• Consecutive rules are dependent. For each rule pair (ri, ri`1) in Prog, the head
relation of ri is identical to the event relation in ri`1.
• Head relations only appear as the event relations in rule bodies. For each head relation
hd in any rule ri, there does not exist a rule rj, such that hd is a non-event relation
in rj.
In a typical network application, non-event relations often represent network states, which
change slowly compared to the fast rate of incoming events. For example, in packet forward-
ing, the route relation is either updated manually or through a network routing protocol.
In either case, it changes slowly compared to the large volume of incoming packets. We
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call such non-event relations in a DELP as slow-changing relations, and assume they do not
change during the fixpoint computation. This assumption is realistic and can be enforced
easily in the networks where configuration is updated at runtime and packets see only ei-
ther the old or new configuration version across routers, as shown in prior work [71] in the
networking community.
A DELP tr1, r2, ..., rnu can be deployed in a distributed fashion over a network, and its
execution follows the pipelined semi-näıve evaluation strategy introduced in prior work [54]
– whenever a new event tuple is injected into a node Ni, it triggers r1 by joining with the
slow-changing tuples at Ni. The generated head tuple hd is then sent to a node Nj as
identified by the location specifier of hd – triggering r2 at Nj . This process continues until
rn is executed.
DELP can model a large number of network applications, due to their event-driven nature,
such as packet forwarding (Figure 45), Domain Name System (DNS) resolution [58], Dy-
namic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [28] and Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) [68].
5.2.2. Provenance of Interest
It is often the case that network administrators use a subset of network states more often
than others as their starting point for debugging. In the packet forwarding example, an
administrator is more likely to query the provenance of a recv tuple rather than a packet
tuple upon packet misrouting, because the nodes that generate recv tuples are usually the
first places where an administrator observes abnormality. Therefore, we allow a user to
specify relations of interest – i.e., relations whose provenance information interests a user
the most in a network application – and our runtime system maintains concrete provenance
information only for those tuples of the relations of interest. However, the provenance of
other tuples – i.e., those of the relations of less interest – is still accessible. We can adopt,
for example, the reactive maintenance strategy proposed in DTaP [94], by only maintaining
non-deterministic input tuples, and replaying the whole system execution to re-construct
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packet(@n1,n1,n3, data  
r1@n1
route(@n1,n3,n2)
r1@n2
route(@n2,n3,n3)
r2@n3
recv(@n3,n1,n3, data  
Figure 48: An optimized provenance tree for the tree in Figure 47.
the provenance information of the tuples of less interest during querying.
As with prior work [96], we represent the provenance information of the tuples of interest
as provenance trees. The only difference is that, given the syntactic restriction of a DELP,
our system treats slow-changing tuples as base tuples during provenance querying – i.e., the
provenance tree of a slow-changing tuple, e.g., a route tuple, is not automatically presented,
even if the tuple could be derived from another network application, e.g., a routing protocol.
To obtain the provenance tree of a route tuple during provenance querying, a user could
specify route as a relation of interest in the application that derives it, and explicitly query
the provenance tree of the route tuple in a separate process.
5.3. Basic Storage Optimization
Based on the model introduced in the previous section, we propose our basic storage op-
timization for provenance trees, which lays the foundation for the compression scheme in
Section 5.4. Simply put, for each provenance tree, we remove its provenance nodes repre-
senting the intermediate event tuples. Figure 48 shows an optimized provenance tree tr1
of the tree in Figure 47. The (distributed) relational database maintaining tr1 is shown in
Table 12, where vid values and rid values are identical to those in Table 11.
Compared to Table 11, Table 12 differs at two parts:
• The prov table only maintains the provenance of the queried tuple, i.e., the recv tuple.
Other entries in the prov table are omitted because they represent either the removed
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prov
Loc VID RID RLoc
n3 vid6 rid3 n3
ruleExec
RLoc RID R VIDS NLoc NRID
n3 rid3 r2 NULL n2 rid2
n2 rid2 r1 (vid4) n1 rid1
n1 rid1 r1 (vid1,vid2) NULL NULL
Table 12: Optimized ruleExec and prov tables for the provenance tree in Figure 48.
intermediate tuples or the base tuples.
• Two extra columns NLoc and NRID are added to the ruleExec table. These two
attributes help recursive queries find the child node for each provenance node.
The optimization of removing the intermediate nodes saves a fair amount of storage space,
especially when the input events arrive at a high rate and generate a large number of
intermediate tuples, as is common in typical networking scenarios. We use the querying
of recvp@n3, n1, n3, “data”q’s provenance in Table 12 to illustrate the two-step provenance
querying process for optimized provenance trees:
Step 1: Construct the optimized provenance tree. The query first fetches the prove-
nance tree in the optimized form through recursive querying over Table 12. Starting from
the prov entry corresponding to recvp@n3, n1, n3, “data”q, we fetch the provenance node
for the last rule execution rid3 in the ruleExec table, then follow the values in NLoc and
NRID to recursively fetch all the ruleExec tuples (i.e., rid3, rid2 and rid1) until no further
provenance nodes can be fetched – i,e., both NLoc and NRID are NULL.
Step 2: Compute the intermediate provenance nodes. At the end of Step 1, we
obtain the provenance tree tr1 in Figure 48. To recover the intermediate provenance nodes,
we start from the leaf nodes, i.e., packetp@n1, n1, n3, “data”q and routep@n1, n3, n2q, and
re-execute the rule r1 to derive packetp@n2, n1, n3, “data”q. This process is repeated in a
bottom-up fashion until the root is reached, resulting in the provenance tree in Figure 47 .
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In summary, the basic optimization still allows the user to query the complete provenance
trees, but incurs extra computational overhead during provenance querying to recover the
intermediate nodes. The extra query latency is negligible, as is shown in Section 5.6.1.
5.4. Equivalence-based Compression
The storage optimization described in Section 5.3 focuses on reducing the storage overhead
within a single provenance tree. Building upon this optimization, we further explore remov-
ing redundancy across provenance trees. We propose grouping provenance trees of DELP
execution into equivalence classes, and only maintaining one copy of the shared sub-tree
within each equivalence class. Our definition of the equivalence relation allows equivalent
provenance trees to be quickly identified through inspection of equivalence keys – a subset
of attributes of input event tuples – and compressed efficiently at runtime. The equivalence
keys can be obtained through static analysis of a DELP.
5.4.1. Equivalence Relation
We first introduce the equivalence relation for provenance trees. We say that two provenance
trees tr and tr1 are equivalent, written (tr „ tr1) if (1) they are structurally identical – i.e.,
they share the identical sequence of rules – and (2) the slow-changing tuples used in each
rule are identical as well. In other words, two equivalent trees tr and tr1 only differ at two
nodes: (1) the root node that represents the output tuple and (2) the input event tuple.
More formally, We define tree equivalence using the following notations: an instance of the
input event relation e is denoted ep@ι,~cq, or ev in shorthand; an instance of a slow-changing
relation b is denoted as bp@ι,~cq or B (thus we write B1:: ¨ ¨ ¨ ::Bn to denote the slow-changing
tuples used to execute rule rID); and instances of fast-changing relations are denoted by P ,
pp@ι,~cq, Q, or qp@ι,~cq. A provenance tree tr is inductively defined as follows:
Provenance tree tr ::“ xrID, P, ev,B1:: ¨ ¨ ¨ ::Bny
| xrID, P, tr,B1:: ¨ ¨ ¨ ::Bny
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tr „K tr1 is defined inductively as follows:
ev „K ev1
vxrID, P, ev,B1:: ¨ ¨ ¨ ::Bny „K xrID, P 1, ev1, B1:: ¨ ¨ ¨ ::Bny
tr „K tr1
xrID, P, tr,B1:: ¨ ¨ ¨ ::Bny „K xrID, P 1, tr1, B1:: ¨ ¨ ¨ ::Bny
In our packet forwarding example, the provenance tree generated by a new incoming event
packetp@n1, n1, n3, “url”q (with “url” as its payload) is equivalent to the tree in Figure 48.
For each equivalence class, we only need to maintain one copy for the sub-provenance tree
shared by all the class members, while each individual tree in the equivalence class only
needs to maintain a small amount of delta information – i.e., the root node, the event
leaf node, and a reference to the shared sub-provenance tree. Additionally, this definition
of equivalence enables more efficient equivalence detection than node-by-node comparison
between trees. In fact, we show that equivalence of two provenance trees can be determined
by checking equivalence of the input event tuples in both trees, based on the observation
that the execution of a DELP is uniquely determined by the values of a subset of attributes
in the input event tuple. For example, in the packet forwarding program (Figure 45), if the
values of the attributes (loc, dst) in two input packet tuples are identical, these two tuples
will generate equivalent provenance trees.
We denote the minimal set of attributesK in the input event relation whose values determine
the provenance trees as equivalence keys. Two event tuples ev1 and ev2 of a relation e are
said to be equivalent w.r.t K, written as ev1 „K ev2, if their valuation of K is equal.
Formally:
Definition 2 (Event equivalence). Let K “ te:i1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , e:imu, ept1 ¨ ¨ ¨ tnq „K eps1 ¨ ¨ ¨ snq iff
@j P ti1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , imu, tj “ sj.
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Here, e:i denotes the ith attribute of the relation e.
Based on the above discussion, our approach to compressing provenance trees, with regard
to a program DQ, consists of the following two main algorithms. (1) an equivalence keys
identification algorithm, which performs static analysis of DQ to compute the equivalence
keys (Section 5.4.2); and (2) an online provenance compression algorithm, which maintains
the shared provenance tree for each equivalence class in a distributed fashion (Section 5.4.3).
Correctness of using event equivalence for determining provenance tree equivalence is shown
in Theorem 8. The proof will be discussed in Section 5.4.2.
Theorem 8 (Correctness of equivalence keys). Given a program DQ of DELP, and two
input event tuples ev1 and ev2, if ev1 „K ev2, where K is the equivalence keys for DQ, then
for any provenance tree tr1 (tr12) generated by ev1 (ev2), there exists a provenance tree tr2
(tr11) generated by ev2 (ev1) s.t. tr1 „ tr2 (tr11 „ tr12).
5.4.2. Equivalence Keys Identification
Given a DELP, we define a static analysis algorithm to identify the equivalence keys of the
input event relation. The algorithm consists of two steps: (1) building an attribute-level
dependency graph reflecting the relationship between valuation of different attributes and
(2) computing equivalence keys based on the constructed dependency graph. Details of each
step are given below.
Build the attribute-level dependency graph. An attribute-level dependency graph
G=(V , E) is an undirected graph. Nodes of G represent attributes in the program. Specif-
ically, the i-th attribute of a relation rel corresponds to a vertex labeled as (rel:i) in G.
Figure 49 shows an example attribute-level dependency graph for the packet forwarding
program in Figure 45. Based on Section 5.4.2, the equivalence keys are (packet:0, packet:2).
Two vertices v1 and v2 are directly connected in G if and only if v1 represents an attribute
attr1 of the event relation in a rule r and v2 represents another attribute attr2 in r , and
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packet:0
packet:1
packet:2
packet:3
route:0
route:1
route:2
recv:0
recv:1
recv:2
recv:3
Figure 49: The attribute-level dependency graph for the packet forwarding program in
Figure 45.
satisfies any of the following conditions: (1) attr2 is an attribute of the same name as
attr1 in a slow-changing relation (e.g., v1 “ ppacket:1q and v2 “ proute:1q in rule r1 of
Figure 45); (2) attr2 is a head attribute with the same name as attr1 (e.g., v1 “ ppacket:1q
and v2 “ precv:1q in r2 of Figure 45); (3) attr2 and attr1 appear in the same arithmetic atom
(e.g., v1 “ ppacket:0q and v2 “ ppacket:2q in rule r2 of Figure 45); and (4) v1 is on the right
hand side of an assignment asn and attr2 is on the left hand side of asn. (e.g., if rule r2
of Figure 45 were to be redefined as r21 recvp@L, S,N,DT q :́ packetp@L, S,D,DT q, N :“
L` 2., and v1 “ ppacket:0q while v2 “ precv:2qq.
Identify equivalence keys. Given the attribute-level dependency graph G, we identify the
equivalence keys of the input event relation ev using the function GetEquiKeys (Figure 50).
GetEquiKeys takes G and ev as input, and outputs a list of attributes eqid representing
the equivalence keys. In the algorithm, for each node pev:iq in G, GetEquiKeys checks
whether pev:iq is reachable to any attribute in a slow-changing relation. If this is the case,
pev:iq would be identified as a member of the equivalence keys, and appended to eqid.
We always include the attribute indicating the input location of ev (e.g., ppacket:0q) in the
equivalence keys, to ensure no two input event tuples at different locations have the same
equivalence keys. When applied to the packet forwarding program, GetEquiKeys would
identify ppacket:0q and ppacket:2q as equivalence keys.
Now we introduce a few denotations to help prove Theorem 8. We use predicate joinSAttrpp:nq
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1: function GetEquiKeys(G, ev)
2: eqid Ð {}
3: eqid.append(ev:0)
4: nodes Ð event attribute nodes in G
5: for each ev:i in nodes do
6: for bnode in non-event nodes of G do
7: if ev:i is reachable to bnode then
8: eqid.append(ev:i)
9: return eqid
10: end function
Figure 50: Pseudocode to identify equivalence keys
to denote that a node (p:n) in the dependency graph has an edge to an attribute in a
slow changing relation. We denote each edge connecting two attributes pp:n, q:mq not
in any slow-changing relation as predicate joinFAttrpp:n, q:mq. We further use predicate
joinFAttrpp:n, q:mq to inductively define connectedpe:i, p:nq, denoting a path in the graph
from pe:iq to pp:nq. We then formally define below what it means, given a DELP, for K to
be equivalence keys:
Definition 3. K is equivalence keys for a program DQ of DELP, if @pe:iq P K, either
DQ $ joinSAttrpe:iq or Dp, n s.t. DQ $ connectedpe:i, p:nq and DQ $ joinSAttrpp:nq.
We show the correctness of Theorem 8 by proving Lemma 9, a stronger lemma that gives
us Theorem 8 as corollary. In Lemma 9, we write tr : P to denote that tr is a provenance
tree of the output tuple P , and write prog,DB, ev ( tr : P to mean that tr is generated by
executing the program prog over a database DB, triggered by the event tuple ev.
Lemma 9 (Correctness of equivalence keys (Strong)).
If GetEquiKeyspG, evq “ K and ev1 „K ev2
and prog,DB, ev1 ( tr1 : ppt1, ..., tnq,
then Dtr2 : pps1, ..., snq s.t. prog,DB, ev2 ( tr2 : pps1, ..., snq
and tr1 : ppt1, ..., tnq „ tr2 : pps1, ..., snq
and @i P r1, ns, ti ‰ si implies
D` s.t. prog $ connectedpev:`, p:iq and pev:`q R K.
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Intuitively, Lemma 9 states that given two equivalent input event tuples ev1 and ev2 w.r.t.
K, and ev1 generates a provenance tree tr1, we can construct a tr2 for ev2 such that
tr1 and tr2 are equivalent – i.e., they share the same structure and slow-changing tuples.
Furthermore, if the two output tuples ppt1, ..., tnq and pps1, ..., snq have different values for a
given attribute, this attribute must connect to an event attribute that is not in equivalence
keys in the dependency graph. This last condition enables an inductive proof of Lemma 9
over the structure of the trees. More details could be found in the technical report [21].
Time complexity. Next, we analyze the time complexity of static analysis. Assume that
a program DQ has m rules. Each rule r has k atoms, including the head relation and all
body atoms. Each atom has at most t attributes. Hence, the attribute-level dependency
graph G has at most n=m ˚ k ˚ t nodes. The construction of G takes O(n2) time, and the
identification of equivalence keys takes O(t ˚ n) time. Normally t is much smaller than n.
Therefore, the total complexity of static analysis is O(n2).
5.4.3. Online Provenance Compression
We next present an online provenance compression scheme that compresses equivalent (dis-
tributed) provenance trees based on the identified equivalence keys. In our compression
scheme, execution of a DELP, triggered by an event tuple ev, is composed of three stages:
• Stage 1: Equivalence keys checking. Extract the value v of ev’s equivalence keys,
and check whether v has ever been seen before. If so, set a Boolean flag existF lag to
True. Otherwise, set existF lag to False. Tag existF lag along with ev throughout
the execution.
• Stage 2: Online provenance maintenance. If existF lag is True, no provenance
information is maintained during the execution. Otherwise, the complete provenance
tree of the execution would be maintained.
• Stage 3: Output tuple provenance maintenance. When the execution finishes,
associate the output tuple to the shared provenance tree to allow for future provenance
122
(n1,n3) 
encountered 
before?
existFlag := FalseexistFlag := True
Append existFlag to packet tuple
existFlag == False? existFlag == False?
r1@n2 r2@n3 existFlag == False?
Associate Equivalence Key with 
the shared provenance tree
Maintain 
provenance 
nodes
Associate the output tuple with 
the shared provenance tree
Yes
Yes
Yes
Stage 1: Equivalence Key Checking Stage 2: Distributed Online Provenance Maintenance Stage 3: Output Tuple Provenance Association
: Execution of packet(@n1,n1,n3,  data  : Execution of packet(@n1,n1,n3,  url  
Q={r1@n1,
r1@n2,
r2@n3}
 
packet(@n1,n1,n3,  url  
packet(@n1,n1,n3,  data  
Equivalence Key:
(loc, dst)
Yes No
Maintain 
provenance 
nodes
Maintain 
provenance 
nodes
r1@n1
existFlag == False?
Yes
No
Figure 51: An example execution of the packet forwarding program. The program is first
triggered by packetp@n1, n1, n3, “data”q, followed by packetp@n1, n1, n3, “url”q.
querying.
To illustrate this, Figure 51 presents an example consisting of two packets traversing
the network topology (from n1 to n3 ) in Figure 46. packetp@n1, n1, n3, “data”q is first
inserted for execution (represented by the solid arrows), followed by the execution of
packetp@n1, n1, n3, “url”q (represented by the dashed arrows). The three stages of online
compression are logically separated with vertical dashed lines. Table 13 presents the (dis-
tributed) relational tables (i.e., a ruleExec table and a prov table) that maintain the com-
pressed provenance trees for the aforementioned execution. Next, we introduce each stage
in detail.
Equivalence Keys Checking. Upon receiving an input event ev, our runtime system
first checks whether the value of ev’s equivalence keys have been seen before. To do this,
we use a hash table htequi to store all unique equivalence keys that have arrived. If ev’s
equivalence keys eqid has a value that already exists in htequi, a Boolean flag existF lag will
be created and set to True. This existF lag is supposed to accompany ev throughout the
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ruleExec
Loc RID RULE VIDS NLoc NRID
n3 rid1(sha1(r2)) r2 NULL n2 rid2
n2 rid2(sha1(r1,vid1)) r1 (vid1(sha1(routep@n2,
n3, n3q)))
n1 rid3
n1 rid3(sha1(r1,vid2)) r1 (vid2(sha1(routep@n1,
n3, n2q)))
NULL NULL
prov
Loc VID RLoc RID EVID
n3 tid1(sha1(recvp@n3, n1,
n3, “data”q))
n3 rid1 evid1(sha1(packetp@n1,
n1, n3, “data”q))
n3 tid2(sha1(recvp@n3, n1,
n3, “url”q))
n3 rid1 evid2(sha1(packetp@n1,
n1, n3, “url”q))
Table 13: a ruleExec table and a prov table for compressed provenance trees produced in
Figure 51
execution, notifying all nodes involved in the execution to avoid maintaining the concrete
provenance tree. Otherwise, existF lag would be set to False, instructing the subsequent
nodes to maintain the provenance tree. For example, in Figure 51, when the first packet
tuple packetp@n1, n1, n3, “data”q arrives, it has values (n1, n3) for its equivalence keys,
which have never been encountered before, so its existF lag is False. But when the second
packet tuple packetp@n1, n1, n3, “url”q arrives, since it shares the same equivalence keys
values with the first packet, the existF lag for it is True.
Online Provenance Maintenance. For each rule r triggered in the execution, we se-
lectively maintain the provenance information based on existF lag’s value. if existF lag is
False, the provenance nodes are maintained as tuples in the ruleExec table locally. Oth-
erwise, no provenance information is maintained at all. For example, in Figure 51, when
packetp@n2, n1, n3, “data”q triggers rule r1 at node n2, the existF lag is False. Therefore,
we insert a tuple ruleExecpn2, rid2, r1, vid1, n1, rid3q into the ruleExec table at node n2
to record the provenance. The semantics of the inserted tuple are the same as introduced
in Section 5.3. In comparison, when packetp@n2, n1, n3, “url”q triggers r2 at node n2, its
existF lag is True. In this case, we simply execute r2 without recording any provenance
information.
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Output Tuple Provenance Maintenance. For the execution whose existF lag is True,
we need to associate its output tuple to the shared provenance tree maintained by previous
execution. To do this, we maintain a hash table hmap on each node to store the reference
to the shared provenance tree, wherein the key is the hash value of the equivalence keys,
and the value is the node closest to the root in the shared provenance tree. For example,
in Figure 51, the shared provenance tree is stored in hmap as {hashpn1, n3q: (n3, rid1)}.
We then associate each output tuple tp to the shared provenance tree st, by looking
up its equivalence keys’ values in hmap. This association is stored as a tuple in the
prov table. For example, in Figure 51, the first execution generates the output tuple
recvp@n3, n1, n3, “data”q, which is associated to pn3, rid1q. This is reflected by the tu-
ple provpn3, tid1, n3, rid1, evid1q in the prov table (Table 13). evid1 is used to identify the
event tuple peculiar to the execution, which is not included in the shared provenance tree.
Correctness of Online Compression. We prove the correctness of the online compres-
sion algorithm by showing that our compression scheme of provenance trees is lossless –
that is, the distributed provenance nodes maintained in the ruleExec and prov tables contain
the exact same set of provenance trees that would have been derived by semi-näıve evalua-
tion [54] without compression (Theorem 10). To do this, we define the operational semantics
of semi-näıve evaluation of a DELP with a set of transition rules of form: Csn ÑSN C1sn,
where Csn denotes a state in semi-näıve evaluation that records the complete execution
as provenance [20]. We also define a set of transition rules of form: Ccm ÑCM C1cm for
semi-näıve evaluation with our online compression algorithm. Here, Ccm denotes a state in
semi-näıve evaluation with compression. The proof is to show that we can assemble entries
in the ruleExec and prov tables to reconstruct an original provenance tree D. Likewise, given
a provenance tree D, we can also find an identical tree P encoded as entries in the ruleExec
and prov tables. This correspondence is denoted as D „d P and can be defined by induction
over the structure of provenance trees.
Theorem 10 (Correctness of Compression). @n P N and an initial state Cinit, if Cinit ÑnSN
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Csn, then DCcm s.t. Cinit ÑnCM Ccm and for any provenance tree D P Csn, there exists a
provenance tree P P Ccm s.t. D „d P and for any provenance tree P P Ccm, there exists a
provenance tree D P Csn s.t. D „d P. And the same is true for semi-näıve evaluation when
Ccm is given.
The above theorem states that if we initiate a DELP DQ from an initial state Cinit, and
execute DQ for n steps to reach a state Csn, then we can also execute DQ for n steps
with the online compression scheme, starting from Cinit and ending in Ccm. In the end, the
sets of provenance trees respectively maintained by these two processes are identical. An
implication of Theorem 10 is that compressed provenance trees, like traditional network
provenance, would faithfully record the system execution, even if the execution is erroneous
due to misconfiguration (e.g., wrong routing tables).
To prove Theorem 10, we show Lemma 11 which implies Theorem 10 as corollary. Lemma 11
shows that semi-näıve evaluation with the online compression scheme is bisimilar to the one
that stores provenance trees without compression. This bisimilarity relation shows that
both evaluation strategies have identical semantics.
Lemma 11 (Compression Simulates Semi-näıve Evaluation). @n P N and an initial state
Cinit, if Cinit ÑnSN Csn, then DCcm s.t. Cinit ÑnCM Ccm and Csn RC Ccm, and vice versa.
We define a bisimulation relation RC between Csn and Ccm – i.e., Csn RC Ccm means that
when Csn ÑSN C1sn, there exists a state C1cm s.t. Ccm ÑCM C1cm and C1sn RC C1cm, and
vice versa. Intuitively, RC relates two states of the two evaluation strategies – i.e., semi-
näıve evaluation with and without compression – that execute identical programs to the
point of identical program execution states, and, most importantly, for any provenance tree
P P Ccm, there exists a provenance tree D P Csn s.t. D „d P, and vice versa. Proof details of
Lemma 11, along with the formal definition of the bisimulation relation RC, are presented
in the technical report [21].
Generality of equivalence-based compression. The idea of equivalence-based compres-
126
sion is not just applicable to distributed scenarios, but can be generally used to compress
arbitrary provenance tree sets maintained in a centralized manner as well. We adopt the
definition of the equivalence relation in Section 5.4.1 because it allows us to use equivalence
keys to efficiently identify equivalent provenance trees, thus more suitable for the distributed
environment where networking resources (e.g., bandwidth) are scarce.
5.4.4. Inter-Equivalence Class Compression
The online compression scheme introduced in Section 5.4.3 focuses on intra-equivalence
class compression of provenance trees – i.e., only trees of the same equivalence class are
compressed. In fact, provenance trees of different equivalence classes can be compressed as
well. For example, assume a tuple packetp@n2, n2, n3, “ack”q is inserted into n2 in Figure 51
for execution. The produced provenance tree prov shares the provenance nodes rid1 and
rid2 in the ruleExec table of Table 13. To avoid the storage of such redundant rule execu-
tion nodes, we separate the ruleExec table into two sub-tables: a ruleExecNode table and a
ruleExecLink table (Table 14). The ruleExecNode table maintains the concrete rule execution
nodes, while the ruleExecLink table, maintained for each provenance tree tr individually,
records the parent-child relationship of the rule execution nodes in tr. If two provenance
trees, whether in the same equivalence class or not, share the same rule execution node nd,
only one copy of the concrete nd will be maintained in the ruleExecNode table. Each tree
maintains a reference pointer pointing to nd in their respective ruleExecLink tables.
ruleExecNode
Loc RID RULE VIDS
n3 rid1 r2 NULL
n2 rid2 r1 (vid1)
n1 rid3 r1 (vid2)
ruleExecLink
Loc RID NLoc NRID
n3 rid1 n2 rid2
n2 rid2 n1 rid3
n1 rid3 NULL NULL
Table 14: The ruleExecNode table and the ruleExecLink table replacing the ruleExec table in
Table 13 to allow for compression of the shared rule execution nodes.
127
n1 n4 n3
route
L D N
@n1 n3 n2
@n1 n3 n4
route
L D N
@n4 n3 n3
n2
Figure 52: An updated topology of Figure 46. A new node n4 is deployed to reach n3. The
route table of n1 is updated to forward packets to n4 now.
5.4.5. Updates to Slow-changing Tables
Though we assume that slow-changing tables do not change during a fixpoint computation,
our system is designed to handle these updates at runtime. Figure 52 presents an example
scenario based on Figure 46, where a network administrator decides to use n4, instead of
n2, as the intermediate hop for packets sent from n1 to n3. To redirect the traffic, the
administrator (1) deletes the route entry routep@n1, n3, n2q, and (2) inserts a new route
entry routep@n1, n3, n4q.
Deletion of a tuple from a slow-changing table – e.g., routep@n1, n3, n2q in Figure 52 –
does not affect the stored provenance, as provenance information is monotone – that is, it
represents the execution history which is immutable [94].
However, if a tuple tp is inserted into a slow-changing table – e.g., routep@n1, n4, n3q – the
provenance tree generated by tp could be incorrect or missing. For example, in Figure 52,
after routep@n1, n4, n3q is inserted, the provenance trees for all subsequent packets need to
be recalculated. However, since these packets are not the first in their equivalence classes,
their existF lags are set to true. As a result, the provenance tree for the packet traversal
on the path n1 Ñ n4 Ñ n3 would not be maintained.
To handle such scenarios, we require that, once a new tuple tp is inserted into a node n’s
slow-changing table, n should broadcast a control message sig to all the nodes in the system.
Any node receiving sig would empty the hash table used for equivalence keys checking
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(Section 5.4.3). Therefore, provenance trees will be maintained again for all equivalence
classes. In Figure 52, after the insertion of routep@n1, n3, n4q, n1 would broadcast a sig to all
the nodes, including itself. When a new packet pkt destined to n3 arrives at n1, the packet
would have its existF lag set as f alse. When this packet traverses the path n1 Ñ n4 Ñ n3,
the nodes on the path are expected to maintain the corresponding provenance nodes. In
all our network applications, the extra network overhead incurred by the broadcast and
the impact on the effectiveness of compression due to reset of the hash table is negligible,
as slow-changing tables are updated infrequently in practice (relative to the rate of event
arrival). We experimentally validated this, as is shown in Section 5.6.1.
5.4.6. Provenance Querying
To query the provenance tree of an output tuple tp, we take the following steps:
• Compute the hash value htp of tp, and find the tuple prvtp in the prov table that has
htp as its VID.
• Initiate a recursive query for the (shared) provenance nodes in the ruleExec table,
starting with the values of (Loc,RID) in prvtp. Also, tag the event ID evid stored
in the attribute EVID along with the query.
• When the query reaches a ruleExec tuple at node n with values (NULL,NULL) for
(NLoc,NRID), the tagged evid is used to retrieve the event tuple materialized at n.
For example, in Table 13, to query the provenance tree of recvp@n3, n1, n3, “data”q, we first
find prov(n3, tid1, n3, rid1, evid1), and use the values (n3, rid1) to initiate the recursive
query in the ruleExec table to fetch the provenance nodes rid1, rid2 and rid3. evid is carried
throughout the query, and is used to retrieve the event packetp@n1, n1, n3, “data”q when the
query stops at ruleExec(n1, rid3, r1, vid2, NULL, NULL). The above steps return to the
initial querying location a collection of entries from the ruleExec and prov tables. We define
a top-level algorithm Query that reconstructs the complete provenance tree D based on
these entries. The pseudocode of Query can be found in Figure 53. Query takes as input
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the network state Ccm of the online compression scheme, an output tuple P , an event ID
evid, and returns a set of provenance trees, each of which corresponds to one derivation of
P using the input event tuple of ID evid. The example based on Table 13 has only one
derivation for the output tuple, so we return a singleton set.
Correctness of Querying. To show that our query algorithm (Query in Figure 53) is
able to recover the correct derivation tree of a given tuple from our compressed provenance
storage, we state and prove the correctness of the query algorithm (Theorem 12). This
theorem states that given initial network state Cinit that transitions to Ccm in n steps using
the rules for online compression, there exists a network state Csn for semi-näıve evaluation
s.t. for any derivation tree D that is a proof of output tuple P and derived using an input
event tuple ev with ID evid, Query takes as inputs Ccm, P and evid and returns a set M
consisting of all derivation trees (including D) that are proofs of P and that were derived
using ev. Theorem 12 tells us that Query always returns all the derivations in Csn for P
and evid.
Theorem 12 (Correctness of the Query Algorithm).
@n P N, given an initial state Cinit s.t. Cinit ÑnCM Ccm
and there are no more updates to be processed,
then DCsn s.t. Cinit ÑnSN Csn
and @D:P in the output provenance storage of Csn
s.t. #EventOfpDq “ evid,
DM s.t. QuerypCcm, P, evidq “M and D PM
and @D1 PMzD, D1 is a proof of P stored in Csn
and #EventOfpD1q “ evid.
The proof relies on Lemma 10 to determine that there exists a network state Csn for semi-
näıve evaluation s.t. Ccm and Csn are bisimilar (Csn RC Ccm). Given such an Csn, we pick
an arbitrary derivation tree D for tuple P in Csn that was generated by event tuple ev with
event ID evid. Because Csn RC Ccm, there exists a tuple prov for P in a specific prov table
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1: function Query(Ccm, P , evid)
2: htpÐ #P
3: if x , htp, , , evidy P Ccm then
4: rprov1 ¨ ¨ ¨ provns Ð Get ProvpCcm, htp, evidq
5: MÐ tu
6: for i P r1, ns do
7: xloc, htp, r loci, ridi, evidy Ð provi
8: Pi Ð QrpCcm, pr loci, ridiqq
9: Di Ð Transform To DpPi, evidq
10: MÐMYDi
11: return M
12: else
13: return H
14: end function
15:
16: function Qr(Ccm, ploc, ridq)
17: if loc ““ NULL and rid ““ NULL then
18: return []
19: else
20: ruleExecÐ Get RuleExecpCcm, ploc, ridqq
21: xloc, rid, r, vids,nloc,nridy Ð ruleExec
22: return QrpCcm, pnloc,nridqq :: ruleExec
23: end function
Figure 53: Pseudocode for querying a provenance tree.
in Ccm storing an association to a specific provenance P, and furthermore D „d P. By
the above reasoning and the semantics of Query, the “If” branch of the If-Else statement
on lines 3-13 of Query is taken. On line 4, Get Prov takes as input Ccm, htp (the hash of
P ), and evid, then returns every provi in the prov tables of Ccm containing an association
pr loci, ridiq to a provenance tree Pi for P that was derived using ev. By the relation in E5,
each Pi is recorded in Ccm. We use Qr to retrieve Pi. If we can show that Qr can correctly
retrieve Pi, it is straightforward to show that Transform To D recovers D when given Pi
and evid as inputs. Hence, the conclusion holds.
We still need to show that recursive algorithm Qr will return Pi when given Ccm and the
association pr loci, ridiq to provenance Pi. We prove Lemma 13 below. The proof uses a
uniqueness property on elements in the ruleExec table–the first two arguments of ruleExec
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(i.e. loc and rid) are primary keys that uniquely determine it. Thus, given any ruleExec and
ruleExec1, that agree on the first two arguments loc and rid, then ruleExec “ ruleExec1.
Lemma 13 (Correctness of Qr). Given that Csn RC Ccm and D:P P Csn and ruleExec =
xloc, rid, r, vids, nloc, nridy and P :: ruleExec is stored in the ruleExec tables of the local
states of Ccm and D „d P :: ruleExec, then QrpCcm, pnloc,nridqq “ P :: ruleExec.
We prove Lemma 13 by induction over `, the length of P :: ruleExec.
Base Case A: ` “ 0. By the assumption we have P :: ruleExec “ rs. By the definition
of „d that relates derivation trees to compressed provenance trees, ED P Csn s.t. D „d rs.
Thus the antecedent of the lemma is false.
Base Case B: ` “ 1. By the assumption we have P “ rs and thus P :: ruleExec “
ruleExec. BecauseD:P „d ruleExec, D has only one rule. Thus (nloc, nrid) are null by the
correspondence relation as only rule r was used to derive P . Because (loc, rid) are not null,
the “Else” branch of the If-Else statement on Lines 17-22 of Qr is taken. Therefore on Line
20 of Qr, the algorithm finds ruleExec (where ruleExec “ xloc, rid, r, vids,nloc,nridy) by
the uniqueness property. The query QrpCcm, pnloc,nridqq initiates a query for an empty
rule provenance list, that by Base Case A returns an empty list. By Line 22 of Qr, we have
Qr(Ccm, (loc, rid)) = rs :: ruleExec as desired.
Inductive Case: ` “ k ` 1 ě 2. By assumption, nloc and nrid are not null, thus the
“Else” branch of the If-Else statement on Lines 17-22 of Qr is taken. Therefore on Line
20 of Qr the algorithm finds ruleExec (where ruleExec “ xloc, rid, r, vids,nloc,nridy) by
the uniqueness property. By assumption, there exists P 1 and ruleExec1 s.t. P “ P 1 ::
ruleExec1 and ruleExec1 is not null. By the above and the correspondence D „d P ::
ruleExec1, exists D1 in Csn that is a subderivation of D s.t. D1 „d P and ruleExec1
= xnloc,nrid, r1, vids1,nloc1,nrid1y. Using I.H. we can obtain Qr(Ccm, (nloc, nrid)) =
P 1 :: ruleExec1. By Line 22 of Qr, we have QrpCcm, ploc, ridqq= P 1 :: ruleExec1 :: ruleExec
= P :: ruleExec as desired.
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5.5. Implementation
We have implemented a prototype based on enhancements to the RapidNet [59] declarative
networking engine – RapidNet compiles NDlog programs to generate efficient distributed
network protocol implementation – First, we provide compiler extensions to add support
for DELP. We further provide a static analysis module that takes as input a DELP, and
generates equivalence keys for event relations.
eqc r1 equiHashp@loc, src, dst, data, eqid, idq :́
packetp@loc, src, dst, dataq,
progIDp@loc, dst, idq,
eqid :“ f sha1ploc` dstq.
eqc r2 hashCountp@loc, src, dst, data, eqid, id, a COUNT x˚yq :́
equiHashp@loc, src, dst, data, eqid, idq,
hashSetp@loc, eqidq.
eqc r3 hashSetp@loc, eqidq :́
hashCountp@loc, src, dst, data, eqid, id, hcountq,
hcount ““ 0.
eqc r4 packetp@loc, src, dst, data, existF lagq :́
hashCountp@loc, src, dst, data, eqid, id, hcountq,
hcount ““ 0,
existF lag :“ false.
eqc r5 packetp@loc, src, dst, data, existF lagq :́
hashCountp@loc, src, dst, data, eqid, id, hcountq,
hcount! “ 0,
existF lag :“ true.
Figure 54: Rewritten program implementing equivalence key checking for packet forwarding
in Figure 45.
At compile time, we further add a program rewrite step that rewrites each DELP into a new
NDlog program progPROV that supports online provenance maintenance and compression
at runtime. Interestingly, because all the provenance tables are maintained and queried as
relational tables, no additional runtime enhancements are required beyond rule writes. For
example, Figure 54 presents the rewritten DELP rules performing equivalence key checking
for the packet forwarding program in Figure 45. In this program, rule eqc r1 computes the
hash value eqid of the equivalence keys attributes loc and dst, and stores eqid in a equiHash
tuple. Rule eqc r2 is an aggregation rule that checks whether eqid exists in the hashSet
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table. If the aggregation result hcount is 0 , eqc r3 would update hashSet table with the
new eqid, and eqc r4 would generate existF lag with value f alse. Otherwise, if hcount is
not 0 , eqc r5 generates existF lag with value true. We omit the detailed nineteen rules of
progPROV , but present all the relations of progPROV in Table 15.
In progPROV , progPROV is triggered when a tuple initPacketpNode, SrcAdd,DstAdd,Dataq is
inserted. The program first checks whether the hash values of the packet’s equivalence keys
– i.e., (Node,DstAdd) in the packet forwarding example – exist in a hash table equiHashTable.
If the hash value does not exist, progPROV needs to maintain the provenance for the ex-
ecution of the inserted packet. This is done by first joining the initPacket with the local
flowEntry and conn to perform the forwarding. But instead of generating a new packet that
is to be sent to the next hop, progPROV first generates a temporary packet epacketTemp,
which contains the contents of the original initPacket as well as necessary information for
provenance maintenance, such as the triggered rule’s name and used rule bodies. Based on
epacketTemp, the program will generate a ruleExec tuple that records the provenance, and
a provLink tuple that connects the local provenance node to the previous one to facilitate
future querying. Also, a packet will be generated to be sent to the next hop. On the other
hand, if the hash value of the equivalence keys exist, only the new packet will be produced,
and no provenance-related tuples would be generated.
When the packet is forwarded to intermediate nodes in the network, each node would pro-
duce a temporary epacketTemp to help record the provenance information. When the packet
is received at the destination, additional processing is needed. The program would first gen-
erate a temporary tuple erecvPacketTemp, which helps record the provenance information at
the last hop. In addition, the erecvPacketTemp will derive a provHashTable tuple and a provRef
tuple. The provHashTable associates the values of equivalence keys to the last provenance
node of the shared provenance in the equivalence class, while the provRef tuple associates
the received packet to the corresponding equivalence keys’ values and the input initPacket.
With the above two tuples, the user could construct the complete provenance information
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during querying.
Predicate Description
initPacketp@Node,SrcAdd,
DstAdd,Data,PIDequi,
ProgIDq
Initiate a packet at node Node to be sent from SrcAdd
to DstAdd, with payload Data. The packet also con-
tains the hash value of equivalence key PIDequi, and
the program ID ProgID.
equiHashTablep@Node,
DstAdd,PIDequi)
A hash table at node Node, with the destination ad-
dress DstAdd as key and the hash value of the equiva-
lence keys PIDequi as value.
packetp@Node,SrcAdd,
DstAdd,Data,PIDHashq
A packet transmitted to Node with the source address
SrcAdd, the destination address DstAdd and the pay-
load Data. PIDHash contains the hash values related
to provenance information (e.g., equivalence keys)
flowEntryp@Node,DstAdd,
Nextq
A routing entry at node Node that indicates the next
hop Next towards the destination DstAdd.
connp@Node,Nextq A link connecting node Node and Next
epacketTempp@Node,Next,
SrcAdd,DstAdd,Data,
RID,R,List,Tagq
A temporary packet at Node containing the prove-
nance, including the executed rule’s RID, its name R,
and its bodies List. Tag contains the global provenance
information (e.g., equivalence keys).
packetProvp@Node,SrcAdd,
DstAdd,Data,Tagq
A transmitted packet whose provenance information
needs to be recorded. The meaning of attributes is
the same as that of epacketTemp.
ruleExecp@RLOC ,RID,R,
Listq
A ruleExec records the provenance information of a trig-
gered rule R. The meaning of the attributes is the same
as that of epacketTemp.
provLinkp@RLOC ,RID,
CurCount,Preloc,
PreRID,PreCount,
PIDequiq
A provLink tuple links two consecutive provenance nodes
of RID and PreRID to enable querying. CurCount and
PreCount are program step counters that differentiate
two provenance nodes of the same contents.
recvPacketp@Node,SrcAdd,
DstAdd, Dataq
A received packet at Node, from the source SrcAdd to
the destination DstAdd with payload Data.
provHashTablep@Node,
PIDequi,ProgID,Loc,
RID,Countq
A hash table at node Node that stores the reference to
the last provenance node RID at node Loc, correspond-
ing to the equivalence keys PIDequi.
provRefp@Node,PID,
PIDequi,PIDevq
A hash table at node Node that stores the reference to
the input tuple PIDev corresponding to the equivalence
keys PIDequi.
recvPacketNPp@Node,
SrcAdd,DstAdd, PIDHashq
A received packet whose traversal of the network does
not trigger the provenance maintenance. PIDHash con-
tains the hash values of the equivalence keys and the
input tuple.
Table 15: Relations for maintaining compressed provenance
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5.5.1. Properties of Provenance Maintenance Programs
We further show that static analysis introduced in Chapter 4 could facilitate runtime analy-
sis by verifying properties of provenance maintenance programs. We verify three properties
that are supposed to hold when provenance is maintained and compressed (Table 16).
Prop Property de-scription Formal specification Result
ϕPROV 1
When a packet
was sent out,
the provenance
node for the
packet has been
recorded.
@Next,SrcAdd,DstAdd,Data,PIDequi,
PIDev,ProgID,
packetpNext,SrcAdd,DstAdd,Data,
PIDequi,PIDev,ProgIDq
Ą
DNode,RID,CurCount,Preloc,PreRID,
PreCount,
provLinkpNode,RID,CurCount,Preloc,
PreRID,PreCount,PIDequiq
false
ϕPROV 2
When a packet
which is the
first of its equiv-
alence class
was sent out,
the provenance
node for the
packet has been
recorded.
@Next,SrcAdd,DstAdd,Data,NewCount,
RLOC ,RID,PIDequi,PIDev,ProgID,
packetProv’pNext,SrcAdd,DstAdd,Data,
NewCount,RLOC ,RID,PIDequi,PIDev,
ProgIDq
Ą
DCurCount,Preloc,PreRID,PreCount,
provLinkpRLOC ,RID,CurCount,Preloc,
PreRID,PreCount,PIDequiq
^NewCount “ CurCount` 1.
true
ϕPROV 3
The provenance
node of each
received tuple
which is the first
of the equiva-
lence class is
linked to the
shared subtree.
@Node,SrcAdd,DstAdd,Data,
recvPacketpNode,SrcAdd,DstAdd,Dataq,
Ą
DPIDequi,PIDev,PID,ProgID,
Loc,RID,Count,
provHashTablepNode,PIDequi,ProgID,
Loc,RID,Countq
^provRefpNode,PID,PIDequi,PIDevq
true
Table 16: Safety properties of maintenance of compressed provenance and verification results
In Table 16, property ϕPROV 1 intends to show that each transmitted packet has its prove-
nance recorded. The fact that this property is false actually shows that our solution correctly
avoids maintaining concrete provenance for all incoming packets– i.e., only packets that are
the first of their equivalence classes need to have their provenance recorded (ϕPROV 2). Prop-
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erty ϕPROV 3 shows that the representative provenance tree is correctly associated to each
equivalence class when the first packet of the equivalence class is received. This ensures
that all subsequent provenance trees in the equivalence class could share the maintained
provenance tree.
The proof strategy follows the symbolic execution-based approach introduced in Chapter 4.
We first construct a dependency graph Gprov for progPROV , and use Gprov to generate a
derivation pool DPprov that contains the derivations, along with corresponding constraints,
for all relations in progPROV . A property ϕ is verified only if no derivation could violate ϕ.
5.6. Evaluation
We have implemented a prototype based on enhancement to the RapidNet [59] declara-
tive networking engine. At compile time, we add a program rewrite step that rewrites
each DELP program into a new program that supports online provenance maintenance and
compression at runtime. We evaluate our prototype to understand the effectiveness of the
online compression scheme. In all the experiments, we focus on comparing four techniques
for maintaining distributed provenance. The first is ExSPAN [95], a typical network prove-
nance engine. We maintain uncompressed provenance trees in the same way as ExSPAN.
The second is the distributed provenance maintenance with basic storage optimization (Sec-
tion 5.3). The third is the provenance maintenance using equivalence-based compression
(Section 5.4). We also compared our solution with the reactive provenance maintenance
in DTaP [94] using the packet forwarding application. Reactive maintenance, during sys-
tem execution, stores only the non-deterministic input tuples (e.g., packet and route tuples).
When a user queries the provenance tree of an output tuple, he/she needs to replay the
execution of the stored input tuples on the relevant nodes – i.e., the nodes that forward
the input tuple so as to generate the queried output tuple – and queries the provenance
re-generated during replay.
In the evaluation section, we refer to the above four techniques as ExSPAN, Basic, Advanced
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packet forwarding, with 500 pairs of nodes,
each transmitting 100 packets.
and Reactive respectively.
Workloads. Our experiments are carried out on two classic network applications: packet
forwarding (Section 5.1) and Domain Name System (DNS) resolution. DNS resolution is an
Internet service which translates human-readable domain names into IP addresses. Both
applications are event-driven, and typically involve large volume of traffic during execution.
The high-volume traffic incurs large storage overhead if we maintain provenance information
for each packet/DNS request, which leaves potential opportunity for compression. The
workloads are also sufficiently different to evaluate the generality of our approach. Packet
forwarding involve larger messages along different paths in a graph, while DNS lookups
involve smaller messages on a tree-like topology.
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Testbed. In our experiment setup, we write the packet forwarding and DNS resolution
applications in DELP, and use our enhanced RapidNet [59] engine to compile them into
low-level (i.e., C++) execution codes.
The experiments for measuring storage and bandwidth are run on the ns-3 [64] network
simulator, which is a discrete-event simulator that allows a user to evaluate network ap-
plications on a variety of network topologies. The simulation is run on a 32-core server
with Intel Xeon 2.40 GHz CPUs. The server has 24G RAM, 400G disk space, and runs
Ubuntu 12.04 as the operating system. We run multiple node instances on the same machine
communicating over the ns-3 simulated network.
Performance Metrics. The performance metrics that we use in our experiments are:
(1) the storage overhead, and (2) the network overhead (i.e., bandwidth consumption) for
provenance maintenance, and (3) the query latency when different provenance maintenance
techniques are adopted.
In our experiments, the relational provenance tables are maintained in memory. To measure
the storage occupation, we use the boost library [74] to serialize C++ data structures into
binary data. At the end of each experiment run, we serialize the per-node provenance tables
(i.e., ruleExec table and prov table) into binary files, and measure the size of files to estimate
the storage overhead.
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5.6.1. Application #1: Packet Forwarding
Our first set of results is based on the packet forwarding program in Figure 45. The topology
we used for packet forwarding is a 100-node transit-stub graph, randomly generated by the
GT-ITM [89] topology generator. In particular, there are four transit nodes – i.e., nodes
through which traffic can only traverse, but not initiated – in the topology, each connecting
to three stub domains, and each stub domain has eight stub nodes – i.e., nodes where
traffic only originates or terminates. Transit-transit links have 50ms latency and 1Gbps
bandwidth; transit-stub links have 10ms latency and 100Mbps bandwidth; stub-stub links
have 2ms latency and 50Mbps bandwidth. The diameter of the topology is 12, and the
average distance for all node pairs is 5.3. Each node in the topology runs one instance of
the packet forwarding program.
In the experiment, we randomly selected a number of node pairs (s, d) – where s is the
source and d is the destination– and sent packets from s to d while the provenance of each
packet is maintained. To allow the packets to be correctly forwarded in the network, we
pre-computed the shortest path p between s and d using a distributed routing protocol
written as a declarative networking program[55]. The routes are stored in the route tables
at each node in p.
Storage of Provenance Trees Figure 55 shows the CDF (Cumulative Distribution
Function) graph of storage growth for all the nodes in the 100-node topology. In the
experiment, we randomly selected 100 pairs of nodes, and continuously sent packets within
each pair at the rate of 100 packets/second. As packets are transmitted, their provenance
information is incrementally created and stored at each node (and optionally compressed
for Basic and Advanced). We calculated the average storage growth rate of each node,
and plotted a CDF graph based on the results. We observe that ExSPAN has the highest
storage growth rate among the three: 20% of the nodes have storage growth greater than 5
Mbps; 4% of nodes (i.e., transit nodes) have storage growth greater than 30 Mbps. This is
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because a number of node pairs share the same transit node in their paths. As expected,
Basic has less storage growth rate compared to ExSPAN, as it removes intermediate packet
tuples from the provenance tables of each node. Reactive shows significantly lower storage
growth rates, where 57% of the nodes have their growth rates close to 0 Mbps – i.e., most of
the nodes which have no incoming packets stop maintaining provenance information after
the routing tables have been set up – and the rest of the nodes have lower than 1.2 Mbps
storage growth. Advanced significantly outperforms ExSPAN and Basic: all the nodes in
the topology have less than 2 Mbps storage growth rate. The gap between Advanced and
ExSPAN results from the fact that Advanced only maintains one representative provenance
tree for each pair of nodes, while ExSPAN has to maintain provenance trees for all the
traversing packets. However, compared to Reactive, Advanced has higher storage growth
rate. The reason is that, apart from the storage of the incoming packets’ provenance infor-
mation – this information is maintained by both Advanced and Reactive – Advanced also
needs to maintain the provenance of each output tuple for query purpose.
Figure 56 shows the total storage usage with continuous packet insertion. We ran the
experiment for 100 seconds and took a snapshot of the storage every 10 seconds. The figure
shows that ExSPAN has the highest storage overhead. For example, it reaches the storage
of 11.8 GB at 90 seconds, and keeps growing in a linear fashion. Basic has a similar pattern,
with 9.2 GB at 90 seconds. However, Advanced presents lower storage growth, where at
90 seconds it only consumes storage space of 0.92 GB. Reactive, however, has even lower
storage growth with storage occupation of 0.57 GB at 90 seconds. This is about half of
the storage space needed by Advanced. The extra storage of Advanced comes from two
sources: (1) the materialized shared sub-provenance trees, and (2) the materialized output
tuples. Reactive adopts a replay-based approach, thus only maintaining the input tuples,
which, without multicast, are of the same number as output tuples. Advanced tradeoffs
the extra storage with efficiency in provenance querying, as shown in Section 5.6.1. We
further calculate the average growth rate for all three lines. ExSPAN’s storage grows at 131
MB/second, Basic at 109 MB/second, Advanced at 10.3 MB/second, and Reactive at 6.3
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MB/second. This means that ExSPAN could fill a 1TB disk within 2 hours, Basic within
2.5 hours, whereas Advanced more than one day, and Reactive almost two days.
Figure 57 shows the storage usage when we increase the number of communicating pairs,
but keep the total number of packets the same (i.e., 2000 packets). All the packets are
evenly distributed among all the communicating pairs. We observe that the storage usage
of ExSPAN and Basic remains almost constant: ExSPAN’s total storage usage is around
27 MB and Basic’s total storage usage is around 21 MB. This is because in both cases,
each packet has a provenance tree maintained in the network, irrelevant of its source and
destination. The burst of storage at the beginning of the experiments for ExSPAN and
Basic is due to the fact that sizes of provenance trees also depend on the length of the path
that each packet traverses. In our experiment, the initial node pairs happen to have path
length shorter than the average path length in the topology, thus incurring less storage
overhead. Reactive’s storage usage is completely constant in this experiment and remains
as low as 2.5MB. The provenance information maintained by Reactive is always the 2000
injected packets, thus keeping constant regardless of the increase of node pairs.
For the case of Advanced, its storage usage increases with the number of communicating
pairs. This is because each communicating pair forms an equivalence class, and maintains
one copy of the shared provenance tree in the equivalence class. Therefore, whenever a new
communicating pair is added to the experiment, we need to maintain one more provenance
tree for that pair, which increases the total storage. The storage gap between Advanced
and Reactive increases with more node pairs. However, the gap is bounded, as in the
most extreme case, each pair of nodes sends one packet between each other, creating one
provenance tree for each of the 2000 packets. Despite the storage increase, Advanced still
consumes much less storage space than ExSPAN and Basic.
In summary, we observe that Basic is able to reduce storage growth, and in combination
with the equivalence-based compression (Advanced), the storage reduction is significant
compared to the näıve provenance maintenance strategy – i.e., a 92% reduction over ExS-
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PAN. However, Reactive could achieve even lower storage consumption against Advanced –
i.e., a further 38% by maintaining only the non-deterministic input tuples. Such reduction
is obtained at the cost of longer query latency, as is shown in Section 5.6.1. Therefore,
both solutions have tradeoff between storage overhead and query latency, and an selection
strategy will be an interesting topic for future exploration (Section 7.1.3).
Network Overhead. Figure 58 presents the bandwidth utilization when we randomly
selected 500 pairs of nodes and each pair communicated 100 packets. As expected, the
bandwidth consumption of Advanced is close to other solutions. This is because the extra
information carried with each packets is merely existF lag and some auxiliary data (e.g.,
hash value of the event tuple), which is negligible compared to the large payload of the
packets. We repeated the experiment for Advanced, but updated a route every 10 seconds,
in order to study the effects of updates to slow-changing tuples. We observe a negligible
bandwidth increase of 0.6%.
Query Latency To evaluate latency of queries, we used an actual distributed implemen-
tation that can account for both network delays and computation time. We ran the packet
forwarding application on a testbed consisting of 25 machines. Each machine is equipped
with eight Intel Xeon 2.67 GHz CPUs, 4G RAM and 500G disk space, running CentOS 6.8
as the operating system.
On each machine, we ran up to four instances of the same packet forwarding application
with provenance enabled. Instead of communicating via the ns-3 network, actual sockets
were used over a physical network. In total, there were 100 nodes, connected together using
the same transit-stub topology we used for simulation.
In our experiment, we executed 100 queries, selected on random nodes, where each query
returned the provenance tree for a recv tuple corresponding to a random source and des-
tination pair, where the destination node is the starting point of the query. The query
is executed in a distributed fashion as described in Section 5.4.6. Based on our physical
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network topology, each query takes 5.3 hops on average in the network. We repeated the
experiment for Basic, Advanced, Reactive and ExSPAN for 100 queries each.
Figure 59 shows our experimental results in the form of a CDF of query latency. We observe
that both Basic and Advanced have significantly lower latency compared to ExSPAN and
Reactive. For example, the mean/median for ExSPAN is 75ms and 74ms respectively,
and 93ms and 91ms for Reactive, as compared to only 25.5ms and 25ms for Basic. This
is approximately 3X reduction for ExSPAN in latency times, and 4X for Reactive. The
overhead saving of Advanced and Basic is attributed to the fact that the querying algorithm
is designed based on DELP, which allows for more optimization compared to ExSPAN. For
example, a query of Advanced knows which tuples are the slow-changing tuples during the
querying process, thus it could directly return these slow-changing tuples without further
probing their provenance information, while ExSPAN needs to probe one level further to
determine that these slow-changing tuples are treated as base input themselves. Reactive
requires even longer latency, as it involves the replay time of the original network events.
Also, note that in our experiments, we assume the replay of Reactive starts right with the
input packet corresponding to the query – i.e., Reactive makes a checkpoint right before
the packet is inserted – but this may not be the case for all real scenarios. If the checkpoint
is taken earlier, the querying time for Reactive could be even longer.
In the original work of DTaP [94], similar results were shown for query latency. In the
experiments, DTaP compared the query latency of proactive and reactive maintenance re-
spectively. Proactive provenance maintenance stores the provenance information in the form
of “deltas” between adjacent provenance versions. The average query latency for proactive
maintenance is within 0.34 seconds, compared to 37.7 seconds for reactive maintenance.
Our online compression solution achieves both low storage overhead and low query latency,
with the help of static analysis of programs.
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5.6.2. Application #2: DNS Resolution
DNS resolution [58] is an Internet service that translates the requested domain name, such
as “www.hello.com”, into its corresponding IP address in the Internet. In practice, DNS
resolution is performed by DNS nameservers, which are organized into a tree-like structure,
where each nameserver is responsible for a domain name (e.g., “hello.com” or “.com”). We
used the recursive name resolution protocol in DNS, and implemented the protocol as a
DELP program (Figure 61. During the execution of each DELP DNS program, provenance
support is enabled so that the history DNS requests can be queried.
The program in Figure 61 is composed of four rules. Rule r1 forwards a DNS request of ID
RQID to the root nameserver RT for resolution. The request is generated by the host HST
for the URL URL. Rule r2 is triggered when a nameserver X receives a DNS request for
URL, but has delegated the resolution of sub-domain DM corresponding to URL to another
nameserver SV. Rule r2 then forwards the DNS request to SV for further DNS resolution.
Rule r3 generates a DNS resolution result containing the IP address IPADDR corresponding
to the requested URL, when URL matches an address record on the nameserver X. Finally,
Rule r4 is responsible for returning the DNS result to the requesting host HST.
r1 requestp@RT,URL,HST,RQIDq :́
urlp@HST,URL,RQIDq.
rootServerp@HST,RT q.
r2 requestp@SV,URL,HST,RQIDq :́
requestp@X,URL,HST,RQIDq,
nameServerp@X,DM,SV q.
f isSubDomainpDM,URLq ““ true.
r3 dnsResultp@X,URL, IPADDR,HST,RQIDq :́
requestp@X,URL,HST,RQIDq,
addressRecordp@X,URL, IPADDRq.
r4 replyp@HST,URL, IPADDR,RQIDq :́
dnsResultp@X,URL, IPADDR,HST,RQIDq.
Figure 61: DELP for DNS resolution.
We synthetically generated the hierarchical network of DNS name servers. In total, there
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Figure 63: Bandwidth consumption for DNS
resolution with 100,000 DNS requests.
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Figure 64: Provenance storage growth with continuous input requests at 1000 requests/sec.
were 100 name servers, and the maximum tree depth is 27. Our workload consists of clients
issuing requests to 38 distinct URLs. In total, DNS requests were issued at a rate of 1000
requests/second. Our topology resembles real-world DNS deployments. Prior work [44]
has shown that in reality, the requested domain names satisfy Zipfian distribution. In our
experiments, we adopted the same distribution.
Storage of Provenance Trees
Figure 60 shows the provenance storage growth rate for all nameservers in the Domain Name
System over a 100 seconds duration. We measure the storage growth of each nameserver
by first measuring the growth rate of each 10-second interval, and calculating the average
growth rates over all 10 intervals. We observe that ExSPAN has the largest storage growth
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rate for each node among the three experiments, while Advanced has the lowest storage
growth rate. Note that the reduction of storage growth rate in Figure 60 is not as significant
as that in the packet forwarding experiments (Figure 55). For example, 80% of nameservers
in ExSPAN have storage growth rate less than 476 Kbps. while the rate is 121 Kbps
for Advanced. Advanced is four times better than ExSPAN, compared to 11 times in
packet forwarding. The reason is that, compared to packet forwarding, we rate the total
throughput of incoming events – i.e., packet tuples in packet forwarding and request tuple in
DNS resolution – and this causes the storage growth rate at each node using either ExSPAN
and Basic to drop as well.
Figure 64 shows provenance storage growth for all nameservers. We record storage growth
rates at 10-second intervals. In Figure 64, the storage of ExSPAN and Basic grows much
faster than that of Advanced. Specifically, the growth rate of ExSPAN, Basic and Advanced
are 13.15 Mbps, 11.57 Mbps and 3.81 Mbps respectively, and their storage space at 100
seconds reaches 1.32 GB, 1.16 GB, and 0.38 GB. With the given rates, ExSPAN would fill
up a 1TB disk within 21 hours, Basic within 24 hours, and Advanced up to 3 days.
Figure 62 shows the storage growth when we increased the number of requested URLs. In
this experiment, we fixed the total number of requests at 200, so that when more URLs
were added, there would be fewer duplicate requests. In Figure 62, the storage overhead
for ExSPAN and Basic remains stable at around 2.5 MB and 2.26 MB respectively. This
is because the storage overhead is mostly determined by the number of provenance trees,
which is equal to the number of incoming requests (i.e., 200 in this case). For Advanced,
the storage grows at a rate of 11.6 Kb per URL. This is expected as we need to maintain
one provenance tree for each equivalence class, and the number of equivalence classes grows
in proportion to the number of URLs. Similar to our packet forwarding results, despite the
storage growth, Advanced still requires significantly less storage compared ExSPAN and
Basic. Unless a URL is only requested once (highly unlikely in reality), which represents
the worst case for Advanced, Advanced always performs better than ExSPAN and Basic.
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Network Overhead
Figure 63 shows the bandwidth usage with elapsed time when 100,000 requests are con-
tinuously sent to the root nameserver. All three experiments finish within 102 seconds.
Throughout the execution, ExSPAN and Basic have similar bandwidth usage at around 4.5
MBps. On the other hand, Advanced’s bandwidth usage is about 6 MBps, which is about
25% higher than the other two techniques. This is because unlike in the packet forwarding
where each packet carries a payload of 500 characters, each DNS request does not have any
extra payload. Therefore, the meta-data tagged with each request (e.g., existF lag) accounts
for a large part of the size of each request, resulting in higher bandwidth overhead.
5.6.3. Summary
In all the experiments, the storage overhead of Advanced is significantly lower than ExSPAN
and Basic. Moreover, the storage gap varies – when a same equivalence class contains more
events, the ExSPAN would incur much higher provenance storage compared to Advanced.
Reactive, however, outperforms Advanced in storage occupation, by maintaining only the
non-deterministic input and sacrificing the query latency. Therefore, tradeoff exists as to
which solution is more desirable.
Regarding the network overhead, when each packet carries large payload, such as the case in
packet forwarding, the extra provenance maintenance information (e.g., existF lag) carried
with each intermediate tuple is negligible. But when the execution incurs light traffic,
like DNS requests, the overhead of extra information accounts for a large portion of the
intermediate tuples, causing extra network overhead. Reactive is supposed to perform the
best in this case, as it incurs no provenance overhead at all during the execution. We
refer interested readers to ExSPAN [95] for comparison of network overhead against the
normal execution without provenance maintenance. The network overhead for light-traffic
execution could be reduced by several optimizations, such as removing the ID of the event
tuple when there is no projection throughout the execution.
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CHAPTER 6
Related Work
We summarize the related works that analyze distributed systems using static analysis and
dynamic analysis.
6.1. Static Analysis of Distributed Systems
We first introduce important related works that apply static analysis to distributed systems
for verification purpose.
6.1.1. Verification of System Trace Properties.
There are a number of works that focus on developing logic for verifying trace properties of
programs (protocols) that run concurrently with adversaries [27, 35]. The first piece of our
work (Chapter 3) are inspired by their program logic that requires the asserted properties
of a program to hold even when that program runs concurrently with adversarial programs.
6.1.2. Networking Protocol Verification.
There has been a large body of work on verifying the correctness of various network protocol
design and implementations using proof-based and model-checking techniques [11, 39, 30].
Also, several papers have investigated the verification of route authenticity properties on
specific wireless routing protocols for mobile networks [6, 7, 26]. They have showed that
identifying attacks on route authenticity can be reduced to constraint solving, and that the
security analysis of a specific route authenticity that depends on the topologies of network
instances can be reduced to checking these properties on several four-node topologies. In
our own prior work [17], we have verified route authenticity on variants of S-BGP using
a combination of manual proofs and an automated tool, Proverif [12]. The modeling and
analysis in these works are specific to the protocols and the route authenticity properties.
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Some of the properties that we verify in our case study are similar. We propose a general
framework for leveraging a declarative programming language for verification and empirical
evaluation of routing protocols. The program logic proposed in Chapter 3 can be used to
verify generic safety properties of SANDlog programs.
6.1.3. Control-plane and Data-plane Verification.
In recent years, formal verification has been applied to both the control-plane (e.g., routing
protocols) and data-plane (e.g., packet forwarding) of networks. There has been a cloud
of prior work on network verification focusing on several different aspects. One aspect
is the verification of network configurations, where the proposed solutions detect network
configuration errors either 1) through static analysis of the configuration files [33, 4, 32, 62,
87], or 2) by analyzing snapshots of the data plane—reflecting the aggregate impact of all
configurations—during system execution [48, 47, 56, 90]. These solutions rely heavily on
application-specific network models and property specifications, which limits its adoption
in more general scenarios.
One special case of network verification is SDN verification [9, 13, 50, 3, 42, 69, 78]. For
example, VeriCon [9] defines its own special language for modeling SDN controller and
switches. A Hoare-logic is developed on this language to prove properties of SDN controllers.
The proof obligations are translated to constraints and solved by the SMT solver. NICE is a
testing tool for SDN controllers written in Python [13]. NICE combines symbolic execution
of the controller programs with state-exploration-based model checking.
An alternative approach is to verify network configurations generated by SDN controllers
in realtime, instead of verifying the protocols directly [50, 56]. For instance, Anteater
reduced SDN data plane verification into SAT problems so that SAT solvers can solve
them effectively in practice [56]. NetKAT is a high-level language designed specifically for
programming SDN. Its semantics are based on Kleene algebra. The correctness properties
of networks programming using NetKAT are tightly connected to the semantics of Kleene
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algebra, for instance, reachability, way points and traffic separation. All of the above tools
are specially designed to analyze SDN controllers or data planes.
6.2. Runtime Analysis of Distributed Systems
Next, we summarize the works that allow for runtime analysis of distributed systems.
6.2.1. System Monitoring
There are a number of research works that monitors the execution of the distributed sys-
tem. The monitoring allows the system developer to understand the key behavior of the
distributed system, and to diagnose the problem in a more effective way. For example,
Gunter et al. [41] proposes to dynamically monitor the distributed system by instrumenting
network devices in a light-weighted manner. Chen et al. [24] records runtime paths that
requests follow in a distributed system to manage failure and evolution of the system. P2
Monitor [77] develops an application logging, monitoring and debugging facility built on
top of P2 system. D3S [52] allows the developers to specify prediate over the distributed
system, and would output a sequence of state changes when failure occurs.
6.2.2. Message Logging
Message logging is a well-studied area for analyzing distributed systems. Aguilera et al. [2]
uses message-level traces to debug performance in distributed systems with black boxes.
Netlogger [80] records the event logs in a distributed system to provide detailed end-to-
end application and system-level monitoring. Pip [72] proposes infrastructure that allows
the user to compare his/her expected behavior of the distributed system with the actual
behavior that is recorded through instrumentation of the system. Liblog [37] records log
execution for C/C++ applications in a distributed system, and deterministically replay the
logs to help debug the system. Google has also proposed Dapper [76], which is a tracing
infrastructure that help debug the distributed system. X-trace [34] designs a tracing frame-
work that provides a comprehensive view of the distributed system. Friday [36] combines
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the deterministic replay with symbolic debugging. WiDS Checker [53] uses simulation to
replay the execution of the distributed system, and allows the user to specify high-level
properties which are fed to the checker for verification.
6.2.3. Network Provenance
Network provenance is an area which draws the attention of researchers recently. Compared
to message logging, network provenance explicitly captures the causality relationship among
events in the distributed system, providing a more convenient tool for the user to debug
the system.
Network provenance has been proposed and developed by ExSPAN [95] and DTaP [94].
These two proposals apply the concept of data provenance to the networking field to sup-
port network diagnosis and forensics. In Chapter 5, we adopted ExSPAN’s provenance tree
model as a starting point, and developed compression schemes based on the model. Secure
Network Provenance [92] enables network provenance in an adversarial environment, where
misbehaving nodes can be detected even if they lie. Negative provenance [85] extends the
network provenance to explain the missing event in the network. There are a number of
works that have already used network provenance to systematically debug the system. Dif-
ferential provenance [16] debugs the distributed system by identifying the difference between
a faulty provenance tree and a reference provenance tree. Meta Provenance [84] proposes
to debug the software of network devices with the help of provenance. Our compression
scheme is expected to work on all the systems that support network provenance.
6.2.4. Provenance Compression
In database literature, a number of works have considered optimization of provenance stor-
age. However, we differ significantly in our design due to the distributed nature of our
target environment. We briefly list a few representative bodies of work, and explain our
differences.
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Woodruff et al. [83] reduce storage usage for maintaining fine-grained lineage (i.e., prove-
nance) by computing provenance information dynamically during query time through in-
vertible functions. Their approach makes tradeoff between storage efficiency and accuracy
of provenance. On the other hand, our approach requires no such tradeoff, achieving the
same level of accuracy as queries on uncompressed provenance trees.
Chapman et al. [15] develop a set of factorization algorithms to compress workflow prove-
nance. Their proposal does not consider a distributed setting. For example, node-level
factorization (combining identical nodes) requires additional states to be maintained and
propagated from node to node during provenance maintenance to resolve potential ambi-
guities. Maintaining and propagating these states can lead to significant communication
overhead in a distributed environment. In contrast, our solution uses equivalence keys to
avoid comparing provenance trees on a node-by-node basis, and hence minimizes commu-
nication overhead during provenance maintenance.
Our compression technique implicitly factorizes provenance trees at runtime before removing
redundant factors among trees in the same equivalence class. Olteanu et al. [65][66] propose
factorization of provenance polynomials for conjunctive queries with a new data structure
called factorization tree. Polynomial factorization in [66] can be viewed as a more general
form of the factorization used in the equivalence-based compression proposed in Chapter 5.
If we encode the provenance trees of each packet as polynomials, the general factorization
algorithm in [66], with specialized factorization tree, would produce the same factorization
result in our setting. Our approach is slightly more efficient, as we can skip the factorization
step by directly using equivalence keys at runtime to group provenance trees for compression.
Exploring the more general form of factorization in [66] for provenance of distributed queries
is an interesting avenue of future work.
ProQL [46] proposes to save the storage of single provenance tree by (1) using primary
keys to represent tuples in the provenance, and (2) maintaining one copy for attributes of
the same values in a mapping (rule). These techniques could also be applied alongside our
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online compression algorithm to further reduce storage. ProQL does not consider storage
sharing across provenance trees. Amsterdamer et al. [5] theoretically defines the concept
of core provenance, which represents derivation shared by multiple equivalent queries. In
our scenario, the shared provenance tree of each equivalence class can be viewed as core
provenance.
Xie et al. [86] propose to compress provenance graphs with a hybrid approach combining
Web graph compression and dictionary encoding. Zhifeng et al. [10] proposes rule-based
provenance compression scheme. Their approaches on a high level compresses provenance
trees to reduce redundant storage. However, these approaches require knowledge of the
entire trees prior to compression, which is not practical, if not impossible, for distributed
provenance.
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CHAPTER 7
Future Work
In addition to the work that has been done, we propose future work that aims at providing
a more complete framework that allows for unified static analysis and runtime analysis of
declarative distributed systems. The future work is mainly composed of two parts:
• A more complete framework for provenance compression. To make our frame-
work more complete, we intend to add more features into our current framework, along
with more evaluation on additional applications.
• Optimization of static analysis. We plan to optimize static analysis by designing
algorithms that could incrementally maintain derivation instances for evolving NDlog
programs.
7.1. A More Complete Framework of Provenance Compression
Though our provenance compression scheme has already achieved significant storage reduc-
tion for packet forwarding and DNS resolution applications, we try to make the framework
more complete by (1) allowing the user to dynamically specify the equivalence relation of
provenance trees, and (2) performing more evaluation over the prototype we have now. We
introduce these two tasks in more detail below.
7.1.1. Dynamic Definition of Equivalence Relation
When we perform the provenance compression now, the equivalence relation for provenance
trees is pre-defined. This definition, though effective in reducing storage space, could still
incur large storage overhead under certain circumstances. For example, consider a slow-
changing table T (e.g., a routing table). Two provenance trees that use different tuples in
T , but share the rest of the provenance nodes would not be considered equivalent, given our
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current definition of the equivalence relation. However, if we exclude T from the definition
of the equivalence relation, the above two provenance trees can be viewed as equivalent and
got compressed.
Therefore, we intend to support such dynamic definition of the equivalence relation, so that
users could specify their own equivalence relations that mostly meet their needs. We expect
the new design to further compress provenance trees that differ in a portion of provenance
nodes, rather than only one single provenance node.
The change of design could possibly make provenance maintenance and query more compli-
cated, as it now requires nodes in the distributed system to selectively maintain provenance
information – i.e., these nodes need to compress provenance nodes involved in the definition
of the equivalence relation, but not those not involved. We expect to explore the new design
more carefully in the future.
We also plan to evaluate the storage overhead using the dynamic definition of the equiv-
alence relation, and compare it with the static definition, over a few popular networking
applications, such as packet forwarding.
7.1.2. Provenance Maintenance for SDN Applications
The two applications we are evaluating now – i.e., packet forwarding and DNS resolution
– are relatively simple, in that their specification involves no more than five NDlog rules.
To show the generality of our solution, we plan to apply the compressed provenance to
applications in software-defined networking, such as Ethernet MAC learning or Ethernet
address resolution. A typical SDN-enabled distributed system involves multiple types of
network devices, including a controller, a number of bare-metal switches (e.g., Openflow
switches) and end hosts. Each network device will be modeled in NDlog rules and the
provenance information will be collected and compressed for packets traversing the network,
as well as control-plane messages (e.g., ARP messages).
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We will not only apply our solution to the selected SDN application, but also redo all the
evaluation for the new application. This includes measurement of the provenance storage
(growth), the bandwidth utilization and the query latency.
7.1.3. A Cost Model for Selection between Alternative Solutions
The experimental results In Section 5.6.1 show that the reactive maintenance strategy of
DTaP [94] could save more storage than our online compression scheme, sacrificing a certain
amount of time during querying. As a result, the user needs to make tradeoff in reality when
selecting either solution. A rigorous cost model could ease the pain of making a decision as
to which strategy to take. The cost model is expected to take into account several factors:
(1) frequency of querying, where the online compression scheme is favored when the query
frequency is high; (2) storage availability, where DTaP is preferred when storage is scarce.
(3) bandwidth availability, where DTaP consumes less bandwidth, and (4) cost of replay,
where the online compression scheme is a winner if replay is costly – e.g., no duplication
system exists.
7.2. Optimization of Static Analysis
We intend to optimize computation of the derivation pool in Chapter 4. Specifically, we
plan to develop a new algorithm that incrementally maintains the derivation pool when new
rules are added to a NDlog program.
7.2.1. Incremental Maintenance of the Derivation Pool
The symbolic execution of NDlog programs in Chapter 4 would generate a derivation pool
which contains all possible derivations of each relation in the program. Since the derivation
pool is large, it is slow and unnecessary to generate the pool from scratch for every program,
especially when one program is an evolved version of another program. For example, in the
application of Ethernet Address Resolution (Section 4.4). the user might want to add a rule
for access control, so that only an authorized machine is allowed to query the MAC address
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of another one. Though the new program only differs in one rule from the old program,
the derivation pool has to be re-generated all over again with our current solution, which
is inefficient.
We would like to explore the possibility of maintaining the derivation pool incrementally,
when new rules are added into the program. This potentially requires a new algorithm that
takes as input an existing NDlog program prog, the delta rules rs and the derivation pool
of prog, and outputs a new derivation pool corresponding to prog Y rs.
7.2.2. Evaluation of the Incremental Maintenance Algorithm
We intend to prove correctness of the incremental maintenance algorithm and analyze its
time complexity. We would also empirically evaluate the time that is needed for the algo-
rithm to re-compute the derivation pool, and compare the results with the old algorithm
where the derivation pool is re-computed from scratch.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion
In this dissertation, we have shown that STRANDS could not only ensure correctness of
distributed systems, but, in the case of failure, help network administrators debug the
system. We also demonstrate that static analysis and runtime analysis could aid each other
to achieve better performance during system analysis.
We have designed a program logic for verifying secure routing protocols specified in the
declarative language SANDlog. We have integrated verification into a unified framework
for formal analysis and empirical evaluation of secure routing protocols.
To better automate the verification process, we presented a symbolic execution-based ap-
proach to analyze and debug network protocols using declarative networking. By focusing
on a specific class of safety properties, we are able to analyze NDlog programs with few
annotations. Our algorithm reduces property checking to constraint solving that can be
automatically checked by SMT solvers (e.g., Z3). We analyzed formal properties of our
algorithms and implemented a prototype tool on top of RapidNet, a compilation and ex-
ecution framework for NDlog. Using our tool, we analyzed a number of real-world SDN
network protocols. Our tool can unveil problems ranging from software bugs, incomplete
topological constraints, and incorrect property specification. When a given safety property
is violated, our tool can provide meaningful counterexamples to help debug the protocol
specification.
Finally, we enable the users of distributed systems to deploy storage-efficient distributed
provenance, faciliting root cause analysis during system failure. We propose an online
compression scheme that compresses distributed network provenance during the execution
of network applications. Our work is motivated by network settings, where the large volume
of events necessitate compression techniques, and existing centralized approaches do not
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work. We define an equivalence relation between provenance trees, and come up with a
compile time static analysis phase for determining equivalence keys attributes that can be
used for grouping provenance tress together. At runtime, through a rule rewrite process, our
network implementation maintains and stores only one concrete copy for provenance trees
that are shared by all the members in the equivalence class. Our evaluation results show
that the compression scheme saves storage significantly, incurs little network overhead, and
allows for efficient provenance query.
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